The Respondent operates a number of facilities in New York City and New Jersey, including the one at issue located on Paidge Avenue in Brooklyn. That facility provides telephone and other electronic services to customers in southern Manhattan. Its staff includes technicians who make service calls and “foremen” to whom those technicians report. The Union represents the technicians and the foremen in a single multi-facility unit.3 The parties’ most recent regional collective-bargaining agreement expired on March 31, 2013.4

On April 1, 2014, the Respondent issued 2-day suspensions to several foremen at Paidge Avenue, including two of the alleged discriminatees in this case—Ralf Anderson and Frank Tsavaris—for violating a new requirement that they carry tools at work. Anderson and Tsavaris informed Derek Jordan, the Union’s business agent, of their suspensions, and also that no shop steward was present when Anderson received his suspension. Jordan and other union representatives then called a “safety meeting” for unit members outside the facility for the next morning.

Shortly before 6:30 a.m. on April 2, Jordan positioned his car outside the facility in the middle of Paidge Avenue, perpendicular to traffic. By 6:33 a.m., at Jordan’s direction, six employees had similarly put their cars in adjacent positions in front of the facility’s vehicular access points, also blocking the street. The effect was to prevent vehicles from entering the block or entering the facility, and also to prevent the Respondent’s service trucks from departing for work assignments. There is no dispute that this obstruction caused a “ripple effect” of delayed or missed service appointments for the rest of the day.

Over the next hour, about 50 employees, many of whom were scheduled to start work between 6:30 and 8 a.m., gathered on foot around the cars blocking the street. During that period, Jordan and other union representatives who were present handed out fliers on workplace safety and Weingarten rights. The participating employees remained in that location until about 7:30 a.m., when Jordan gathered the participants around him, still in the middle of the street, and addressed them on the same

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1. The motion to expedite, by its terms, was rendered moot by the issuance of a summary order by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. IBEW, AFL–CIO, Local Union No. 3, 684 Fed. Appx. 68 (2d Cir. 2017), affirming Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. IBEW, AFL–CIO, Local Union No. 3, 2016 WL 1043049 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). On April 8, 2016, the Board denied the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

2. Because the parties dispute whether they have an arbitration procedure in force, and the Respondent has indicated that it would oppose the refiled of the Union’s grievance contesting the procedure based on the assertion that the Union earlier withdrew it with prejudice, we reject the Respondent’s argument that the Board should defer this case to arbitration under Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971).

3. Although three of the four alleged discriminatees were classified by the Respondent as “foremen,” there is no longer any contention that they were supervisors within the meaning of the Act.

4. As the Board has already found, although the parties attempted to negotiate a successor contract, they failed to reach a complete agreement. See Local 3, IBEW (Time Warner Cable NYC), 363 NLRB No. 30 (2015).
topics. The gathering broke up at about 8 a.m., and the blocking cars were removed.\(^5\)

Anderson, Tsavaris and the other two alleged discriminatees (Diana Cabrera and Azeam Ali) were not scheduled to work at the time of the "safety meeting." All four, however, had been informed in advance that the meeting had been scheduled and were among those who came to the event.

The Respondent was able to identify several of the employees who were present at the car blockage, including the four alleged discriminatees, from video taken by its external surveillance cameras. As further discussed below, those employees were summoned to interviews by management a few weeks later and questioned about their involvement in the event. On May 22, 2014, the Respondent issued 2-week suspensions to seven of the employees interviewed, including the four alleged discriminatees.\(^6\)

B.

The Respondent initiated a grievance/arbitration proceeding against the Union for damages and other relief, contending that the April 2 demonstration violated the no-strike clause in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, which prohibited any “cessation or stop of work, service or employment.” The parties voluntarily agreed to submit this question to arbitration.\(^7\)

On December 12, 2014, an arbitrator found that the Union’s “‘safety meeting’ was a pretext”; that “the manner in which the meeting was conducted impeded ready access to the Company’s Pai[d]ge Avenue facility for all employees seeking to report to work [and] effectively and materially impeded the Company’s normal business operations”; that “[t]he timing of the Union meeting in order to involve bargaining unit employees and the conduct of this meeting until long past their scheduled start times exacerbated the impact on the Company’s installation and service operations”; and that by this action the Union violated the no-strike clause.\(^8\) The arbitrator’s decision was subsequently confirmed and enforced by a federal district court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.\(^9\)

C.

In the Board proceeding, the judge discredited Business Agent Jordan’s testimony that the April 2 gathering was a “safety meeting.” The judge found (as did the arbitrator) that Jordan "orchestrated a work stoppage by positioning vehicles in the middle of the street and instructing employees to gather there in order to impede company operations commencing with the 7 and 7:30 a.m. shifts."

The judge also found “no credited evidence” that the four alleged discriminatees knew beforehand that Jordan planned a work stoppage or that the “safety meeting” would block ingress and egress to the Respondent’s facility. The judge further found that for an hour after the blocking cars were placed in position, employees, including the alleged discriminatees, arrived on the scene and mingled around and between those cars. They then concentrated into a smaller space on the street to hear Jordan and other union officials speak. The employees dispersed only when the cars were removed.

The judge concluded that the alleged discriminatees “went to the gathering on Pai[d]ge Street for a union meeting relating to working conditions, disciplinary actions, grievances and employees’ Weingarten rights,” and that they “were part of the group of employees who gathered in front of the Company’s facility after the blockade was in place.” With respect to the gathering, however, the judge reasoned that the employees “simply stood in the crowd and had no involvement in constructing the vehicular blockade” of the Respondent’s facility. Accordingly, in the judge’s view, the alleged discriminatees did nothing, physically or verbally, that contributed to the blocking of access to the facility. On this ground, he found that the employees engaged only in concerted activity protected under Section 7, and that their suspensions by the Respondent were consequently unlawful.

\(^5\) At some point during the blockade, the Respondent’s security office called the police, and officers came to the scene. Jordan assured them the gathering would soon disperse, and there was no additional police involvement.

\(^6\) The alleged discriminatees and approximately 34 other employees also received final written warnings. The complaint does not allege that any of these warnings was unlawful.

\(^7\) In the arbitration proceeding, the Union challenged the arbitrator’s jurisdiction on the ground that the no-strike and arbitration clauses in the parties’ expired collective-bargaining agreement had not been extended to the time of the April 2 demonstration. Without ruling on whether those clauses had been extended, however, the arbitrator found that he had independent jurisdiction, from the parties’ initial joint submission of the grievance to him, to make a binding determination of whether the demonstration violated the terms of the no-strike clause. The arbitrator’s determination that the parties had voluntarily agreed to submit this specific question to arbitration was subsequently affirmed by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals. *Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. IBEW, AFL–CIO,* Local Union No. 3, 684 Fed. Appx. 68 (2d Cir. 2017), affirming *Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. IBEW, AFL–CIO,* Local Union No. 3, 2016 WL 1043049 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

\(^8\) While the Board intervened in that litigation in support of the Union’s contention that the no-strike and arbitration clauses had not been extended, given that neither the arbitrator nor the reviewing courts reached that question, we need not address it here.

\(^9\) On November 30, 2015, the arbitrator issued a final award of over $19,000 in damages to the Respondent, payable by the Union.

\(^9\) See fn. 7.
For the following reasons, we disagree with the judge’s analysis. It is well established that “employees who engage in conduct that is unlawful, either under the Act or for reasons extrinsic to it, or who pursue ends or employ means that are incompatible with the Act, are engaged in unprotected activity, and thus can be discharged therefor.” Correctional Medical Services, 349 NLRB 1198, 1201 (2007), rev. granted on other grounds sub nom. Civil Service Employees Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME v. NLRB, 569 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2009). One example of such unprotected conduct is participation in a group action that violates a no-strike clause. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956).10

As described above, the parties voluntarily agreed to submit to an arbitrator the question whether the events of April 2 violated the terms of the no-strike clause. The arbitrator found that the Union, by blocking the entrances to the Respondent’s facility during the April 2 demonstration in a manner that “impeded ready access” and “effectively and materially impeded the Company’s normal business operations,” violated the terms of the parties’ no-strike clause, which was not limited to simply withholding one’s labor when scheduled to work. The district and appellate courts subsequently confirmed and enforced that decision in a proceeding in which the Board intervened.11

Given the particular procedural history of this matter, we treat it as established that the April 2 demonstration violated the parties’ no-strike clause. Thus, the demonstration never was protected by the Act. It follows that employees who participated in that demonstration, regardless of the nature of their participation, were themselves engaged in unprotected activity and were subject to discipline.12

On the facts presented here we find, contrary to the judge, that the alleged discriminatees in this case were among the participants in the April 2 demonstration. The judge reasoned that the alleged discriminatees “simply stood in the crowd” and did nothing to contribute to the blockage. This line of reasoning assumes that the employees’ mere participation in the demonstration could not have subjected them to discipline. But that assumption is incorrect in the circumstances of this case.13

The record shows that the employees became aware, no later than their arrival at the Respondent’s facility, that the Union’s arrangement of cars in the street was blocking access to the facility, as well as the street adjoining it. Further, it was clear that other employees had joined the blockage by gathering closely among and around those cars.14 The alleged discriminatees then joined that gathering and similarly milled among the blocking cars. They remained in that strategic location

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10 There are potential exceptions to this basic rule, such as where employees violate a no-strike clause to protest their employer’s serious unfair labor practices. See Mastro Plastics, supra, 350 U.S. at 280–282; Arlan’s Department Store of Michigan, 133 NLRB 802 (1961). But no exception is implicated by the present case.

11 We also observe that employees engage in unprotected misconduct when they block access to their employer’s facility. E.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 98 (Tri-M Group), 350 NLRB 1104, 1107–1108 (2007), enf’d. 317 Fed.Appx. 269 (3d Cir. 2009), and authorities cited therein; Tube Craft, 287 NLRB 491, 492–493 (1987). Cf. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (where employees occupied employer’s buildings “in order to prevent their use by the employer in a lawful manner . . . they took a position outside the protection of the statute”). This is true even where a blockade does not involve actual violence, or is brief in time. Tri-M Group, supra, 350 NLRB at 1107–1108; Metal Polishers Local 67, 200 NLRB 335, 336 fn. 10 (1972); Longshoremen & Warehousemen Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twins), 79 NLRB 1487, 1506 (1948). But given the arbitrator’s and the courts’ findings that the April 2 demonstration violated the parties’ no-strike clause, as explained below, we need not rely on these cases here.

12 The Second Circuit, in rejecting the Union’s argument that the April 2 demonstration did not violate the terms of the no-strike clause and confirming the arbitrator’s decision, noted that “[t]he arbitrator found . . . that union members were not in fact orderly because they had blocked vehicular access to Time Warner’s facility.” Time Warner Cable of New York City v. IBEW Local 3, supra, 684 Fed.Appx. at 71–72 (2d Cir. 2017), quoting Tri-M Group, supra, 350 NLRB at 1107.

13 Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s assertion, this conclusion is not premised on a finding that “a no-strike clause was in effect” on April 2 by virtue of a previous agreement by the parties to extend, in whole or in part, their collective-bargaining agreement. Rather, we are simply acknowledging that we do not write on a clean slate in this case. The parties themselves specifically asked the arbitrator to determine whether the April 2 demonstration violated the terms of the no-strike clause. We merely follow the arbitrator’s determination, later enforced by the reviewing courts, that the demonstration did violate that no-strike clause, which means it never enjoyed the protection of the Act. While the Board is not bound by the arbitrator’s determination, as our dissenting colleague emphasizes, we are not barred from holding the parties to it in the particular circumstances of this case.

We also observe that the Respondent’s argument that the four alleged discriminatees’ actions were unprotected is similarly based on their having “aided and abetted” the mass blockage of access to the Respondent’s facility, thereby violating the parties’ no-strike clause. The Respondent does not contend that the alleged discriminatees were strikers as a matter of Board law. By the same token, our adoption of the arbitrator’s and the courts’ finding that the blockade violated the no-strike clause and was therefore unprotected is not a finding that these four employees were strikers.

14 As a result, we need not pass on the question whether the Respondent lawfully could have disciplined the employees even in the absence of their participation in the April 2 demonstration. Likewise, we find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s distinction between “active” and “passive” participation, or the cases he cites involving an employee’s loss of protection due to his own misconduct.

15 It is thus irrelevant that, as the judge found, the alleged discriminatees were not shown to have known the nature of the Union’s unprotected demonstration before they arrived at the scene.
with the other participating employees until the termination of the demonstration, which lasted 90 minutes. In these circumstances, we have little trouble finding that the alleged discriminatees participated in the Union’s unprotected demonstration, thereby exposing themselves to discipline.\textsuperscript{15}

The General Counsel, as did the judge, emphasizes that the initial blockage of access to the Respondent’s facility was imposed by Business Agent Jordan and the drivers of the blocking cars, that the alleged discriminatees arrived after the cars were in place, and that none of the alleged discriminatees was shown to have engaged in any violent or disruptive action. He further attempts to distinguish the alleged discriminatees’ actions from the direct, face-to-face blocking of access that occurred in some other cases in which the Board found that employees’ misconduct deprived them of the Act’s protection while they were \textit{initially} engaged in protected activity.\textsuperscript{16} These arguments, however, fail to come to terms with the fact that the alleged discriminatees made themselves part of what was—in the particular circumstances of this case—an unprotected demonstration and were disciplined for that reason. Whether the alleged discriminatees initiated that demonstration, whether they acted peacefully, and whether their participation was necessary to effectively block access to the facility, is all beside the point. What matters, rather, is that the employees were not mere bystanders and that the activity for which they were disciplined—participation in a demonstration that, because it violated the no-strike clause, was never protected—was not itself protected concerted activity under the Act.\textsuperscript{17}

We therefore conclude that the Respondent did not violate the Act by suspending the employees.

\textbf{II. THE INTERROGATIONS}

As noted above, the Respondent summoned the employees whom it had identified by video as being present at the April 2 event to investigatory interviews. In these interviews, the employees were asked a series of questions from a prepared script. The questions included: “Who told you about this gathering?”; “When did you receive notification of the gathering?”; “How was this event communicated to you?”; and, “What were you told about the reason for the protest?” Employees were also asked whether they had “reviewed the CBA,” and whether they were familiar with its no-strike clause, which the Respondent read aloud to them.

If an employee said she was not told about the event or asked to participate, she was asked in addition, “[w]hy did you remain outside?” Employees who were not scheduled to work at the time of the incident (including the four alleged discriminatees) were also asked, “Why did you come to work? Did anyone in management direct you to come to work?” The foremen and the steward who had been suspended on April 1 were similarly asked why they had “come to work.”\textsuperscript{18} The judge found all of the above questions unlawfully coercive.

The Respondent was investigating a demonstration at its facility which, as has been established, was unprotected. The Respondent therefore had the right to inquire about the employees’ and the Union’s participation in that event to a greater extent than if no unprotected conduct had occurred or if it were interviewing employees who clearly were only bystanders.\textsuperscript{19} That inquiry, however, also had the potential to intrude into protected employee activity. The Respondent’s inquiry was accordingly required to focus closely on the unprotected misconduct and to minimize intrusion into Section 7 activity.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, the Respondent, through its video, had already established specifically what had happened, and it had identified by the same means many of the employees who participated in the event. There was therefore no need for the Respondent to inquire into the activity of any employees prior to the event, except (as the judge recognized) specifically to identify the additional indi-

\textsuperscript{15} We reject the contention of the General Counsel and the Union that the Respondent’s discipline of the alleged discriminatees should be analyzed, and found unlawful, under the framework established in \textit{NLRB v. Burnup & Sims}, 379 U.S. 21 (1964). That analytical framework applies where an employer mistakenly disciplines employees for misconduct that purportedly occurred in the course of their protected activity and the employer’s mistake was of fact, not of law. \textit{Three D, LLC d/b/a Waikiki Beach Hotel and Hotel Renew}, 361 NLRB 308, 313 fn. 20 (2014), affd. 629 Fed. Appx. 33 (2d Cir. 2015). Those circumstances are absent here. Employees are protected under \textit{Burnup & Sims} only where they are shown not to have committed the purported misconduct for which they were disciplined.

\textsuperscript{16} See, e.g., \textit{Unite Here! Local 5 (Aqua-Aston Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Waikiki Beach Hotel and Hotel Renew), 365 NLRB No. 169} (2017), and authorities cited therein.

\textsuperscript{17} That fact distinguishes this case from \textit{Altorfer Machinery Co.}, 332 NLRB 130 (2000), and \textit{Detroit Newspapers}, 342 NLRB 223 (2004), cited by our dissenting colleague. In both of those cases, employees were engaged in a lawful strike and lawful strike activities, and some employees were found not to have lost statutory protection simply by being present on occasions when other strikers committed individual acts of misconduct. Here, by contrast, the group activity was unprotected from the outset, the alleged discriminatees deliberately joined it, and they were disciplined accordingly.

\textsuperscript{18} The Respondent confirmed at the hearing that the question “Why did you come to work?” meant “Why did you come to the area of the Paidge Avenue location?”

\textsuperscript{19} E.g., \textit{St. Francis Regional Medical Center, 363 NLRB No. 69}, slip op. at fn. 2 (2015); \textit{Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB 151, 159 (2014)}; \textit{Alton Box Board Co., 155 NLRB 1025, 1041 (1965)}.

\textsuperscript{20} Id.
viduals who were actual participants in the demonstration.21

In this light, the judge was correct that at least three of the Respondent’s questions—“Who told you about this gathering?” “When did you receive notification of the gathering?” “How was this event communicated to you?”—were unlawfully coercive under Section 8(a)(1). These questions intruded into Section 7 communications between employees without directly seeking identification of other individuals who were present at and participated in the unlawful demonstration. Because the remedy for the additional questions posed by the Respondent that the judge found unlawful—a cease-and-desist prohibition of such questions, included in the notice-posting—would be essentially cumulative of the remedy for the questions we have found unlawful, we need not reach the legality of those additional questions.

ORDER

IT IS ORDERED that the Respondent, Time Warner Cable New York City, LLC, New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from
   a. Coercively interrogating any employee about union support or union activities.
   b. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
   a. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Brooklyn, New York, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”22 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 2, 2014.
   b. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. June 22, 2018

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Lauren McFerran,
Member

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Marvin E. Kaplan,
Member

(SEAL)

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

MEMBER PEARCE, dissenting in part.

I disagree with my colleagues’ decision to reverse the judge and dismiss the complaint allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending employees Ralf Anderson, Frank Tsavaris, Diana Cabrera, and Azeam Ali for 2 weeks each. The four employees were clearly engaged in protected conduct when attending a union meeting on April 2, 2014, concerning the Respondent’s discipline and change in work rules. And simply put, the four employees did not commit the acts of which they were accused, i.e., instigating and participating in an illegal stoppage in violation of a collective-bargaining agreement no-strike clause and interfering with ingress to and egress from the Respondent’s facility.

Contrary to the conclusion of my colleagues, the employees did not act in violation of a no-strike clause because the contract containing that no-strike clause had expired. In fact, the Board previously held that these very parties had not agreed to a successor contract by the time of the events in question. See Electrical Workers IBEW Local 3 (Time Warner Cable), 363 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 16 (2015). It is well-settled that a no-strike clause does not survive an expired contract. See Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, 362 NLRB No. 188, slip op. at 3–4 (2015). Even if sincerely held, the Respondent’s mistaken belief—that on April 2, there was in effect a valid

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21 There are no exceptions to the judge’s findings that the Respondent could lawfully inquire as to “the perpetrators of the vehicular blockade,” and could ask questions to confirm “the employee’s presence in front of the facility on April 2, their arrival time, how they got there, whether they drove a company vehicle, and where they parked.”

22 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
collective-bargaining agreement containing a no-strike clause—does not insulate it from liability. See NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 23–24 (1964) (“A protected activity acquires a precarious status if innocent employees can be discharged while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in good faith.”)

My colleagues nevertheless treat it as established—for purposes of evaluating the legality of the four suspensions at issue here—that the April 2 gathering violated the parties’ no-strike clause based on an arbitration decision that awarded the Respondent damages caused by the Union’s April 2 conduct. I respectfully disagree. In the first place, the arbitrator’s decision that was confirmed by the district court was not premised on the existence of a collective-bargaining agreement containing a no-strike clause. Rather, as the district court explained, the arbitrator merely assumed for purposes of that specific arbitration that a no-strike clause was in effect, and the arbitrator was entitled to do so because the parties had specifically agreed to arbitrate (via a separate agreement) the question whether the no-strike clause had been breached by the union. And the district court enforced the award on the basis of that specific agreement to arbitrate the Union’s liability, not on the basis of a collective-bargaining agreement containing a no-strike clause. See Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. IBEW, AFL–CIO, Local Union No. 3, 399 F.Supp.3d 392, 399, 418–419 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), affd. 684 Fed.Appx. 68 (2d Cir. 2017).1

The district court’s decision also makes clear that the Board and the arbitrator were free to reach their own separate and even “inconsistent[]” conclusions. Id. at 399, 418–419.2 And the arbitrator simply did not address the legality of the suspensions. Indeed, the district court noted that the case involving the four discriminatees is a different case involving different parties and a different issue before a different adjudicatory authority. Id. at 418. In short, it is my colleagues, not me, who are attempting to wipe the slate clean of both the Board’s prior holding—that the parties had not reached a successor collective-bargaining agreement at the time of the events in question—and the district court’s acknowledgement that the Board and the arbitrator were free to reach inconsistent conclusions regarding whether a no-strike clause was in effect at the time of the events in question.

Nor were the four employees guilty of the other charged misconduct. To be sure vehicles were parked in the middle of the street in front of the Respondent’s facility in such a manner as to block ingress and egress. However, that conduct is not fairly chargeable to the four employees. It is undisputed that they did not park the vehicles that obstructed the Respondent’s operations, request that the vehicles be parked in that location, or even know the vehicles would be situated there when they learned of the union’s meeting. Nor did they contribute to the obstruction. As the judge found, the four employees were passive participants whom the Respondent knew “simply stood in the crowd and had no involvement in constructing the vehicular blockade of the [Respondent’s] facility and operations.” Cf., Altorfer Machinery Co., 332 NLRB 130, 132, 141–142, 148 (2000) (disciplined employee’s mere presence at scene of misconduct does not establish that the employee was guilty of engaging in the statutorily-recognized misconduct that actually did occur that day); Detroit Newspapers, 342 NLRB 223, 230–231 (2004) (though present at the scene, discharged employee was not guilty of the charged misconduct). Therefore, I agree with the judge that the Respondent unlawfully suspended employees.

1 See also id. at 418 (emphasis added in part): Under the magic of the broad federal arbitration statute, an arbitration may be specifically authorized by the parties to decide whether a non-operative no-strike clause has been violated, and to assess damages. For the purposes of the specific arbitration, the no-strike clause in the CBA, as well as the CBA itself, could be assumed to be operative by the arbitrator.

2 See also id. at 418:

According to Local 3 and the NLRB, the arbitrator’s decision is unenforceable as against public policy because it is based on a no-strike provision included in a CBA that the NLRB concluded was non-operative. ***

Giving full effect to the NLRB’s decision does not divest the arbitrator of jurisdiction. The separate, free-standing, valid, specific arbitration agreement expressly granted the arbitrator the authority to decide the dispute “as if there were a more general agreement not to strike.” ***

THE COURT: [T]here may be inconsistencies in the decisions, but that is not a reason for my denying the enforceability of . . . a separate decision on your part to go forward with an arbitration as if there were a contract, CBA, that you had signed.

[. . .]

[T]he fact that another adjudicatory authority is making a decision involving different personnel, different parties, four workers, different from the one that the arbitrator decided, it does not bother me at all. I do not see any collateral estoppel problem.

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The award of the arbitrator for money damages based on the specific agreement to arbitrate does not violate public policy. It can be enforced with no disrespect for the NLRB decision.
Anderson, Tsavaris, Cabrera, and Ali for their attendance at the union meeting.
Accordingly, as to this issue, I respectfully dissent.
Dated, Washington, D.C.  June 22, 2018

Mark Gaston Pearce, Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union support or activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights described above.

TIME WARNER CABLE NEW YORK CITY, LLC

The Board’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-126860 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, SE., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.

Allen M. Rose and Joseph Luhrs, Esqs., for the General Counsel.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case arises out of union strike activity that occurred in front of Time Warner Cable New York City, LLC’s (the Company) facility at Paidge Avenue in Brooklyn, New York, during the morning of April 2, 2014. During its subsequent investigation, the Company questioned employees regarding their participation in the work stoppage and disciplined numerous employees. Most employees who were present received final warning letters. However, seven employees deemed to have engaged in the most serious misconduct received 2-week suspensions. Three were suspended because they engaged in active misconduct by constructing a vehicular blockade of company operations. The other four employees—Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson and Frank Tsavaris—were suspended because they were off duty at the time and had no legitimate reason to be at that location.
This case was tried in New York, New York, on April 11–13, 2016. Local Union No. 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO (the Union or Charging Party) filed and served the charge and amended charge on April 18 and August 19, 2014, respectively, and the General Counsel issued the second amended complaint on March 31, 2016. The complaint alleges that the Company questioned employees following the strike constituted coercive interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act and that its suspensions of Cabrera, Ali, Anderson, and Tsavaris unilaterally discriminated against them in violation of Section 8(a)(3) because they engaged in protected union activity initiated by the Union.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, Charging Party and the Company, I make the following

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. JURISDICTION

The Company, a domestic limited liability company, is engaged in providing cable television, telephone and high speed

1 All dates are 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), et seq.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. The Company’s Operations

The Company operates six divisions in the New York City metropolitan area: Northern Manhattan, Southern Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island, New York, and Bergen County, New Jersey (collectively referred to as the six facilities or divisions). The Southern Manhattan Division, headquartered in an expansive facility located on Padege Avenue in Brooklyn (the facility), provides service (television, internet, security, and telephone) to all of the Company’s residential and commercial customers in Manhattan south of 86th Street. It houses dispatch, communications, technical operations (installation, service, and repair), construction, and survey and design personnel and equipment. The facility encompasses executive offices, an indoor garage, outside parking areas, a staff of over 600 (including various kinds of technicians, foremen, and managers) as well as a fleet of company vehicles. The facility is next door to a New York City Fire Department annex that houses large emergency vehicles.

B. The Collective-Bargaining Relationship With The Union

The Union has represented company employees at the six facilities for over 10 years. CBAs reached between the Company and Union in 2005 and 2009 were each accompanied by Riders specific to each facility and preceded by a comprehensive memorandum of agreement (MOU). The 2009 CBA expired on March 31, 2013. It contained, in pertinent part, a no-strike clause at section 31: “There shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, service or employment on the part of or the instance of either party, during the term of this agreement.”

On January 3, 2013, prior to the commencement of bargaining over a successor CBA, a bargaining unit employee at one of the six locations filed a decertification petition with Region 22 seeking to decertify the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of employees at that facility. After a hearing, the Regional Director for Region 22 dismissed the petition on the ground that the most appropriate unit in the decertification context should have been a multi-location unit consisting of the six facilities. The Company did not contest that decision and subsequently agreed with the Union that all six facilities would be treated as one single bargaining unit.

C. Negotiations for a Successor Agreement

Thereafter, bargaining resumed and the parties executed an MOU on March 28, 2013 summarizing agreed-upon changes to the expiring CBA for all six facilities. The introduction stated that “the full text of the applicable changes will be incorporated in a new Collective Bargaining Agreement which shall become effective, upon ratification by the Union membership, sched-uled for April 4, 2013.” The new CBAs were to be effective from April 1, 2013 to March 31, 2017. The employees at the six facilities ratified the MOUs in a single vote. There was no separate ratification vote, however, regarding the terms and conditions contained in the previous location specific Riders. The 2009–2013 Riders addressed standby procedures at all six facilities, but also included additional issues specific to four facilities: Staten Island facility—vacation, temporary employees and work performed by classification; Bergen facility—bargaining unit work, sick days, work schedules, journeyman and other designations; Northern Manhattan—double compensation for overtime work on weekends; Southern Manhattan—elimination of certain service and maintenance work, and dispatch department function.

Although the parties had not yet integrated the substance of the agreement embodied in the MOU into the standard CBA format covering employees at all six facilities, the Company implemented several changes contained in the MOU as of April 1, 2013. They included wages and increases in payments to the Union’s annuity fund.

On May 14, 2013, the Company provided the Union with a draft of a successor CBA. The draft incorporated the identical provisions of the expired CBA, along with the changes set forth in the MOU provisions the six locations. None of identical provisions, which included the no-strike clause, were discussed during negotiations. Missing, however, were the facility specific Riders that accompanied previous CBAs.

On July 8, 2013, the Union informed the Company that the draft omitted the Riders and language pertaining to bonuses for electrical engineering degrees. After an exchange of communications disagreeing over whether the parties agreed to include these provisions in the successor agreement, the parties met again on September 9, 2013. The Company continued to maintain that it would not agree to include the Riders in the successor agreement. On that basis, the Union refused the Company’s demand that it execute the draft successor agreement. After further negotiations in February and March 2014, the Company proposed revised versions of several Riders in a new successor contract. Several communications followed regarding the Company’s omission of the electrical engineers provision and the Southern Manhattan Rider.

On March 31, after concluding that the Union would not sign any of the proposed CBAs sent to it by the Company, the Company filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging, pursuant to H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941), that the Union failed to execute a written agreement embodying the MOA.

In a decision and recommended order, issued April 28, 2015, and adopted by the Board on October 29, 2015, Judge Steven Fish concluded that the Union did not violate Section 8(b)(3) by refusing to execute the successor CBA. He based that deci-
sion on the insufficiency of evidence demonstrating that the parties reached a “meeting of the minds” on all substantive issues, or that the documents submitted by the Company to the Union for execution accurately incorporated any such agreement. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 3 (Time Warner Cable), 363 NLRB No. 30, slip op. at 16 (2015).

In denying the Company’s motion to reopen the record to admit posthearing evidence of grievances filed by the Union, which allegedly constituted admissions that the Union unlawfully refused to execute an agreed-upon contract, the Board noted:

The Charging Party contends that this evidence demonstrates that the [Company] unlawfully refused to execute an agreed-upon contract. Contrary to the [Company’s] contention, the [Union’s] posthearing conduct shows only that the [Company] mistakenly believed that the parties had reached agreement on March 28, 2013. It does not bear on the relevant question of whether the parties reached a meeting of the minds regarding all material terms of their successor contract.

The Board provided further clarification as to why the Union did not violate Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by refusing to execute the successor CBA:

[We] find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s finding that the Charging Party’s inclusion of the South Manhattan Rider in the copy of the contract it attached to its Federal district court complaint alleging a violation of the contractual no-strike clause constituted an admission that the Rider was part of the parties’ agreement.

D. Foremen Are Disciplined

On April 1, 1 day after it filed unfair labor practices against the Union, the Company issued 2-day suspensions to several foremen, including Anderson and Tsavaris, for refusing a company directive requiring them to take tools home at the end of their shifts. The directive was the subject of the grievance process set forth in the expired CBA. In addition, Phil Papale, a shop steward, was suspended for conduct while representing a foreman during the grievance process.

Shortly after their suspensions, Anderson and Tsavaris informed Derek Jordan, their union representative. Anderson also informed Jordan that a shop steward was not present when he was issued the suspension. Jordan and other union representatives responded by calling for bargaining unit members to attend a “safety meeting” outside the facility the next morning.  

E. The Union Disrupts Company Operations On April 2

On a typical day in 2014, between 6:30 and 8 a.m. approximately 150 field technicians drove their personal vehicles to work, parked on a lot adjacent to the Paidge Avenue facility, entered the facility to receive assignments from their foremen, and then drove designated company vehicles out of the facility to customer service locations. In addition to dispatching vehicles from the warehouse and repairing them there, the Company also receives shipments of equipment and supplies at the facility.

As depicted by the Company’s closed-circuit security camera video, at about 6:23 a.m. on April 2, 2014, Jordan arrived in front of the facility for the purpose of initiating a work stoppage or strike. Although there were available parking spots along the curb, he parked his vehicle perpendicular to the direction of traffic in the middle of Paidge Avenue. Shortly thereafter, Jordan directed several Company employees to move their vehicles from parking spots and position them in similar fashion, perpendicular to traffic, in the middle of the street. Over the next 10 minutes, six more vehicles parked in the middle of Paidge Avenue. The result was that, by 6:33 a.m., vehicles could no longer access or exit from the facility, including the main entrance, garage entrance and employee parking lot.

By 7 a.m., about 50 employees gathered in between the vehicles positioned in the middle of the street. As they congregated, union representatives handed them fliers regarding work safety and Weingarten rights to representation during disciplinary interviews. At about 7:30 a.m. Jordan motioned employees to gather around him in the middle of the street. He then proceeded to address employee safety concerns relating to the absence of their suspended foreman, as well as their Weingarten rights. The gathering broke up at about 8 a.m. and Paidge Avenue was reopened to vehicular traffic.

Gregg Cory, the Company’s area vice president for Southern Manhattan, was apprised immediately about the vehicles parked in the middle of the street. Cory called the Company’s security office, which in turn called the police department. Police officers responded shortly thereafter and spoke with Jordan. He assured them that the crowd would soon disperse.

As a result of the impeded access to the facility, approximately 77 technicians on the 7 and 7:30 a.m. shifts were unable to access the facility or company vehicles in the adjacent parking lot. This further resulted in a half hour or 1-hour delay (depending on the shift) before technicians could leave the facility in order to make scheduled appointments. The disrup-

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5 GC Exh. 31, 33.
6 Cabrera testified that the Union announced the “safety meeting” the previous day on social media. (Tr. 165.), while Tsavaris testified that he was notified about the meeting in an early morning call from his shop steward on April 2. (Tr. 189–190.) I found it peculiar that the 4 discriminatees would travel to Paidge Avenue on their day off for a safety meeting. Nevertheless, there is insufficient credible evidence to conclude that any of them knew beforehand that the Union planned a work stoppage.
7 Jordan’s denial that he precipitated a “job action” and merely convened a “safety meeting” in order “to get the workers to go back to work or to go to work,” was not credible. Responding to the previous day’s suspension of the foreman, he orchestrated a work stoppage by positioning vehicles in the middle of the street and instructing employees to gather there in order to impede company operations commencing with the 7 and 7:30 a.m. shifts. (Tr. 367–368, 370–371, 389–390).
8 GC Exh. 20.
9 GC Exh. 23A-B.
10 Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. 420 U.S. 251 (1975) affirming employees’ rights to union representation at investigatory interviews.
11 It is undisputed that Paidge Street was completely blocked off and a back-alley exit, which Corey used to return into the facility, was not previously used as an entrance by employees arriving for work or while working. (Tr. 229, 235–240, 248–249, 265–273, 384; GC Exh. 19–20, 23, 29; R. Exh. 6–7, 9–10.)
tion caused a ripple effect of delayed or missed appointments throughout the day.

Cabrera, Ali, Anderson, and Tsavaris were not scheduled to work at the time, but decided to attend the event. All were aware that the Union called a “safety meeting.” Anderson arrived early after driving 55 miles from his home to Paidge Avenue, parked and took a nap. Ali also drove his vehicle from Suffolk County and even picked up a coworker to attend the meeting. Diana Cabrera learned about the event on social media and, although she usually commuted to work by train or taxi, she was given a ride to the event by a coworker.12

The gathering dispersed at approximately 8 a.m., enabling technicians on the 7 and 7:30 a.m. shifts to report to work and begin their shifts.

F. The District Court Action

In April 2014, the Company also sought injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The suit alleged the Union’s violation of the no-strike clause in the contract in September 2013, March and April 2, 2014. After a 3-day hearing, Judge Jack Weinstein found that two of the incidents described in the complaint constituted a strike in violation of the no-strike clause:

That was not a safety meeting . . . They blocked ingress and egress to that plant. There was a substantial delay in starting operations that day. I’m holding it was a strike. I don’t want to get involved in any euphemisms.

Nevertheless, Judge Weinstein dismissed the petition on May 5, on the ground that the disputes involved were subject to arbitration, were in the process of being arbitrated and there was no evidence or likelihood of further violations of the no-strike clauses.

G. Arbitration Brought By The Company

On April 17, the Company initiated an arbitration proceeding against the Union seeking damages and other relief for the events on April 2. After three sessions, Arbitrator Daniel Brent found:

That the convocation of this “safety meeting” was a pretext to communicate to the Company the Union’s dissatisfaction about requiring Foremen to carry tools is not simply a justifiable conclusion; it is the only reasonable conclusion . . .

Thus, by creating a sham safety meeting that not only impeded the timely arrival of bargaining unit employees for their shifts, but also involved many employees until well after the scheduled commencement of their shift hours, and to the extent that customers were deprived of their coveted early morning appointments and other customers were inconvenienced by unnecessary delay in keeping scheduled service appointments throughout the day on April 2, 2014, the Union was directly and inextricably culpable . . .

On November 30, 2015, Arbitrator Brent issued a final award and awarded the Company damages in the amount of $19,297.96.

H. The Investigatory Interviews

After the April 2d strike, the Company launched an investigation to determine the identities of employees involved in the blockade. Employees identified through surveillance video as having attended the work stoppage were summoned to interviews in mid-April. Using a standardized questionnaire, Concetta Ciliberti, Mary Maldonado, and other human resources department managers and supervisors asked each employee nearly two dozen questions.13 They started with preliminary questions about tenure with the Company, assigned schedules and to whom they reported. The employees were also asked whether they were part of the group of employees who gathered outside the Paidge Avenue facility on April 2, how they got to work, whether they parked, if they arrived in a company vehicle, and what time they arrived. If the employee denied being present, he/she was shown photographs or the video indicating otherwise.

After establishing that the employee was present at the gathering, he or she was told, “It appears that Derek Jordan was present as well.” The employee was then asked “who told” the employee about the gathering, “when” the employee received “notification of the gathering,” how the “event” was “communicated” to the employee, and what the employee was “told about the reason for the protest.” Any employees professing ignorance about the gathering and claiming not to be involved were asked why they remained outside and if they attempted to contact a manager or otherwise attempt to enter the facility.

Employees were then asked questions about the CBA and if they were “familiar with the section that prohibits cessation or stoppage of work.” Reading from the script, company managers and supervisors recited that provision followed by standard comments conveying the ramifications of his/her actions on April 2:

There shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, service or employment, on the part of, or at the insistence of either party, during the term of this Agreement.

You understand that this rally stopped the work of the SNYC Area for over one hour prohibiting us from meeting our service calendar. As a result of this violation of the law and CBA and the inability to maintain our business. Do you understand that this action subjects you to discipline, including possible

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12 The four employees admitted to being a part of the group that gathered in the middle of Paidge Avenue. (R. Exhs. 3–4.) As previously noted, Tsavaris and Cabrera testified that the Union called a safety meeting for the morning of April 2 in front of the facility, while Anderson and Ali asserted that they inadvertently stumbled onto the scene. Anderson’s testimony that he drove there on his day off in order to file a grievance over his suspension was not credible. It was preposterous to believe that he drove 55 miles from home, parked his vehicle, took a nap and suddenly woke up to realize that he was blocked in by other vehicles. After attending the event, he left without making any attempt to file his grievance. (Tr. 121, 129–130, 137–142.) Ali, who lives about 40 miles from the facility, testified that he planned to drive into Manhattan to pick up mail, but decided to give a coworker a ride to work, then parked and exited his vehicle because he was curious. That explanation was also absurd. (Tr. 143, 146, 156–162.)

termination?

(If the employee asks what happens next)

We are gathering facts and you should return to work. To be clear, you are prohibited from engaging in any work slowdown or any other action which impacts on workflow. Any attempts to do so will lead to further discipline, including the possibility of immediate termination.

If you have anything else you want to share with me please call me or send me an email by tomorrow.

The four discriminatees, as well anyone else who was not scheduled to work on April 2, were also asked the following form questions:

Why did you come to work? Did anyone in management direct you to come to work?
[For previously suspended employees] Why did you come to work that day?
You understand that a suspension means that you are not to come to work?
You understand that you were in violation of your suspension by coming to work on April 2? Who directed you to come to work?

Cabrera told company investigators that she drove to the facility merely to drop someone off.14 Ali also professed ignorance about the event, insisting he only drove to the facility in order to drop someone off while on his way into Manhattan. He also told them that after venturing to the gathering, he learned that the gathering was described as a work safety meeting.15 Anderson conceded that he was present at the site, but gave no explanation as to why he was there.16 Tsavaris stated that he “just happened to be in the neighborhood” for “personal” reasons.17

I. The Suspensions

On May 22, 2014, the Company issued 2-week suspensions to seven employees determined to be the most culpable for the strike, either because they had no reason to be present other than to participate in the job action or because they engaged in particularly egregious conduct.18 Approximately 34 employees, all of whom were scheduled to work during the work stoppage, received final written warnings. However, the Company overlooked the roles played by the facility’s two shop stewards, including Papale, who was among those suspended on April 1 and not scheduled to work on April 2.19

Byron Yu was on the schedule at the time of the strike and played an active role by parking his vehicle in the middle of the street. Joseph McGovern, had called out sick earlier that day. David Lopez was assigned to another company facility and was scheduled to work later that day. The remaining four employees—Ali, Cabrera, Anderson, and Tsavaris—were not scheduled to work that day. The corrective action forms cited four grounds: violation of rules, safety violation, misconduct and “other.” Their notices of discipline were virtually identical, with minor differences in the next to last paragraph of each:

Attached is a disciplinary notice that you are being issued a final written warning and being suspended for two weeks effective May 22, 2014 for your role in the April 2 work stoppage in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.

On the day of the illegal strike you were not scheduled to work, but appeared at Paigde Avenue to instigate and participate in the illegal work stoppage. You showed a complete disregard for your responsibilities to the Company and our customers, intentionally impeding service to our customers in violation of the no strike provision in the collective bargaining agreement.

Your conduct justifies immediate termination. However, because we believe you were misled by the Union both about engaging in this conduct and about the consequences of your actions, we are going to give you this last chance. Your participation in any further work stoppages or other activities to impede the Company’s business in violation of the collective bargaining agreement will lead to your immediate termination.

You should understand that your blind adherence to the Union’s unlawful directives not only put you in danger of losing your job, but reflects very badly on you.

The Company and our customers expect more of you.20

J. Regional Director Revokes Dismissal of Union’s Charge

On January 5, 2015, the Regional Director for Region 2 dismissed the instant charge on the ground that the April 2nd strike, spurred by the suspension of five foremen and the alleged violation of their Weingarten rights, violated the no-strike clause of the CBA and, thus, the Act. Additionally, she opined that the alleged unfair labor practices precipitating the April 2nd work stoppage were not sufficiently serious as to justify overriding the no-strike clause and that the suspensions flowed from employee misconduct during the unprotected strike. However, after Judge Fish issued the aforementioned decision on April 28, 2015, dismissing the complaint alleging unfair labor practices by the Union during the April 2 strike, the Regional Director revoked the dismissal of the instant charge on May 21,
2015.

K. The Board Denies The Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment

On February 8, 2016, the Company moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint allegation that it violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act when it suspended Diane Cabrera for engaging in serious misconduct by participating in “a job action led by the Charging Party.” The motion alleged that the “job action” upon which the complaint is premised constituted a “complete blockade” and disruption of Company’s operations for an hour and, thus, did not constitute protected activity under Section 7 of the Act. The complaint was amended by the Regional Director in order to add the three additional employees who were also suspended – Azeam Ali, Andersen, and Tsavaris.

The General Counsel opposed the motion on the ground that there were genuine factual issues as to whether the four suspended employees lost the protection of the Act by their conduct during the strike activity. On April 8, 2016, the Board denied the Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that it failed to demonstrate the absence of issues of fact.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. THE SUSPENSIONS

The General Counsel and Charging Party allege that the 2-week suspensions issued to Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris constituted unfair labor practices under Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Company insists that the job action was actually an unlawful mass picket and, thus, the discriminatees engaged in misconduct by being at the event. The Company further contends that such misconduct rendered their activity unprotected.

NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, 379 U.S. 21 (1964), provides the applicable legal standard in cases involving employer discipline of employees who engage in misconduct during protected activities. Under the Burnup & Sims test, discipline is unlawful “if it is shown that the employee was at the time engaged in a protected activity, that the employer knew it was such, that the basis of the [discipline] was an alleged act of misconduct in the course of that activity, and that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that misconduct.” Id. at 23.

As orchestrated by the Union, several union officials and company employees halted company operations at 6:33 a.m. on April 2 by positioning seven vehicles in the street in front of the facility. The Union announced the event as a safety meeting and Jordan speak to employees about their Weingarten rights and the need to be careful in the field due to the unavailability of suspended foremen. However, the blockade orchestrated by the Union clearly amounted to a work stoppage or strike that lasted nearly 90 minutes and service appointments by technicians were delayed by either a half hour or a full hour. The four discriminatees were part of the group of employees who gathered in front of the Company’s facility after the blockade was in place. All four went there at the behest of the Union.

A. The No-Strike Clause

Attendance by the four discriminatees at a Union event, including a work stoppage, discussing and/or protesting the Company’s discipline of foremen and alleged violation of some of their Weingarten rights clearly constituted protected concerted activity. See Mushroom Transportation Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (activity relating to group action in the interest of the employees). However, that conduct lost its protection if it violated an extant no-strike prohibition incorporated into the terms and conditions of their employment. That, in turn, requires an initial determination as to whether the no-strike clause in the expired CBA still applied to unit members as of April 2.

The Board’s decision in IBEW Local 3 (Time Warner Cable) serves as the law of the case on the issue of whether there was an agreement between the parties regarding the expired CBA by virtue of the MOU entered into by the parties: there was no meeting of the minds as to significant portions of the agreement (the inclusion of local Riders) and thus, the parties did not agree to all of the material terms of a successor CBA. See, e.g., Great Lakes Chemical Corp., 300 NLRB 1024, 1025 fn. 3 (1990), enf’d. 967 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and cases cited therein (generally, a finding necessary to support the judgment in a prior proceeding bars relitigation on that issue in a subsequent proceeding involving the same parties.

It is the MOU and not the inability to agree to a successor CBA, which is dispositive with respect to the applicability of the no-strike clause to the events of April 2. The no-strike clause was among the numerous provisions of the expired CBA that were to carry over to the successor CBA but were not mentioned in the MOU. Its incorporation by reference in the MOU is evidenced by the introduction: ‘[T]he changes summarized below were agreed upon relative to the [CBA] which will expire on March 31, 2013 and that the full text of the applicable changes will be incorporated in a new [CBA] which shall be-

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21 The Company’s reliance on Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enf’d. on other grounds 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), is misplaced. It would have been appropriate if the Company had also disciplined the discriminatees for reasons unrelated to the allegedly protected activity, which is not the case. Wright Line, 251 NLRB at 20–21; Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 401–402 (“dual motive” analysis applicable where the protected conduct is shown to be a motivating factor in the discipline, in which case the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the “same action would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct”).

22 The Company’s reliance on district court litigation and arbitration between the Company and the Union containing conclusions to the contrary is unavailing. “The Board adheres to the general rule that if the Government was not a party to the prior private litigation, it is not barred from litigating an issue involving enforcement of Federal law which the private plaintiff has litigated unsuccessfully.” Field Bridge Associates, 306 NLRB 322, 322 (1992), enf’d. sub nom. Service Employees Local 32B-32J v. NLRB, 982 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied 509 U.S. 904 (1993). As the Board noted in Teamsters Local 769, successor to Teamsters Local 390, 355 NLRB 197, 200 (2010), this view is consistent with the “well established general principle that the government is not bound by private litigation when the government’s action seeks to enforce a federal statute that implicates both public and private interests.” (quoting Herman v. South Carolina National Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1425 (11th Cir. 1998).
come effective upon ratification by the Union membership, scheduled for April 4, 2013.” (emphasis supplied) The only reasonable interpretation of that preamble is that the changes mentioned into the MOU were being added to the language of the expired CBA along with those provisions not mentioned.

It has long been established that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) when it unilaterally changes employees’ wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment without providing their bargaining representative prior notice and meaningful opportunity to bargain about the changes. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742–743 (1962). The Katz rule, initially applied to newly certified unions, also extends to situations where the parties’ agreement has expired and negotiations continue over a successor contract. In such instances, with certain exceptions, the parties are required to continue in effect terms and conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Litton Financial Printing Division v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991).

In Litton, the court held that no-strike clauses, arbitration provisions and management rights clauses were mandatory subjects of bargaining but did not survive expiration of the contract. The court distinguished such provisions from other terms and conditions that survived because they represented the waiver of statutory rights that employees would otherwise enjoy in the interest of achieving an agreement. Id. at 199.

The parties bargained over the inclusion of Riders in a successor CBA. In the meantime, they continued to adhere to the status quo ante, with the exception of the Company’s prompt implementation of the wage and benefits provisions of the MOU. This served as the Company’s quid pro quo and evidence of the parties intent to continue applying certain terms and conditions of the expired CBA, such as the no-strike clause. See Crimpex, Inc., 211 NLRB 855, 858 (1974) (evidence consistent with parties’ intention to be bound until the final contract was executed); Granite Construction Co., 330 NLRB 205, 208 (1999) (affirmative nod evidenced an oral agreement to extend the contract until the next bargaining session).

The Board recently referenced the Litton principles in Lincoln Lutheran of Racine, 362 NLRB No. 188, slip op. at 2 (2015). In that case, the Board overruled a contrary earlier decision in Bethlehem Steel, 136 NLRB 1500 (1962) and its progeny, holding that an employer’s obligation to check off union dues constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining and, thus, survived contract expiration. Describing its inextricable link to wages and benefits, the Board distinguished dues checks from no-strike clauses, arbitration and provisions and management rights, which do not survive the contract. Id. at 3.

Litton and Lincoln Lutheran are distinguishable. Both cases involved the expiration of CBAs and there was an absence of evidence of subsequent intent by the parties to continue following the contractual provisions at issue. In the instant case, however, the intention of the parties was reflected in the MOU, which incorporated certain provisions from the expired CBA, including the no-strike clause. The MOU constituted a clear continuation of the waiver of employees’ rights set forth in the expired CBA. See Provena Hosps., d/b/a Provena St. Joseph Med. Ctr. & Illinois Nurses Ass’n, 350 NLRB 808, 812 (2007) (finding that the waiver of a statutory right has to be explicit as well as clear and unmistakable).

Therefore, the no-strike clause, which remained in effect on April 2, prohibited the four discriminatees from the “cessation or stoppage of work, service or employment on April 2. Contrary to the Company’s assertion, however, the four discriminatees did not violate the terms of the no-strike clause since they were in a nonworking status at the time. As such, they could not be deemed to have ceased or stopped working during the pendency of the strike.

B. The Conduct of the Discriminatees During the Strike

Even in the absence of an applicable no-strike clause, the activities of the four discriminatees would negate otherwise protected conduct if the Company had a reasonable belief that the employees were engaged in misconduct and the employees did, in fact, engage in misconduct. Medite of New Mexico, Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 790 (10th Cir. 1995) (employer’s refusal to reinstate employees justified based on “honest belief” that they engaged in misconduct during strike); Machinists Local 1150 (Cory Corp.), 84 NLRB. 972, 975–976 fn. 9 (1949).

The evidence reveals that the four discriminatees went to the gathering on Paidge Street for a union meeting relating to working conditions, disciplinary actions, grievances and employees’ Weingarten rights. Over approximately 2 weeks following the April 2 event, company managers and supervisors reviewed security video revealing that the blockade of its operations was fully in place by 6:33 a.m. As a result, prior to calling in the four discriminatees for their disciplinary/investigatory interviews, company officials knew that they were present during the strike, but did not cause the vehicular blockade of company operations. The blockade was implemented by union officials and other employees, and was already in place by the time the four discriminatees congregated in the middle of Paidge Avenue. Moreover, there is no credible evidence that any of the four discriminatees knew before arriving for the event that it would be venued in between vehicles parked in the middle of Paidge Avenue in a manner that would bring company operations to a halt.

Under the circumstances, the relatively passive participation of the four discriminatees at the strike location did not constitute misconduct. See Abilities & Goodwill, 241 NLRB 27, 31 (1979) (employer unlawfully discharged striking employees for passive participation in strike); Bowman Transportation Co., 112 NLRB 387, 388 (1955) (insufficient evidence of disciplined employee’s active participation in strike). Simply participating in a picket is not grounds for discipline because it would undo the active vs. passive test long applied by the Board. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 1404, 1408 (4th Cir. 1984) (abusive behavior does not amount to serious strike misconduct unless it reasonably tends to coerce or intimidate coworkers); Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044, 1046 (1984) (quoting NLRB v. W.C. McQuade, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 1977) (misconduct has to reasonably coerce or intimidate employees from exercising their rights); Cf. Big Horn Coal Co., 309 NLRB 255, 259 (1992) (picketing employees engaged in misconduct by actively interfering with the right of nonstriking employees to continue
The cases cited by the Company are distinguishable. In *Detroit Newspapers*, 342 NLRB 223 (2004), several disciplined employees actively intimidated and violently assaulted coworkers. Id. at 233–234. However, in the case of one employee disciplined for blocking the view of a delivery truck that was backing out of the facility, the Board concluded that the employer did not have a good faith belief that the employee engaged in misconduct. Id. at 231 (surveillance video showed that the employee was not an active participant in blocking the truck driver’s view).

In *Kohler*, 128 NLRB 1062 (1960), employees participated in a strike that lasted months and in which the participants were actively engaged in the picket lines that blocked access to the plant. In that case, disciplined employees positioned their bodies in order to block non-striking employees from entering the plant. Id. at 1180. In contrast, the Company knew from reviewing security video that the four discriminatees simply stood in the crowd and had no involvement in constructing the vehicular blockade of the Company’s facility and operations. Under the circumstances, the Company unlawfully suspended Diana Cabrera, Azeem Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.

II. THE INTERROGATIONS

The complaint alleges that the Company unlawfully interrogated employees regarding their “union activities and sympathies of other employees” in the April 2 strike. The Company contends that its questioning of employees was lawful because it related to employee conduct during unprotected mass picketing.

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits employers from questioning employees in a manner that tends to restrain, coerce or interfere with protected concerted activity. *Rossmore House*, 269 NLRB 1176, 1177 (1984). In determining whether questioning is coercive, we must examine the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1178. Factors in determining whether an interrogation is coercive include the background of the parties’ relationship, the nature of the information sought, the identity of the questioner, the place and method of interrogation, and the truthfulness of the reply. *Bourne v. NLRB*, 332 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1964). The *Bourne* factors provide a framework to use when assessing the lawfulness of employee interrogation. *800 River Rd. Operating Co., LLC v. NLRB*, 784 F.3d 902, 913 (3d Cir. 2015); see also *Timisco Inc. v. NLRB*, 819 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (questioning of employees about their participation in union election by company president, who previously had little interaction with employees and espoused anti-union views, viewed as coercive).

Employees were instructed to meet with company managers, supervisors, and human resource staff in a conference room, where the company officials proceeded to rattle off questions from a prepared script. Certain questions asked of employees were reasonably related to a legitimate investigation seeking to identify employee misconduct, i.e., the perpetrators of the vehicular blockade. These included questions seeking to confirm the employee’s presence in front of the facility on April 2, their arrival time, how they got there, whether they drove a company vehicle, and where they parked.

Other questions, however, went well beyond potential employee misconduct or involvement in the vehicular blockade by seeking to elicit employee knowledge about union activities. Employees were asked who told them about the gathering, how and when they learned about the gathering, and what they were told about the reason for the protest. After extracting information about the event, company officials tested employees on their knowledge of the CBA, asking whether they had reviewed it and were familiar with the no-strike clause.

The totality of the circumstances established that the questions relating to employee knowledge about the organization of the April 2 event were coercive. The questions were asked in a formal setting by human resource managers, supervisors, and staff in the presence of shop stewards. Having already established that the employee was present at the gathering on April 2, these questions revealed the possibility of potential or further discipline based on the employee’s answers to the questions. See *Holsum De Puerto Rico, Inc.*, 344 NLRB 694, 710–711 (2005) (motivation for the questioning was to identify employees who were union sympathizers).

Since everyone in the interview room knew about the union-initiated activity that transpired on April 2, questions relating to communications and planning for the event reasonably conveyed the sense that the Company sought to unearth the employee’s union activities, as well as the names of other employees involved with or sympathetic to the Union. A similar coercive effect resulted from the Company’s inquiry as to why the four discriminatees, who were not scheduled to work that morning, were at the event. See *Metro-W. Ambulance Service*, 360 NLRB No. 124, slip op. at 65 (2014) (employer policy preventing employees from being at work when not scheduled to work discouraged protected activities in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1)).

Moreover, questions posed to employees about their knowledge of the CBA and, in particular, the no-strike clause, were unrelated to the determination of whether an employee participated in the blockade. Having apprised employees that they were being investigated and questioned in connection with their activities on April 2, inquiries about their familiarity with the CBA and the no-strike clause reasonably tended to chill employees’ future union activities.

Under the circumstances, the Company interrogation of employees regarding the events of April 2 violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent Time Warner Cable New York City, LLC is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

2. Local Union No. 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by suspending employees Diana Cabrera, Azeem Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris on October 30, 2001, because they engaged in protected union activity by participating in a work stoppage on April 2, 2014.
4. Respondent coercively interrogated employees regarding the events of April 2, 2014, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

5. The aforementioned unfair labor practices affected commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

REMEDY

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

The Respondent, having discriminatorily suspended employees, must make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended:\footnote{23}

ORDER

The Respondent, Time Warner Cable New York City, LLC, New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from
   Suspending or otherwise discriminating against employees because they engaged in protected union activity.
   Coercively interrogating any employee about union support or union activities.
   In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

   Make Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.

   Within 14 days of the date of the Board’s Order, remove from its files any reference to the unlawful suspensions of Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris and, within 3 days thereafter notify the employees in writing that this has been done and that the suspensions will not be used against them in any way.

   Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.

Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility Brooklyn, New York, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”\footnote{24} Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 2, 2014.

Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for physical and/or electronic posting by Time Warner Cable New York City, LLC, if willing, at all places or in the same manner as notices to employees are customarily posted.

Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. June 14, 2016

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT suspend or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting Local Union No. 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers AFL-CIO or any other union.

WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union support or activities.

\footnote{24} If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”

\footnote{23} If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL make Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson and Frank Tsavaris whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from their suspension, plus interest compounded daily.

WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlawful suspensions of Diana Cabrera, Azeam Ali, Ralf Anderson, and Frank Tsavaris, and

WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this has been done and that the suspensions will not be used against them in any way.

TIME WARNER CABLE NEW YORK CITY, LLC

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/02-CA-126860 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.