

Nos. 15-1620 & 1860

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

CELLULAR SALES OF MISSOURI, LLC

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner

**ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD**

**PETITION FOR HEARING EN BANC OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD**

KIRA DELLINGER VOL
Supervisory Attorney

JEFFREY W. BURRITT
Attorney

National Labor Relations Board
1015 Half Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20570
(202) 273-0656
(202) 273-2989

RICHARD F. GRIFFIN, JR
General Counsel

JENNIFER ABRUZZO
Deputy General Counsel

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Associate General Counsel

LINDA DREEBEN
Deputy Associate General Counsel

National Labor Relations Board

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Headings	Page(s)
Introductory statement	1
Statement of the case	2
Argument.....	4
1. <i>Owen</i> erred in relying on Supreme Court precedent that did not address or decide the question before the Court	5
2. <i>Owen</i> failed to analyze the issues presented in accordance with Supreme Court precedent	7
3. <i>Owen</i> erred in finding <i>D.R. Horton</i> in conflict with the FAA	11
4. <i>Owen</i> erred in finding that the FAA implicitly repealed the NLRA if the two statutes conflict.....	13
Conclusion.....	15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases	Page(s)
<i>Adel Clay Products Co.</i> , 44 NLRB 386 (1942), <i>enforced</i> 134 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1942).....	20
<i>Alexander v. Sandoval</i> , 532 U.S. 275 (2001).....	2
<i>American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant</i> , 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)	5, 7, 9, 12,
<i>AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion</i> , 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)	6, 12
<i>Brady v. National Football League</i> , 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).....	3, 9, 13
<i>City of Arlington v. FCC</i> , 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013)	10
<i>Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC</i> , 362 NLRB No. 27, 2015 WL 1205241 (March 16, 2015).....	1
<i>CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood</i> , 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).....	6, 8, 12
<i>D.R. Horton, Inc.</i> , 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012), <i>enf. denied in part</i> , 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), <i>reh’g denied</i> , No. 12-60031 (April 16, 2014).....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11
<i>Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB</i> , 437 U.S. 556 (1978).....	2
<i>Finley v. U.S.</i> , 490 U.S. 545 (1989).....	14

Cases-Cont'd	Page(s)
<i>Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.</i> , 500 U.S. 20 (1991).....	5, 6, 8, 9, 13
<i>Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.</i> , 473 U.S. 614 (1985).....	5, 8, 9, 12
<i>Murphy Oil USA, Inc.</i> , 361 NLRB No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454 (Oct. 28, 2014), <i>appeal pending</i> , 5th Cir. Case No. 14-60800 (oral argument held Aug. 31, 2015)	1, 3, 9, 11, 12, 13
<i>NLRB v. City Disposal System, Inc.</i> , 465 U.S. 822 (1984).....	10
<i>NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.</i> , 301 U.S. 1 (1937).....	10
<i>NLRB v. Stone</i> , 125 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1942).....	3, 10, 12
<i>NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.</i> , 370 U.S. 9 (1962).....	11
<i>National Licorice Co. v. NLRB</i> , 309 U.S. 350 (1940).....	3, 10, 12
<i>New York Shipping Association v. Federal Maritime Commission</i> , 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988)	7
<i>Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.</i> , 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).....	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14
<i>Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.</i> , 490 U.S. 477 (1989).....	8
<i>Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. NLRB</i> , 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953).....	11

Cases-Cont'd

Page(s)

United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB,
307 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 2

Statutes:

Page(s)

National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) 1
Section 1 (29 U.S.C. § 151)..... 9, 11
Section 7 (29 U.S.C. § 157)..... 2
Section 8(a)(1) (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)) 3, 10, 12
Section 8(b)(1) (29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)) 10
Section 9 (29 U.S.C. § 159)..... 10
Section 10 (29 U.S.C. § 160)..... 10

Fair Labor Standards Act
(29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.) 1

Federal Arbitration Act
(9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.)..... 1
Section 2 (9 U.S.C. § 2) 2

Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.) 6

Norris-LaGuardia Act
(29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.) 4

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, the National Labor Relations Board petitions for *en banc* review of *Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC*, 362 NLRB No. 27, 2015 WL 1205241 (March 16, 2015). In *Cellular Sales*, the Board reaffirmed its holding that employers violate the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA,” 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.), by imposing on employees agreements prohibiting them from exercising their substantive statutory right to engage in concerted legal activity, and that such agreements are therefore not enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA,” 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.). See *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454 (Oct. 28, 2014), *appeal pending*, 5th Cir. Case No. 14-60800 (oral argument held Aug. 31, 2015); *D.R. Horton, Inc.*, 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *1 (Jan. 3, 2012), *enf. denied in part*, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), *reb’g denied*, No. 12-60031 (April 16, 2014).

This Court rejected the Board’s *D.R. Horton* decision in *Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.*, 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013), where the Court enforced an arbitration agreement and ordered employees to individually arbitrate claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA,” 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.). In doing so, it relied on the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence, and on circuit decisions implementing that jurisprudence, to enforce similar agreements in FLSA lawsuits. But none of those cases considered, much less affirmed, the legality of an individual arbitration agreement’s prospective waiver of an unrepresented employee’s right, under Section 7

of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157, to litigate work-related grievances in concert with fellow employees. Had *Owen* properly applied the Supreme Court's FAA precedent to the novel legal issue it confronted, it would have found, as did the dissenting Fifth Circuit judge in *D.R. Horton*, that the FAA does not authorize enforcement of an arbitration agreement that requires a prospective waiver of substantive rights afforded by federal statutes. 737 F.3d at 365 (Graves, J., dissenting).

Because the Supreme Court has instructed that lower courts are not to treat its decisions as authoritative on issues of law that it did not decide, *Owen's* overreading of the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence warrants en banc review. See *United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB*, 307 F.3d 760, 774 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 282-84 (2001)).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. In *D.R. Horton, Inc.*, 2012 WL 36274, the Board announced that an employer violates the NLRA by imposing on its employees, as a condition of employment, an agreement that requires them to arbitrate individually all work-related disputes with their employer. As the Board explained, the Supreme Court and this Court have long recognized that Section 7 of the NLRA, which protects employees' right to "engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or protection," extends to concerted work-related legal claims. 2012 WL 36274, at *2 & n.4 (citing *Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB*, 437 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978) (citing with approval cases illustrating principle that Section 7's protections extend to concerted work-

related legal claims); *Brady v. Nat'l Football League*, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) (“a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is ‘concerted activity’ under [Section] 7”).

Likewise, it is well established that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which bars employers from interfering with employees’ rights under Section 7, by imposing on employees individual agreements that purport to restrict those rights. *See D.R. Horton*, 2012 WL 36274, at *5-6 & n.7 (citing *Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB*, 309 U.S. 350, 364 (1940); *NLRB v. Stone*, 125 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1942); *Adel Clay Prods. Co.*, 44 NLRB 386, 396 (1942), *enforced*, 134 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1943) (finding unlawful employer’s conditioning employment on the signing of individual agreements not to engage in self-organization and collective bargaining) (additional citations omitted)). Consistent with those principles, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by imposing on its employees, as a condition of employment, arbitration agreements that prospectively waive their NLRA right to band together with other employees to pursue work-related legal claims. *D.R. Horton*, 2012 WL 36274, at *1. In *Murphy Oil*, 2014 WL 5465454, the Board reexamined and readopted its *D.R. Horton* decision. In reaching its decision in *Murphy Oil*, the Board analyzed the Court’s decision in *Owen* and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in *D.R. Horton* and set forth its reasons for respectfully disagreeing with them. 2014 WL 5465454, at *9-15.

2. In *Owen*, the Court (Judges Smith, Beam, and Gruender), reversing a decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Missouri, granted Defendant

Bristol Care’s motion to stay an FLSA class-action proceeding initiated by former employee Sharon Owen and to compel individual arbitration pursuant to an agreement that Bristol Care imposed on employees, including Owen, as a condition of employment. 702 F.3d 1050. The Court described its holding as consistent with Supreme Court and circuit decisions upholding similar arbitration agreements, some in FLSA cases. *Id.* at 1054. *Owen* gave no consideration to the Board’s finding that a different result is warranted where arbitration agreements compel a prospective waiver of employees’ substantive right under the NLRA to engage in concerted legal activity. In taking that approach, *Owen* was influenced by its conclusion that the FAA implicitly repealed the NLRA (and the FLSA and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, *et seq.*) in the event the statutes conflicted, based on the FAA’s codification after the other statutes’ enactment. *Id.* at 1053.

ARGUMENT

The Board requests that the Court hear this case en banc to reconsider and overrule the panel decision in *Owen* to the extent it rejected *D.R. Horton*. The central flaw in *Owen* is the Court’s failure to account for the key distinction between the “pro-arbitration” jurisprudence it cites and cases like *Owen* and this one: the presence here of an additional substantive federal right, not asserted or addressed in those cases, guaranteeing employees’ right to litigate work-related claims concertedly. It is well-established that Section 7 rights cannot be prospectively waived in individual

agreements outside the arbitral context, and no Supreme Court case has considered the legality of an arbitration agreement purporting to effect such an impermissible waiver. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed, over decades of FAA jurisprudence, the key principle that “a substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld.” *14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett*, 556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009); *see also Am. Express Co. v. Ital. Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985). *Owen* should be reconsidered because it depends on a flawed overreading of FAA jurisprudence and disregards relevant NLRA precedent.

1. *Owen* Erred in Relying on Supreme Court Precedent That Did Not Address or Decide the Question before the Court

Owen's principal rationale for rejecting the Board's *D.R. Horton* decision was that the Supreme Court and other courts of appeals had enforced similar arbitration agreements. This ignores that fact that none of those courts addressed or decided the question before it: how the distinct NLRA right to pursue work-related legal claims concerted affects the enforceability of arbitration agreements barring all such protected concerted activity.

For example, *Owen*, 702 F.3d at 1054, lists *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991), among the key pro-arbitration Supreme Court cases influencing its analysis. *Gilmer* addressed whether a manager could be compelled to arbitrate his federal age-discrimination claim pursuant to a clause in his New York

Stock Exchange brokerage application. *Id.* at 20. No issue of concerted activity or NLRA rights was presented, and the Court upheld the arbitration agreement only because it did not entail the prospective waiver of *any* substantive right central to the purposes of the statute creating it.¹ Importantly, in deciding that critical FAA question, the Court focused on Congress’ intent in enacting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.) (to guarantee freedom from age-based discrimination), in finding that provisions creating a judicial forum and an optional collective-litigation procedure were not “substantive” for FAA purposes. *Id.* at 27-29, 32. By contrast, the arbitration agreements at issue here and in *Owen* do require the prospective waiver of signatory employees’ central right under the NLRA to act collectively for mutual protection. Contrary to *Owen*, *Gilmer*—which did not implicate Section 7—does not speak to the validity of such agreements. Properly applying *Gilmer* to that different situation, moreover, requires reviewing courts to determine the impact of the agreement on the different rights Congress provided employees under the NLRA.²

¹ *Gilmer* filed an individual claim and did not assert Section 7 rights, which the Supreme Court did not consider. Moreover, the applicable arbitration procedures under his agreement allowed for collective proceedings. *Gilmer*, 500 U.S. at 32.

² The other Supreme Court cases *Owen* highlights did not arise in the employment context and so did not implicate employees’ Section 7 rights. See *CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood*, 132 S. Ct. 665, 671 (2012); *AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). The circuit-court FLSA cases *Owen* cites, 702 F.3d at 1054, apply *Gilmer* in the absence of any Section 7-based arguments.

Owen failed to recognize that, even in cases brought to vindicate individual rights in the employment context under the FLSA and comparable statutes, plaintiffs like Owen carry into court not only those individual rights but also the separate Section 7 right to act concertedly. Consequently, those individuals may properly be entitled to more relief than plaintiffs who either do not enjoy or fail to assert that additional right.³ By mechanically applying Supreme Court precedent to that novel circumstance, while glossing over a dispositive federal right, *Owen* erred in a manner warranting en banc hearing. *See UFCW Local 1036* (citing *Alexander*, 532 U.S. at 282-84).

2. Owen Failed To Analyze the Issues Presented in Accordance with Supreme Court Precedent

Had *Owen* properly applied the Supreme Court's FAA precedent to the novel legal issue it confronted, it would have evaluated the impact of the agreement on the substantive rights afforded employees under the NLRA and determined whether the agreement required a waiver of those substantive rights. That is the analytical approach sanctioned by the Supreme Court's FAA cases. The Supreme Court has consistently held that arbitration agreements requiring a prospective waiver of substantive rights may not be enforced under the FAA, and it has always looked to

³ *See generally New York Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n*, 854 F.2d 1338, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is no anomaly if conduct privileged under one statute is nonetheless condemned by another; we expect persons in a complex regulatory state to conform their behavior to the dictates of many laws, each serving its own special purpose.”).

the animating policies of the statutes creating the rights at issue in deciding whether the agreement waives substantive rights. *E.g., Ital. Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2310.

That analytical approach is evident in *Gilmer*, where, as just discussed, the Supreme Court decided the FAA issue as it did only after first determining that Congress enacted the ADEA to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination and did not “intend[] the substantive protection afforded [by the ADEA] to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum...” 500 U.S. at 29 (quoting *Mitsubishi*, 473 U.S. at 628); *see also Pyett*, 556 U.S. at 267 n.9, 275 (“[I]t [was] the [*Gilmer*] Court’s fidelity to the ADEA’s text” that led to its decision that the ADEA permitted waiver of a judicial forum.). Indeed, in assessing whether arbitration agreements impermissibly impair substantive federal rights, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to the animating policies of the statutes creating the rights at issue. In doing so, it has repeatedly rejected challenges to the enforcement of arbitration agreements where those agreements do not impair a statute’s substantive protections and the challenges are based solely on statutory provisions ancillary to the congressional goals of the statutes in question. *See, e.g., CompuCredit*, 132 S. Ct. at 665 (judicial-forum provision not “principal substantive provision[]” of Credit Repair Organizations Act); *Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.*, 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (judicial-forum and venue provisions in Securities Act not “so critical that they cannot be waived”).

Owen's analysis rejecting *D.R. Horton*, and enforcing an individual arbitration agreement prospectively waiving an employee's Section 7 right to litigate work-related disputes in concert with fellow employees, does not comport with the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence. Most important, it disregards the importance of "prevent[ing] 'prospective waiver of a party's *right to pursue* statutory remedies,' ... [which] would certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights." *Ital. Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting *Mitsubishi*, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19); *see also Pyett*, 556 U.S. at 273; *Gilmer*, 500 U.S. at 26 ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.")).

Several years before *Owen*, this Court found that "a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees to achieve more favorable terms or conditions of employment is 'concerted activity' under [Section] 7." *Brady*, 644 F.3d at 673. Despite that precedent affirming the federal right at issue, *Owen* failed to examine whether Section 7 rights are "critical" to the NLRA—or "substantive" for FAA purposes—a key determination that turns on an interpretation of the NLRA. The Board has determined that Section 7 is indeed the core "substantive" right protected by the NLRA. *See D.R. Horton*, 2012 WL 36274, at *2; *Murphy Oil*, 2014 WL 5465454, at *1. The reasonableness of that determination is supported by the NLRA's text, which declares that protecting concerted activity for mutual protection is "the policy of the

United States,” 29 U.S.C. § 151; by the structure of the NLRA, in which every provision effectuates or enforces Section 7’s guarantee;⁴ and by NLRA jurisprudence, including the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the right to engage in concerted action is “fundamental.” *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). Because the Board is charged with the primary authority to interpret the NLRA, this determination is entitled to “considerable deference” provided that it is reasonable. *NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc.*, 465 U.S. 822, 829-30 (1984); *see also City of Arlington v. FCC*, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868-71 (2013) (to reject agency interpretation of statute within its expertise requires showing that “the statutory text forecloses” agency’s interpretation).

The Board and the courts have long held, moreover, that employees’ Section 7 rights are not subject to waiver by individual contract. Specifically, contracts that require employees to adjust their grievances with their employer individually, rather than concertedly, are per se violations of the NLRA, even when “entered into without coercion.” *Stone*, 125 F.2d at 756; *see also Nat’l Licorice Co.*, 309 U.S. at 364 (“employers cannot set at naught the [NLRA] by inducing their workmen to agree not to demand performance of the duties which [the statute] imposes”). Precluding

⁴ Section 7 lies at the statute’s core. In Section 8, Congress prohibited employers and unions alike from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (b)(1). Section 9 establishes procedures to implement representational Section 7 rights (e.g., elections, exclusive representation). 29 U.S.C. § 159. And Section 10 empowers the Board to prevent violations of Section 8. 29 U.S.C. § 160.

employers from conditioning employment on individual employee's prospective waiver of the right to pursue workplace grievances through collective litigation advances Congress' goal of minimizing industrial strife through collective action.

As the Board in *Murphy Oil* explained, protection of concerted legal activity fulfills the animating purpose of the NLRA, to “avert[] industrial strife and unrest and restor[e] equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.” 2014 WL 5465454, at *1 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also* *D.R. Horton*, 2012 WL 36274, at *4 (citing *NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.*, 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)). As the Board emphasized, *Murphy Oil*, 2014 WL 5465454, at *6, protecting employees' ability to join together to resolve workplace disputes in an adjudicatory forum has far less potential for economic disruption than many indisputably protected concerted activities, like strikes and boycotts. Such concerted activity “is often an effective weapon for obtaining that to which [employees], as individuals, are already ‘legally’ entitled,” because they may exert “group pressure upon [the employer] in regard to possible negotiation and settlement of [their] claims.” *Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB*, 206 F.2d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1953).

3. Owen Erred in Finding *D.R. Horton* in Conflict with the FAA

In finding the Board's *D.R. Horton* decision in conflict with the FAA, *Owen* failed properly to apply the Supreme Court's FAA precedent to the different situation

that is presented when an arbitration agreement requires a prospective waiver of a core substantive right under the NLRA.

First, as shown, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that it will not sanction the enforcement of arbitration agreements that prospectively waive substantive federal rights. *See Ital. Colors Rest.*, 133 S. Ct. at 2310; *Pyett*, 556 U.S. at 273; *Mitsubishi*, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19. Accordingly, a mandatory arbitration agreement is unenforceable under governing FAA jurisprudence when—like the Agreement here—it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by prospectively restricting employees’ Section 7 rights.

Second, under the FAA’s savings clause, an arbitration agreement is invalid on the same grounds as exist to revoke any contract. *See* 9 U.S.C. § 2; *Concepcion*, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. Any contract that is illegal under federal law may be denied enforcement. *Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins*, 455 U.S. 72, 83 (1982). The Board, with court approval, has repeatedly found unlawful private contracts that seek to deprive employees of Section 7 rights. *See Nat’l Licorice Co.*, 309 U.S. at 361; *Stone*, 125 F.2d at 756. Those contracts—like the Agreement, which bars all collective legal claims, requiring employees to proceed individually—also violate the public policy announced in the NLRA, thwarting Congress’ intent to protect such activity to facilitate interstate commerce. *Murphy Oil*, 2014 WL 5465454, at *1, 6-8, 11. Because the defense of illegality is unrelated to the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue, it falls comfortably within the FAA’s savings clause.

Third, enforcement of an arbitration agreement may be precluded by a statute's contrary congressional command. *See CompuCredit*, 132 S. Ct. at 669. Such a command may be explicit, or may be deduced from either a statute's text or legislative history or an "inherent conflict" between its provisions and the FAA. *Gilmer*, 500 U.S. at 26; *McMahon*, 482 U.S. at 227. Here, such a command is evident in the NLRA's text, which commands employers not to interfere with their employees' right to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. As this Court has recognized, that NLRA right includes the right to pursue joint, class, or collective employment-related legal actions. *See Brady*, 644 F.3d at 673. The Board correctly found in *Murphy Oil*, 2014 WL 5465454, at *12, that the NLRA's text and longstanding construction establish that Section 7 (as enforced in Section 8(1)) constitutes a contrary congressional command to the extent an arbitration agreement bars concerted pursuit of claims.

4. Owen Erred in Finding that the FAA Implicitly Repealed the NLRA if the Two Statutes Conflict

Owen erred in finding that, because the FAA was recodified in 1947, after enactment of the FLSA (1938), NLRA (1935) and Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932), "Congress intended its arbitration protections to remain intact even in light of the earlier passage of three major labor relations statutes." 702 F.3d at 1053. As the Board explained in *Murphy Oil*, the reenactment and codification of the FAA had no substantive effect, and "[u]nder established canons of statutory construction, 'it will

not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.” 2014 WL 5465454, at *15 & n.65 (quoting *Finley v. U.S.*, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989) (additional citations omitted)). Neither the statute codifying the FAA, nor its legislative history, suggests a congressional intention to change the FAA’s effect. *Id.* at *15. And, as the Board found, “[i]t seems inconceivable that legislation effectively restricting the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA could be enacted without debate or even notice, especially in 1947, when those labor laws were both relatively new and undeniably prominent.” *Id.*

In conclusion, *Owen* departs from Supreme Court jurisprudence under both the NLRA and FAA, and disregards a substantive federal right previously recognized by both the Supreme Court and this Court. The panel in *Owen* erred by enforcing an arbitration agreement under the FAA that prospectively waives employees’ recognized Section 7 rights, protected by a coequal statute, and by failing to consider whether that impermissible waiver renders the arbitration agreement unenforceable under the FAA’s savings clause or pursuant to the NLRA’s contrary congressional command. Accordingly, the Court should overrule *Owen* to realign itself with the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence and its own NLRA precedent.

CONCLUSION

The Board respectfully requests that the Court hear this case en banc and enter a judgment enforcing the Board's Order in full.

s/ Kira Dellinger Vol
KIRA DELLINGER VOL
Supervisory Attorney

s/ Jeffrey W. Burritt
JEFFREY W. BURRITT
Attorney

National Labor Relations Board
1015 Half Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20570
(202) 273-0656
(202) 273-2989

RICHARD F. GRIFFIN, JR.
General Counsel

JENNIFER ABRUZZO
Deputy General Counsel

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Associate General Counsel

LINDA DREEBEN
Deputy Associate General Counsel

September 2015

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT**

CELLULAR SALES OF MISSOURII, LLC	*
	*
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent	* Nos. 15-1620,
	* 15-1860
	*
v.	*
	* Board Case No.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD	* 14-CA-094714
	*
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner	*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 10, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit using the appellate CM/ECF system.

I certify that the foregoing document was served on all those parties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system.

s/Linda Dreeben
Linda Dreeben
Deputy Associate General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
1099 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20570
(202) 273-2960

Dated at Washington, DC
this 10th day of September, 2015

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C. 20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can be included in the bound volumes.

Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, and John Bauer.
Case 14–CA–094714

March 16, 2015

DECISION AND ORDER

BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS JOHNSON
AND MCFERRAN

On August 19, 2013, Administrative Law Judge Christine E. Dibble issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.¹ The Respondent also filed a motion to reopen the record, or, alternatively for administrative notice.²

¹ In its brief in support of its exceptions, the Respondent argues for the first time that the Administrative Law Judge acted without authority because the Board lacked a quorum at the time this case was litigated. It asserts that the lack of a quorum prevents the Board and those to whom the Board delegated authority from acting and that “[t]his would include the ALJ in this matter.” Respondent’s Brief at 11. It states that “the Board’s and its agents lacked authority to issue the Complaint” and that “[f]or this reason alone, the ALJ’s Decision must be overturned.”

We reject this argument. Prior to filing its exceptions, the Respondent made no effort to challenge the authority of the judge. Indeed, in its pre-hearing briefs, the Respondent not only once, but twice, argued – in opposition to the General Counsel -- that the hearing before the judge “should proceed as scheduled.” Respondent’s May 3, 2013 prehearing brief at 2; Respondent’s May 8, 2013 pre-hearing reply brief at 8. Finding merit to the Respondent’s position, the judge ordered “that the hearing scheduled for May 14, 2013, will proceed.” ALJ Order dated May 14, 2013.

Under these circumstances, we find that the Respondent is estopped from challenging the authority of the judge at this time. While the Respondent has consistently preserved its argument that the Board lacked the authority ultimately to decide this case in the absence of a quorum, it did not at any relevant time question the authority of the judge. Rather, throughout the litigation of this case the Respondent filed motions with, made argument to, and benefitted from favorable rulings by the judge. The Respondent’s reference to the authority of the judge in its brief in support of its exceptions -- made only after an unfavorable decision -- is too little, too late.

In any event, the Respondent’s argument that the General Counsel or the Administrative Law Judge acted without authority in this case because the Board lacked a valid quorum when the complaint issued is without merit. See *Pallet Companies, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 33 (2014); *Care One at Madison Ave.*, 361 NLRB No. 159, slip op. 1 n.2 (2014).

The Respondent also has requested oral argument. The request is denied as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.

² In that motion, the Respondent requested that the Board take administrative notice of a district court decision granting its motion to compel the Charging Party to arbitrate his wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. *John Bauer v. Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC.*, Case 12-05111-CV-SW-BP (W.D. Mo 2013). On September 20, 2013, the Board granted the request to take administrative notice of that court decision. We have considered the decision and find that it does not alter the result here.

The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions, brief and motion and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,³ findings, and conclusions, and to adopt the recommended Order, as modified and set forth in full below.

The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration policy in its compensation schedule that restricts employees’ rights to file charges with the Board.⁴ Applying the Board’s decision in *D. R. Horton, Inc.*, 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), the judge also found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing a mandatory and binding arbitration policy in the compensation schedule that waives the rights of employees to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

In *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), the Board reaffirmed the relevant holdings of *D. R. Horton*, supra. Based on the judge’s application of *D. R. Horton*, and on our subsequent decision in *Murphy Oil*,

³ We reject, for the reasons stated by the judge, the Respondent’s argument that the Board lacks jurisdiction because the charging party is not an employee under the Act.

⁴ Pursuant to longstanding Board precedent, the Board will find that a work rule that is required as a condition of employment, such as the arbitration policy in this case, violates Sec. 8(a)(1), if employees would reasonably believe the rule or policy interferes with their ability to file a Board charge or access to the Board’s processes, even if the rule or policy does not expressly prohibit access to the Board. See *Murphy Oil USA, Inc.*, 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), slip op. at 13, 19 fn. 98, 39 fn. 15; *D. R. Horton, Inc.*, 357 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at 2 fn. 2 (2011), enf. in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); *U-Haul Co. of California*, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enf. 255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision); *Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia*, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). Here, the parties stipulated, and the judge found, that the Respondent required employees to sign a compensation schedule as a condition of employment, which included, in relevant part, the following provision:

All claims, disputes or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this document or Employee’s employment with Company shall be decided by arbitration. . . . Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, disputes, or controversies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, collective action, or representative proceeding.

(emphasis added). Thus, this provision requires all employment-related disputes, without limit or exception, to be arbitrated as the exclusive means of resolution. In the absence of any limits to this broadly worded provision, we affirm the judge’s conclusion that the Respondent’s maintenance of this agreement violated Sec. 8(a)(1), because employees would reasonably believe it waived or limited their rights to file Board charges or to access the Board’s processes. *Murphy Oil*, slip op. at 13, 19 fn. 98, 39 fn. 15; *U-Haul Co. of California*, 347 NLRB at 377–378.

we affirm the judge's findings and conclusions,⁵ and adopt the recommended Order and notice, as modified and set forth in full below.⁶

As did the judge, we reject the Respondent's argument that the complaint is time barred under Section 10(b) of the Act because the Charging Party signed the compensation schedule more than 6 months before the initial unfair labor practice charge was filed and served. What matters, rather, is that the Respondent maintained and enforced the compensation schedule during the 10(b) period. Here, the parties stipulated that "[s]ince about January 1, 2012, Respondent has promulgated, maintained, and enforced" the compensation schedule. This time span includes, of course, the relevant 6-month period that

⁵ Member Johnson agrees with his colleagues that the Respondent's arbitration agreement, as written, violates the Act insofar as employees would reasonably believe that the agreement restricted their rights to file a Board charge or access the Board's processes. See *Murphy Oil*, slip op. at 39 fn. 15; see also *U-Haul of California*, 347 NLRB at 377–378 (finding that, because employees would reasonably construe the broadly written language in the respondent's arbitration agreement to prohibit filing charges with the Board, the policy violated Sec. 8(a)(1)). Accordingly, he joins his colleagues only in ordering a remedy for that violation.

For the reasons set forth in detail in his dissent in *Murphy Oil*, slip op. at 35–58, however, Member Johnson would not find that the Respondent's maintenance or enforcement of the arbitration agreement violates the Act insofar as it prevents employees from pursuing class and other collective actions. Because he does not find these violations, Member Johnson finds it unnecessary to consider here whether or under what circumstances the remedies related to the enforcement violation would be appropriate. See *Murphy Oil*, slip op. at 39 fn. 15 (Member Johnson, dissenting); see generally *BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB*, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). Because he finds no merit to this allegation, he does not reach the Respondent's related argument that the charging party was not engaged in concerted activity when, as an individual plaintiff, he brought a collective FLSA claim in federal district court. Nor does he pass on whether the enforcement violation was timely raised, or on his colleagues' broad assertion about the enforcement of unlawful rules in general.

⁶ Consistent with our decision in *Murphy Oil*, we amend the judge's remedy and shall order the Respondent to reimburse the Charging Party for all reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest, incurred in opposing the Respondent's unlawful motion to compel individual arbitration in the collective FLSA action. See *Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB*, 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983) ("If a violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys' fees and other expenses" as well as "any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act."). Interest shall be computed in the manner prescribed in *New Horizons*, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed in *Kentucky River Medical Center*, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). See *Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid Corp.)*, 305 NLRB 832, 835 fn. 10 (1991) ("[I]n make-whole orders for suits maintained in violation of the Act, it is appropriate and necessary to award interest on litigation expenses."), enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992).

We shall also amend the judge's remedy to order the Respondent to notify the district court that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreement and to inform the court that it no longer opposes the plaintiff's claims on the basis of the arbitration agreement.

preceded the filing of the charge on December 11, 2012, and its service on December 12, 2012. The Board has held repeatedly that the maintenance of an unlawful rule is a continuing violation, regardless of when the rule was first promulgated.⁷ It is equally well established that an employer's enforcement of an unlawful rule, including a mandatory arbitration policy like the one at issue here, independently violates Section 8(a)(1).⁸ The complaint was timely in this respect, as well.⁹

ORDER

The Respondent, Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, Pittsburg, Kansas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts employees' rights to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

(b) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement that requires employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to main-

⁷ See *Carney Hospital*, 350 NLRB 627, 627 (2007); *Eagle-Picher Industries*, 331 NLRB 169, 174 fn. 7 (2000); *Wire Products Mfg. Corp.*, 326 NLRB 625, 633 (1998), enfd. sub nom. *NLRB v. R. T. Blankenship & Associates, Inc.*, 210 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2000); *St. Luke's Hospital*, 300 NLRB 836 (1990). See also *Murphy Oil*, supra, slip op. at 13 (the vice of maintaining a workplace rule that restricts Sec. 7 activity is that it reasonably tends to chill employees' exercise of their statutory rights); *Lafayette Park Hotel*, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same). Cf. *Teamsters Local 293 (Lipton Distributing)*, 311 NLRB 538, 539 (1993) (finding violation for maintenance of unlawful contractual provision executed outside 10(b) period).

⁸ See *Murphy Oil*, supra, slip op. at 19–21 (citing *NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co.*, 370 U.S. 9, 16–17 (1962)); *Republic Aviation Corp.*, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); *Sahara Reno*, 262 NLRB 824, 824 fn. 2, 845 (1982), enfd. 722 F.2d 734 (3d Cir. 1983); *King Radio Corp., Inc.*, 166 NLRB 649, 649 fn. 2 (1966), enfd. 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1968). In adopting the judge's conclusion that the Respondent violated the Act by enforcing the compensation schedule, we rely solely on the principle that the enforcement of an unlawful provision is, in itself, an independent violation of Sec. 8(a)(1).

⁹ We reject the Respondent's alternative argument that the judge should not have treated its attempt to enforce its policy as within the 10(b) period, because, although alleged as unlawful in the complaint, it was not included in the charge or the amended charge. The Respondent's enforcement of its arbitration policy is part of the same class of violations as the allegation in the amended charge that it maintained an unlawful arbitration policy. The enforcement of the policy was dependent on, and therefore related to, its maintenance. Because the complaint allegation grew out of the charge-alleged matter while the proceeding was pending before the Board, the complaint allegation was sufficiently related to a timely charge. See *NLRB v. Fant Milling Co.*, 360 U.S. 301, 306–309 (1959); *Nickles Bakery of Indiana*, 296 NLRB 927 (1989).

tain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Rescind the mandatory and binding arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear to employees that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict employees' right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

(b) Notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

(c) Notify the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Case 12-05111-CV-SW-BP that it has rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreement upon which it based its motion to dismiss John Bauer's FLSA collective action and to compel individual arbitration of his claim, and inform the court that it no longer opposes the action on the basis of the arbitration agreement.

(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse John Bauer for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that he may have incurred in opposing the Respondent's motion to dismiss the wage claim and compel individual arbitration.

(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Pittsburg, Kansas facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A," and at all other facilities in Missouri and Kansas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."¹⁰ Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, Subregion 17, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,

¹⁰ If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notices reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."

and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice marked "Appendix A" to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 12, 2012, and any employees against whom the Respondent has enforced its mandatory arbitration agreement since June 12, 2012.

(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for Region 14, Subregion 17, a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. March 16, 2015

Mark Gaston Pearce,	Chairman
Harry I. Johnson, III,	Member
Lauren McFerran,	Member

(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

APPENDIX A

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
 POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
 An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

- Form, join, or assist a union
- Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
- Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
- Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement that our employees reasonably would

believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.

WE WILL rescind the mandatory and binding arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

WE WILL notify the court in which John Bauer filed his collective wage claim that we have rescinded or revised the mandatory arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule upon which we based our motion to dismiss his collective wage claim and compel individual arbitration, and WE WILL inform the court that we no longer oppose John Bauer's collective claim on the basis of that agreement.

WE WILL reimburse John Bauer for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses that he may have incurred in opposing our motion to dismiss his collective wage claim and compel individual arbitration.

CELLULAR SALES OF MISSOURI, LLC

APPENDIX B

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union

Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf

Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection

Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory and binding arbitration agreement that our employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement that requires our employees, as a condition of employment, to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.

WE WILL rescind the binding arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear that the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver of your right to maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, and that it does not restrict your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or to access the Board's processes.

WE WILL notify all current and former employees who were required to sign the mandatory arbitration agreement in the compensation schedule in all of its forms that the arbitration agreement has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of the revised agreement.

CELLULAR SALES OF MISSOURI, LLC

The Board's decision can be found at www.nlr.gov/case/14-CA-094714 or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.



Lyn Buckley, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
C. Larry Carbo III, Esq. and *Julie Offerman, Esq.*, for the Respondent.
Mark A. Kistler, Esq., for the Charging Party.

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

CHRISTINE E. DIBBLE, Administrative Law Judge.¹ This case was tried in Overland Park, Kansas, on May 14, 2013. The Charging Party, John Bauer (Bauer), filed the charge in Case 14-CA-094714 on December 11, 2012.² On March 7, 2013, Bauer filed an amended charge in this case. The Regional Director for Region 14 Subregion 17 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued the complaint and notice of hearing on March 22, 2013. The Respondent filed a timely answer on April 5, 2013, denying all material allegations in the complaint.

The complaint alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA/the Act) when (1) since on or about January 1, 2012, the Respondent has required its current and former employees, including Bauer, as a condition of employment, to enter into individual arbitration agreements which fail to contain an exception for unfair labor practice allegations and requires employees to waive their right to pursue class-wide or collective-representative legal action in any forum, arbitral or judicial,³ and (2) on or about January 11, 2013, the Respondent filed a motion with the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri (the District Court) in Case 12-05111-CV-SW-BP seeking an order to dismiss the lawsuit filed by Bauer on November 9, 2012, and compel arbitration and dismissal of the class or collective-action allegations, pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement described in paragraph 4(a) of the Board complaint.⁴ (GC Exh. 1.)⁵

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the Acting General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following

¹ The Respondent argues that any actions taken by this Board, including its agents and delegates, lacks authority because the court in *Noel Canning v. NLRB*, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted 81 U.S.L.W. 3695 (2013) (No. 12-1281), found the recess appointments of Members Sharon Block and Richard Griffin were unconstitutional and invalid. Thus, the Board lacks a quorum. The Board does not accept the decision in *Noel Canning*, in part, because there is a conflict in the circuits regarding this issue. *Belgrove Post Acute Care Center*, 359 NLRB No. 77, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2013).

² All dates are in 2012, unless otherwise indicated.

³ This allegation is alleged in pars. 4(a), (b), and (c), and 5 of the complaint.

⁴ This allegation is alleged in pars. 4(e) and 5 of the complaint.

⁵ Abbreviations used in this decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript; “R Exh.” for Respondent’s exhibit; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s exhibit; “GC Br.” for the General Counsel’s brief; “R Br.” for Respondent’s brief; and “R Ltr. Br.” for Respondent’s letter brief.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. JURISDICTION

The parties stipulated to the following fact on the nature of the Respondent’s business and jurisdiction:

1. The Respondent is a limited liability company with an office and places of business in Missouri and has been operating retail stores selling cell phone equipment and cell phone services at various locations in Missouri and Kansas including Pittsburg, Kansas.

2. In conducting its operations described in paragraph 1 above, during the 12-month period ending December 31, 2012, the Respondent derived gross revenues in excess of \$500,000.

3. In conducting its operations described above in paragraph 1, during the 12-month period ending December 31, 2012, the Respondent purchased and received at its Pittsburg, Kansas facility goods valued in excess of \$5000 directly from points outside the State of Kansas.

4. During calendar year 2012, and through March 31, 2013, the Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. Stipulated Background Facts

The parties stipulated to the following facts:

1. Since December 1, 2011, the following individuals have held the positions next to their respective names and have been supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and agents of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act: Hughes Bowen Hammon (Hammon), Regional Director; and Jose Ordonez (Ordonez), Regional Director. (GC Exh. 2)

2. Since approximately January 1, 2012, the Respondent has promulgated, maintained, and enforced individual agreements with its current and former sales representative employees that include the following provision:

All claims, disputes or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this document or Employee’s employment with Company shall be decided by arbitration. . . . Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, disputes, or controversies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class, collective action, or representative proceeding. . . . The parties agree that no arbitrator has the authority to . . . order consolidation, class arbitration or collective arbitration. The right to arbitrate shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment with the Company. (GC Exhs. 2, 3.)

3. Since approximately January 1, 2012, the Respondent has required sales representative employees to enter into the agreements described above in paragraph 2 as a condition of employment. (GC Exh. 2.)

4. In approximately January 2012, the Respondent and former employee, Bauer, entered into the individual arbitration agreement described above in paragraph 2. (GC Exhs. 2, 3.)

5. On approximately November 9, 2012, Bauer filed a complaint in the District Court captioned John Bauer on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v. Cellular Sales

of Knoxville, Inc., Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC and Dane Scism, Case No. 12-CV-5111. (GC Exhs. 2, 4.)

6. On approximately January 11, 2013, the Respondent filed a motion with the District Court in the matter referenced above in paragraph 5, seeking an order to dismiss the lawsuit, compel arbitration, and dismiss class/collective action allegations, pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreements described above in paragraphs 2 and 4. (GC Exhs. 2, 5.)

Respondent's operations and Bauer's employment history
with Respondent

The evidence establishes that as of May 14, 2013, the Respondent employed approximately 106 sales representatives in its 21 retail stores in Missouri and Kansas. (Tr. 52–53.) The record is undisputed that on an unspecified date in November 2010, Bauer began working for the Respondent as an independent contractor. (Tr. 27.) During a meeting in December 2011, with independent contractors, Hammon and Ordonez notified them that they would be converted to “employee status.” (Tr. 28, 42.) Bauer attended the meeting. Those in attendance were given a compensation schedule, which contained the arbitration clause at issue, to sign. (GC Exh. 6.)⁶ Additionally, the compensation schedule included a sales commission schedule. The parties stipulated that on an unknown date in June, July, or August 2012, the language in the sales commission schedule that appears at General Counsel Exhibit 3 and identified as Exhibit A was changed by the Respondent. The sales commission schedule revised language appears at General Counsel Exhibit 7. The parties stipulated, however, that the language in the compensation schedule never changed. (Tr. 20–21.) Employees were informed that they had to sign the compensation schedule before they could be hired. (Tr. 28, 43.) On or about January 1, 2012, Bauer signed the compensation schedule and became an employee of the Respondent. (Tr. 25; GC Exh. 3.) Bauer worked as an employee in several of the Respondent's retail stores until about the end of May 2012. (Tr. 30.) The parties stipulated that Bauer's “last day at work was about the last day of May of 2012.” (Tr. 25.)

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Does The Mandatory Arbitration Agreement Violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by Unlawfully Prohibiting Employees from Engaging in Protected Concerted Activities

The General Counsel argues that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of employment, to sign an agreement that prevents them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment against the Respondent in any arbitral or judicial forum. Further, the General Counsel contends that because the arbitration agreement does not contain an opt-out provision, it has the effect of leading employees to reasona-

⁶ GC Exh. 6 is a list of sales employees that signed the compensation schedule agreement with the Respondent effective from January 1, 2012, to May 10, 2013. The parties entered into a stipulation agreeing to the description of the document at GC Exh. 6. The parties also agreed that GC Exh. 6 contains an alphabetical list of employee names and their approximate hire dates. (Tr. 17.)

bly believe that they cannot file charges with the NLRB. Accordingly, the “very language of this agreement coerces all signatory employees by prohibiting them from engaging in concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.” (GC Br. 4.)

The Respondent contends the complaint must be dismissed because: (1) the Board lacks jurisdiction over the case in light of the ruling in *Noel Canning v. NLRB*, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted 81 U.S.L.W. 3695 (2013) (No. 12-1281); (2) the Charging Party was not an employee within the meaning of the Act during the 10(b) period; (3) the Charging Party has not engaged in “concerted activity”; and (4) *D. R. Horton, Inc.*, 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), is not applicable and assuming it is applicable, it is contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent and the FAA.⁷

Based on the evidence, I find that the Respondent's action violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it mandated that employees covered by the Act had to waive, as a condition of employment, their right to file joint, class, or collective claims in any arbitral or judicial forum.

1. The Board's jurisdiction to issue the complaint at issue

The Respondent argues that the case should be dismissed because the Board did not have a valid quorum when the charges and complaint in this case were filed. *New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB*, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010). The Respondent contends that any actions taken by this Board, including its agents and delegates, lack authority because the court in *Noel Canning v. NLRB*, found that the recess appointments of Members Sharon Block and Richard Griffin were unconstitutional and invalid.

I reject the Respondent's argument on this point. The Board does not accept the decision in *Noel Canning*, in part, because it is the decision of a circuit court and there is a conflict in the circuits regarding this issue. *Belgrove Post Acute Care Center*, 359 NLRB No. 77, slip op. at 1 fn. 1 (2013). Although the Fourth Circuit recently agreed with *Noel Canning* when it decided *NLRB v. Enterprise Leasing Co. Southeast, LLC*, Nos. 12-1514, 12-2000, 12-2065, 2013 WL 3722388 (4th Cir. 2013), the Board has noted that at least three courts of appeals have reached a different conclusion on similar facts. *Bloomingtondales*, supra (citing *Evans v. Stephens*, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 544 U.S. 942 (2005); *U.S. v. Woodley*, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985); *U.S. v. Allocco*, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962)). Therefore, Respondent's argument fails.

2. Charging Party is an employee within the meaning of the Act

The Respondent contends that the complaint must be dismissed because Bauer filed his initial charge more than 6 months after his execution of the compensation schedule, which

⁷ On July 3 and 8, 2013, the Respondent filed letter briefs in addition to a posthearing brief. The letter brief filed on July 3, addressed the order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Case 12-5111-CV-SW-BP. The letter brief filed by the Respondent on July 8, addressed the most recent Supreme Court ruling on arbitration agreements. The General Counsel did not file responses. Although I did not authorize the parties to file additional briefs beyond the posthearing briefs, I have considered the Respondent's additional filings in my decision-making process.

contained the alleged discriminatory language. (R. Br. 9.) In addition, the Respondent posits that pursuant to Section 2(3) of the Act, Bauer is considered an “employee” during the 10(b) period *only* if his employment “ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of an unfair labor practice.” (R. Br. 10, quoting Sec. 2(3) of the Act.) The Respondent argues Bauer does not fit within this definition of employee on either point. The General Counsel counters that the Respondent had misinterpreted the meaning of the Act’s definition of employee and Section 10(b).

Section 10(b) of the Act states in relevant part that “no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.” Although, the Respondent argues that Bauer was not an employee as defined by Section 2(3) of the Act during the 10(b) period, I find this argument fails. The Board defines “employee” broadly, including “former employees.” The Respondent referenced *Little Rock Crate & Basket Co.*, 227 NLRB 1406 (1977), in its posthearing brief to support its argument that vaguely identifying an individual as “employee” does not cloak him or her with the protections of Section 7 of the Act.

Little Rock Crate & Basket Co., however, supports the General Counsel’s assertion that “a charging party need not be an employee nor one impacted during the 10(b) period by the unfair labor practices alleged.” (GC Br. 8.) *Little Rock Crate & Basket Co.* involved a charging party that was discharged in the morning but allowed to remain in the employer’s facility until his final paycheck was available at noon that same day. The charging party began to distribute union literature to other employees while he waited on his paycheck. His former supervisor told him distribution of the literature on the employer’s property was illegal and threatened to have him arrested. Despite his discharge the Board found the charging party was a statutory “employee” within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act. The Board noted it has “long held that that term [employees] means “members of the working class generally,” including “former employees of a particular employer.” *Little Rock Crate & Basket Co.*, supra at 1406. (See *Briggs Mfg. Co.*, 75 NLRB 569, 570, 571 (1947) (finding that Sec. 2(3) of the Act provides that the term “employees” includes any employee unless the Act explicitly states otherwise; and in its generic sense the term is broad enough to include “members of the working class generally”). Therefore, under this principal, Bauer is clearly an employee within the meaning of the Act.

Further, the compensation schedule was effective within the 10(b) period for current and past employees; and the Respondent’s attempt to enforce the collective and class restrictions of the compensation schedule in District Court was done during the 10(b) period. Thus, the Respondent’s effort to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce” employees (and Bauer) in the exercise of their protected concerted activity occurred during the 10(b) period. The impact of the terms of the arbitration impacted his ability to engage in the protected concerted activity of joining with past and current employees to litigate issues involving the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of their employment with the Respondent. See *D. R. Horton; Bloomingdale’s Inc.*, Case JD(SF)-29-13 (2013) (the NLRB issued a complaint

brought by a charging party approximately 8 months after her termination contesting the class action waiver clause of an arbitration agreement. The complaint was heard and decided by an administrative law judge).

I find that Bauer was an employee within the meaning of the Act during the 10(b) period. Consequently, the Respondent’s affirmative defense on this point fails.

3. *D. R. Horton*, Supreme Court precedent, and the FAA

The Respondent contends that *D. R. Horton* is contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),⁸ 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq., and controlling Supreme Court precedent. The Respondent notes that the majority of lower courts have also declined to adopt the holding in *D. R. Horton*. See, e.g., *Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.*, 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); *Miguel v. JP Morgan Chase Bank*, 2013 WL 452418 (C.C. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013); *Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.*, 2012 WL 4754726 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2012), and cases cited therein. Moreover, on June 20, 2013, the Supreme Court issued *American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant*, 133 S.Ct. 2304, which the Respondent argues supports enforcement of the arbitration agreement at issue.

It is undeniable that increasingly the Supreme Court has shown great deference to enforcement of arbitration agreements. In *AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion*, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011), the Supreme Court emphasizes that its cases “place it beyond dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration.” The Court and NLRB acknowledge that the provisions of the FAA evince a “liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” *Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.*, 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983). The Supreme Court explains that the “principal purpose” of the FAA is to “ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.” *Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.*, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (1989). Parties may agree to specify the issues that can be arbitrated and restrict “with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes.” *Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Intl. Corp.*, 130 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010); *AT & T Mobility LLC*, supra.

American Express Co. involved merchants who accepted American Express cards and had agreements with American Express that contained an arbitration clause. The agreement included a provision precluding any claims from being arbitrated on a class action basis. Subsequently, the merchants filed a class action suit against American Express for violation of the Federal antitrust laws. The merchants argued the provision waiving class arbitration should render the agreement unenforceable because the cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim would exceed their potential recovery. American Express moved to force individual arbitration under the FAA. The Supreme Court held that arbitration is a matter of contract and the FAA precludes courts from invalidating a contractual waiver of class arbitration because “the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.” *Id.* at 2307. The Supreme Court also held

⁸ The FAA was enacted in 1925, 43 Stat. 883, and reenacted and codified in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.

that “unless the FAA’s mandate has been “overridden by a contrary congressional command,” courts cannot invalidate arbitration agreements simply because the claim is based on the violation of a federal statute. *American Express Co.* at 2310; *CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood*, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668–669 (2012).

In *D. R. Horton*, the Charging Party was required, as a condition of employment, to sign an arbitration agreement that did not have an opt-out clause. In addition, the arbitration agreement contained a clause precluding Charging Party and other employees covered by the Act from filing joint, class, or collective claims in arbitral and judicial forums. The Board explained that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it requires employees as defined by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an arbitration agreement that prohibits them from “filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.” *Id.* at 1.

I find that the Supreme Court does not expressly overrule the finding in *D. R. Horton*. The case at issue is distinguishable because the arbitration agreement precludes employees from exercising their substantive rights protected by Section 7 of the Act. The NLRA “protects employees’ ability to join together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation. *Id.*, slip op. at 2. By initiating arbitration on a classwide basis and filing a class action lawsuit in district court, both Bauer and the charging party in *D. R. Horton* were engaging in conduct that the Board has noted is “not peripheral but central to the Act’s purposes.” *D. R. Horton*, supra at 4. The Board went on to find that there was no conflict between the NLRA and the FAA “[s]o long as the employer leaves open a judicial forum for class and collective claims, employees’ NLRA rights are preserved without requiring the availability of class-wide arbitration.” *D. R. Horton*, slip op. at 16. The agreement in this matter does not provide for such an option.

The claim brought by the merchants in *American Express Co.*, is distinguishable in that it was for a violation of antitrust laws. Unlike *D. R. Horton* and the case at issue, the merchants were alleging not that they were precluded from pursuing their claim but rather the cost to do so individually would be prohibitive. *Id.* at 2309. However, the Supreme Court noted “antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.” *American Express Co.*, supra at 2309.

The Respondent does not set forth an argument explaining why it believes the holding in *American Express Co.* overrules *D. R. Horton*, other than to note that it “supports enforcement of Cellular Sale’s arbitration agreement.” (R Ltr. Br. 2.) I find nothing in *American Express Co.* or the FAA to support the Respondent’s assertion. Consequently, I am bound by Board precedent unless and until it is reversed by the Supreme Court.

4. The Charging Party has engaged in concerted activity

The Respondent argues Charging Party’s filing of the lawsuit in District Court is not protected activity under Section 7 of the Act because “there is absolutely no evidence that any employees are seeking to join, took part in, or authorized the filing of the lawsuit.” (R. Br. 13.)

Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The rights guaranteed in Section 7 include the right “to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” See *Brighton Retail, Inc.*, 354 NLRB 441, 441 (2009).

In *Meyers Industries (Meyers I)*, 268 NLRB 493 (1984), and in *Meyers Industries (Meyers II)*, 281 NLRB 882 (1986), the Board held that “concerted activities” protected by Section 7 are those “engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.” However, the activities of a single employee in enlisting the support of fellow employees in mutual aid and protection is as much concerted activity as is ordinary group activity. Individual action is concerted if it is engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing group action. *Whitaker Corp.*, 289 NLRB 933 (1988). The “mutual aid or protection” clause of the Act includes employees acting in concert to improve their working conditions through administrative and judicial forums.

In assessing whether an employer has violated Section 8(a)(1) by unilaterally implementing a policy (in this case it is a mandatory arbitration agreement), the Board applies the test established in *Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia*, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). First, it must be determined whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If the rule does, it is unlawful. However, if there is not an explicit restriction of Section 7 rights, “the finding of a violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following: (1) employees would reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” *Lutheran Heritage*, supra at 647.

It is clear that under *Lutheran Heritage*, the arbitration agreement at issue explicitly restricts and has been applied to restrict the rights protected by Section 7. Further, under Board law, it is established that Bauer engaged in concerted protected activity as a result of the class action lawsuit he filed in District Court. The Board has held that filing a class action lawsuit to address wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment constitutes protected activity, unless done with malice or in bad faith. *Harco Trucking, LLC*, 344 NLRB 478 (2005); *Host International*, 290 NLRB 442,443 (1988); *D. R. Horton, Inc.*, supra. Consequently, the Respondent’s action to force Bauer, and other employees covered under the Act, to waive their right to file a classwide action in any forum, arbitral or judicial interferes with and restrains them in the exercise of their Section rights. Therefore, I find that the Respondent’s argument fails.

Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s action violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it mandated that employees covered by the Act had to waive, as a condition of employment, their right to file joint, class, or collective claims in any arbitral or judicial forum.

B. Does The Respondent's Motion to Compel Arbitration Filed in District Court Violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act

The General Counsel advances the same arguments and cited authority to this charge as it does to the charge contesting the arbitration agreement. Likewise, the Respondent sets forth the same defenses. (GC Br. 6; R Br.; R Ltr. Br.)

In addition to the previously cited defenses, the Respondent argues that I should defer to an order issued by the District Court on July 3, 2013, granting the Respondent's motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Bauer's collective and class claims. (R Ltr. Br. Exh. C attached.) While the District Court's order is instructive, it lacks precedential authority. I am bound by Board precedent. See *Pathmark Stores, Inc.*, 342 NLRB 378 fn. 1 (2004). Consequently, this matter requires me to follow Board law as set forth in *D. R. Horton* which is contrary to the District Court's order.

Therefore, I find that the Respondent's action violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it attempted to restrict Bauer's exercise of his Section 7 rights by filing a motion in District Court to compel arbitration and dismissal of Bauer's collective and class claims.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Respondent, Cellular Sales of Missouri, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing a mandatory and binding arbitration policy which required employees to resolve employment-related disputes exclusively through individual arbitration proceedings and to relinquish any right they have to resolve such disputes through collective or class action.

3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that restricts employees' protected activity or that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to engage in protected activity and/or file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by filing a motion in District Court to compel arbitration and dismissal of Charging Party's collective and class claims.

REMEDY

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

As I have concluded that the arbitration policy contained within the compensation schedule is unlawful, the recommended Order requires that the Respondent revise or rescind it, and advise its employees in writing that said rule has been so revised or rescinded. Because the Respondent utilized the arbitration policy contained in the compensation schedule on a corporate wide basis, the Respondent shall post a notice at all locations where the arbitration policy contained in the compensation schedule was in effect. See, e.g., *U-Haul Co. of California*, supra at 1 fn. 2 (2006); *D. R. Horton*, supra, slip op. at 17.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the

entire record, I issue the following recommended⁹

ORDER

The Respondent, Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Maintaining and enforcing a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that waives the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

(b) Maintaining a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that restricts employees' protected activity or that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to engage in protected activity and/or file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(c) Seeking court action to enforce a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that waives the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial; or restricts employees' protected activity or that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to engage in protected activity and/or file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Rescind or revise the arbitration agreement contained in the compensation schedule to make it clear to employees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver in all forums of their right to maintain employment-related class or collective actions, does not restrict employees' right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or engage in protected activity, and does not require employees to keep information regarding their Section 7 activity confidential.

(b) Notify the employees of the rescinded or revised agreement to include providing them a copy of the revised agreement or specific notification that the agreement has been rescinded.

(c) File a motion with the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri in Case 12-05111-CV-SW-BP asking that the court vacate its order to compel arbitration and/or to limit the class and collective claims.

(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all facilities where the arbitration agreement contained in the compensation schedule applied copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."¹⁰ Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14 Subregion 17, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-

⁹ If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

¹⁰ If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."

secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 1, 2012.

(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. August 19, 2013

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union

Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf

Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection

Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that waives the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.

WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory and binding arbitration policy that restricts employees' protected activity or that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to engage in protected activity and/or file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Federal labor law.

WE WILL rescind or revise the arbitration agreement contained in the compensation schedule to make it clear to employees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver of their right in all forums to maintain class or collective actions, does not restrict employees' right to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board or engage in other protected activity, and does not require employees to keep information regarding their Section 7 activity confidential.

WE WILL NOT notify employees of the rescinded or revised agreement, including providing them with a copy of the revised agreement or specific notification that the agreement has been rescinded.

CELLULAR SALES OF MISSOURI, LLC