JD–23–98
Quincy, IL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES

HUCK STORE FIXTURE COMPANY

and 14–CA–24484

MID-CENTRAL ILLINOIS DISTRICT
COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS
AFFILIATED WITH UNITED
BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO

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for the Charging Party.

# DECISION

## Statement of the Case

KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Quincy, Illinois on June 17 to June 20, and on July 7 and 8, 1997. On a charge filed by the Mid-Central Illinois District Council of Carpenters (the Union) on March 12, as amended on April 30, 1997, the General Counsel issued a complaint against the Huck Store Fixture Company charging it with violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). More specifically, the complaint alleges that the Respondent committed numerous independent acts of 8(a)(1) misconduct, such as coercive interrogations of employees, threatening employees with plant closure, discharge, and unspecified reprisals, creating the impression of surveillance, circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on an antiunion petition. The Company also stands accused of 8(a)(3) violations, devising a new attendance policy and new evaluations for employees and discharging and laying off numerous employees because of their union activity.

The Respondent's answer admits the jurisdictional aspects of the complaint, as well as the supervisory hierarchy consisting of Dennis Michael Prock, president, Gene Soebbing, vice

president for administration, Ronald J. Hamann, vice president, production, Kent A Smith, production coordinator, as well as supervisors, Jeffrey Gibbs, Steve Lockett, Paul Lowe, Ronald Mock, Dave Schnelbacher, Roger J. Trimpe, and James E. Winking. However, the Respondent's answer denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.

On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent,[1] I make the following

## Findings of Fact

### I. Jurisdiction

Huck Store Fixture Company, an Illinois corporation located in Quincy, Illinois is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale of store display fixtures and related products. With sales to and purchases from points outside the state valued in excess of $50,000, the Company is admittedly an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

The Union is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

### II. Background

Prior to November 1995, the Respondent's facility was owned by K-Mart Corporation and known as Huck Fixture Company. It employed approximately 150 to 200 employees whose production and maintenance employees were represented by the Union. K-Mart's decision to close the facility prompted Dennis Prock to purchase the Company on November 1, 1995.

Prior to the actual purchase of the facility, Prock had contacted the Union. The parties met several times in September, but an effort to reach an agreement failed. The Union's effort to resume negotiations in October and thereafter remained unsuccessful.

When the Company under Prock's control began operations in November 1995, it hired many of the employees who had been employed by the predecessor company, including carpenters, finishers and laborers. In January 1996, the Company experienced a downturn in orders which lasted about 2 months. In order to reduce production, Prock decided to cut the hours of all employees rather than laying off any employees.

In January 1996 the Respondent engaged Snelling Personnel Services in order to provide the Company with temporary employees. The agreement included a proviso that the Respondent could hire a Snelling employee after he or she had worked for 300 hours. Snelling referred four employees in January 1996 and another four in April 1996. The Respondent also hired employees directly in 1996 and 1997, reaching a complement of about

[1] General Counsel's motion to strike the Respondent's letter of September 23, 1997 with enclosures is hereby granted.

200 production and maintenance employees. In December 1996, the Company hired a number of Snelling employees who had worked for the Respondent more than 300 hours.

In mid-January, 1997, Prock assembled his employees, including supervisors and informed them as follows (Tr. 117, 1002):

> He was telling us that our, the work for the year was, outlook was. . . . The work load was well covered for the year of '97. That they were working, looked like they were going to get orders from fourteen new Borders stores and that they were working with Phillips 66 and that the outlook was good and there wasn't much to worry about. And that the business had built up quicker than he had anticipated.

On January 20, 1997, the Union held its first meeting with interested employees. Employee Cecil Wayne Steffen, who initially had been employed by Snelling and then transferred as a Huck employee in December 1996, contacted the Union on January 1, 1997. The Union's business representative, Roger Schoenekase advised Steffen to solicit other employees for a union meeting to be held on January 20. A second meeting was held on January 30, 1997. During the third meeting on February 6, 1997, the attending employees signed union authorization cards and formed an organizing committee which included: Wayne Steffen, Jerry Schieferdecker, Roger Willis, Roger Stice, Owen Brown, Lenny Vandermaiden, and Rich Budde. Additional employees signed cards which they received from the members of the organizing committee.

Management became aware of the organizational efforts by its employees on or before February 13, 1997. On that day, Prock assembled his employees and spoke to them as recalled by employee Steffen (Tr. 54):

> Yes, he jumps up on a work bench and he had a Union authorization card in his right hand. And he was waving it over his head and he said, himself and management was aware of this and they strongly opposed and if anybody would like to ask for their cards back and tear them up they could have them.
>
> And that he'd treated us fairly and with open door policy and at that time he jumped off the bench and left the door.

Prock held several meetings with his management staff where, according to several of his supervisors' testimony he advised them not to threaten employees or to interrogate them about the Union. They were not to speak about the Union with the employees unless they were asked. Prock indicated to his management team that he was opposed to the Union. He asked them why the employees wanted to organize. One of the supervisors responded, saying that the employees resented Prock's large house and his expensive way of life while paying his employees low wages.

On February 20, 1997 four union representatives, including Shoenekase distributed union literature, including information about a union meeting to the employees at the Respondent's facility. Supervisor Jeffrey Gibbs approached the union officials. They provided him with the union literature. The union meeting on February 22, 1997, was attended by about 17 employees. Supervisors Gibbs and Steve Lockett went to the meeting but were denied access by the Union's business agent.

On February 26, 1997 employee Mark Smith, brother-in-law of Vice President Gene Soebing, initiated an antiunion petition. He and supervisor Trimpe signed the petition and circulated it among the employees (G.C. Exh. 10). When employee James Gallaher received the petition, it already contained numerous signatures. He did not circulate the petition, but hid it in his toolbox and gave it to the Union. Smith circulated another antiunion petition among the employees after Gallaher had removed the first one. This petition was also signed by several supervisors (G.C. Exh. 11). Supervisor Ronald Mock signed the petition and passed it to the employees in his department. Winking received the petition and gave it to Prock.

The Respondent also engaged in numerous other antiunion activities many of which went beyond any legitimate bounds of conduct.

On February 20, 1997, the Respondent made a personnel decision to reduce the payroll. As a result, the Respondent discharged 11 employees on March 4, 1997 and laid off 10 of the Snelling employees on March 7, 1997, as well as 12 of its own employees on March 11, 1997. On March 10, 1997, the Respondent hired 10 Snelling employees into permanent positions. The Respondent also gave pay raises to a number of employees on March 17, 1997. Employees were selected for discharge or layoff on the basis of a point system which included an employee's absenteeism record, as well as evaluations prepared by supervisors.

In June 1997, the Respondent decided that production had to be increased and that employees had to work overtime in certain departments, and that additional employees had to be hired.

The General Counsel argues emphatically that the Respondent's layoff and discharges were motivated by the Company's antiunion animus and were not justified by business reasons, and that the Respondent manipulated the evaluation and point systems so as to target union supporters. The Respondent's position is that it fairly selected employees for the reduction in its workforce and that the Company experienced a slowdown in orders which made it unavoidable to reduce its workforce. The Respondent also argues that all supervisors with the exception of Trimpe denied having made the unlawful statements attributed to them.

## III. Unfair Labor Practices

### A. The Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct

(A) As alleged in the complaint on February 13, 1997, Supervisor Trimpe admittedly spoke to several employees after Dennis Prock, president of the Company had expressed to the assembled employee his unequivocal opposition to the Union. Trimpe approached five employees who were eating by their work station and asked them what they thought about the Union. On the following day, February 14, Trimpe spoke with two employees about his own past experience with the Union. Trimpe walked by employee Jeremy Fruit's work station and asked Fruit what he thought he could get from the Union. When Fruit replied that he would expect higher wages, Trimpe replied that he might get a 10-cent raise but that Fruit would not be better off because he would have to pay union dues.

Interrogating employees about the Union violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if the interrogation was coercive under the surrounding circumstances. Here the coercion is not directly apparent, but the questioning occurred twice, once after the chief executive's strong expression of his opposition to the Union. The questions were bluntly directed at the employees' union activity rather than in the context of a casual conversation. Under these circumstances, I find such conduct sufficiently coercive so as to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the

Act.

(B) On February 14, 1997, supervisor James Winking, approached employee Jerry Schieferdecker at his workbench. Initially speaking about baseball, Winking spoke about the Union. Schieferdecker asked if he wanted to speak seriously or merely "chit chat." Winking said that he was seriously interested what the employees thought of the Union. Schieferdecker responded that it was time something was done about the employees' pay. Winking responded that if confronted with the Union, the Company would close the doors and leave the area. Ten or 15 minutes later, Winking returned and inquired if Schieferdecker had heard anything about any actual organizing by the employees. Winking added that it was just too early for the employees to organize.

In his testimony, Winking denied that he threatened this employee with plant closure. However, I did not credit Winking's testimony in this regard, based on my observation of his demeanor and his inconsistent testimony. For example, he expressed his desire to join the Union. Yet he had already signed a petition opposing it. Under these circumstances, the record supports the allegations in the complaint that Winking coercively interrogated the employee and unlawfully threatened him with plant closure. The questions, accompanied by threats, obviously create a coercive atmosphere in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

(C) Winking also spoke with employee James Gallaher. On February 19, 1997, Winking told Gallaher that Prock would move the plant elsewhere if the employees were to organize a union. Again, I credit Gallaher's testimony rather than Winking's denial of the conversation. A statement that the plant would be moved or relocated because of the employees' union activity has long been considered a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the remark was based on objective facts or probable consequences beyond management's control. Winking made the statements without any basis of such facts. The allegation in the complaint is accordingly substantiated by the record.

(D) On February 17, 1997 Thomas Boone, an employee assigned to supervisor's Ronald Mock's department, had a conversation with his supervisor. Mock did not deny in his testimony that the conversation occurred. Boone testified credibly that Mock asked him at his work station whether he had attended the last union meeting. Boone answered that he did. Mock then inquired how many people were present at the meeting. Boone replied six or seven. Mock continued asking questions about the Union, wanting to know who was behind the organizing effort. Boone replied that he could find out by attending the union meetings. Mock then asked whether Richard Buddy or Roger Willis were organizing the Union. Boone refused to answer the question and the conversation ended.

Mock's series of questions about Boone's and the other employee's union activities were coercive, particularly in the light of Mock's persistent manner of interrogation.

Moreover, the inquires about the union activities of the two specific employees constitutes a form of surveillance. Neither employee was known as an open union supporter. Nevertheless, Mock's questions about the union activities of two union organizers shows that the Company knew about their activity, giving rise to a presumption that the employees' union activities were under surveillance. This conduct and the coercive interrogation violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

(E) A similar scenario occurred on February 21, 1997 when supervisor Trimpe admittedly spoke with employees Jason Mooneyham and Jeremy Fruit. Trimpe asked them if they were going to attend the next scheduled union meeting. Fruit said that he did not know. Trimpe then said that they better not go because he would recognize their car. If he drove by the meeting place and saw their car he would have to fire them. Fruit replied that it sounded illegal to him. Trimpe stated that Fruit could not be fired for his union activity but that he could be fired for his performance on the job.

Coupled with threats of discharge, Trimpe's questions were coercive. Moreover, Trimpe conveyed the impression that he would recognize the employees' cars at the union meeting. This message has the tendency to discourage these employees from attending union meetings. Accordingly, not only was the interrogation coercive and violative of the Act, Trimpe's threat of discharge and the impression he created that employees' attendance at union meetings were under surveillance also constitute 8(a)(1) violations, as alleged in the complaint.

(F) On February 22, 1997 the Union held an employee meeting at its union hall. Approximately 17 employees attended the meeting. The record shows that Supervisors Jeffrey Gibbs and Steve Lockett went to the union hall and tried to gain admission to the union meeting. Gibbs had earlier obtained a written notice of the meeting which the Union had passed out to the Respondent's employees. Gibbs had approached Schoenekase and requested the flyer addressed to "Huck Employees." Because he, as a supervisor, is considered a member of Respondent's management, he was not admitted to the meeting, nor were supervisors invited. Appearing at a union meeting and attempting to gain entry is considered unlawful surveillance of employees' union activity because employees would be reluctant to attend such a meeting knowing that they would be seen by management. The Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

(G) Supervisor Paul Lowe initiated a conversation on February 25, 1997 at about 12:15 with employee Richard Budde. In a confrontational manner, he inquired why Budde was trying to organize the Union. Budde testified that he stood there and asked what Lowe was talking about. Lowe said that he [Budde] "knew what in the hell [Lowe] was talking about, that [Budde] was sneaking around under the table, trying to get cards signed and that if [he] was a real man, [he] would stand up and talk to everyone and not just one at a time" (Tr. 1089). Lowe also asked whether Budde did not feel guilty about the possibility that employees would loose their jobs for what he was doing and added that employees could lose their jobs, their livelihood and their ability to support their families because of Budde. Lowe finally said that if Buddy didn't like working there, that he "should get the hell out, actually quit, before" he cost everybody their jobs.

This conversation, the substance of which was not contradicted, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in several respects as alleged in the complaint. First, Lowe threatened the employee with the loss of jobs because of his union activity; second, Lowe's observation about the hidden activity to obtain signatures on union cards created the impression of unlawful surveillance; third his inquiry occurred under clearly coercive circumstances because of Lowe's aggressive attitude and his threats. Lastly, the remark that Budde should look for another job, because of the union activity, is clearly coercive.

(H) On February 26, 1997 supervisor Trimpe admittedly informed Mark Smith, an employee that he had to obtain the permission of Gene Soebbing to circulate an antiunion petition. Requiring an employee to obtain permission form management to engage in a union activity, albeit against the Union, is unlawful. Accordingly, Trimpe's statement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

(I) Smith circulated the antiunion petition among the employees for their signatures (G.C. Exh. 10). Trimpe took the petition, signed it and then proceeded to pass it around to about eight employees in his department urging them to sign the petition. Trimpe not only urged employees to sign, but he also threatened them with discharge if they refused to sign the petition. He ultimately handed the signed document to David Schnelbacker, the shipping department supervisor.

The Respondent's conduct in this regard violated Section 8(a)(1) in several respects, first a supervisor's solicitation of an antiunion drive among his subordinates amounts to unlawful interrogation because employees are required to disclose their reaction to the Union. Secondly the threat of discharge in connection with the antiunion petition as well as a supervisor's participation in its circulation constitute unlawful interference with the employees' Section 7 rights.

(J, K.) During the middle of the day, supervisor Jeffrey Gibbs contacted Kent Smith, coordinator of production, to inform him that the petition had disappeared. They informed, Gene Soebbing of the petition's disappearance. Soebbing went to supervisor Ronald Mock's department where they discovered that the petition had surfaced. Supervisor James Winking who had found the petition promptly signed it in front of the employees. He admitted during his testimony that he kept an eye on the petition, but that it disappeared again. Employee James Gallaher had taken it and placed it in his tool box. Winking confronted Gallaher ordering him to produce it. But Gallaher refused. Smith promptly prepared a second antiunion petition (G.C. Exh. 11). Winking assisted in the circulation of the second petition, and handed it to Mock for his signature. Mock passed the petition around among the employees in his department.

On the following day, February 27, Smith took the second petition and handed it to Soebbing who in turn placed it on Prock's desk.

According to the complaint, the following management officials engaged in unlawful interrogation: Soebbing, Smith, Winking, Mock and Gibbs. They also stand accused of circulating the petition and obtaining signatures on an antiunion petition. When the supervisors put the employees on the spot by circulating the petition to them, management was able to observe who among the employees favored the Union and who was willing to sign the document. This form of conduct was obviously coercive and amounted to unlawful interrogation. It is also clear that supervision in aiding and abetting the circulation of an antiunion petition violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Finally, Winking by keeping an eye on the petition, observing its circulation and its subsequent disappearance as Gallaher placed the petition into his toolbox, his stern questioning of Gallaher about it and his request that the petition be returned, constitute unlawful surveillance and coercive interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1).

(L) A conversation on February 26 between Winking and employee Carl Steffen concerning the Union was alleged as a violation of Section 8(a)(1). The record shows that Winking approached Steffen and spoke initially about a basketball game. Winking then inquired about the Union. Steffen responded that he was interested in anyone who could help improve his pay and benefits. Winking said that he lost his job with the predecessor company, because of the Union, and that he would do whatever it took to keep his job. Winking suggested that Steffen speak to someone who could counsel him better like his father-in-law. When Steffen replied that his father-in-law, an IBEW representative, had just organized his workplace, Winking abruptly left.

Winking violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening the employee with unspecified reprisals, when he threatened to do anything to keep the Union out. In this context the interrogation was coercive and also in violation of the Act.

(M) Supervisor Trimpe had a confrontation with Gallaher on about February 28 or 29, 1997, in the presence of two other employees near the coffee machine. Trimpe looked at Gallaher and speaking in a loud voice said: "What do you boys think about this Union shit?" (Tr. 570). The employees did not respond and Trimpe continued saying, "I think we ought to take you boys out who signed union cards, and kick your asses."

Trimpe's conduct amounted to a threat of physical violence and coercive interrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1).

(N) The Huck Store Fixture Company Employee Handbook provides in pertinent part:

> No one may distribute literature or post notices on company premises without written permission from management. All request for such activities will be in accordance with these standards.

The policy provides further that employees are subject to discipline including discharge for violations of the policy. The policy is presumptively invalid as it prohibits the solicitation by employees on their own time. *Our Way, Inc.*, 268 NLRB 394 (1983). The Respondent has not shown that the policy was either not enforced or provided for exceptions to the blanket prohibition. Accordingly, it is clear that the Company's maintenance of such a policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

## IV. Layoffs and Discharges

The complaint alleges that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act when on March 4, 1997 it discharged 11 employees based upon an attendance policy and job evaluations which were applied retroactively because the employees engaged in union activities. On March 7, 1997 the Company laid off 10 employees and on March 11, 12 more employees were laid off. Yet on March 10, 1997, 10 employees who had held temporary positions with Snelling were converted into permanent employees. These personnel actions occurred, according to the General Counsel, not for legitimate business reasons, but for reasons relating to the Union.

The Respondent argues that the Respondent under the leadership of Dennis Prock resurrected a failed company through his investments and that he was encouraged by local civic leaders to reopen that facility. The Respondent grew substantially in a relatively short time. The Company hired a substantial number of employees, including supervisors from the predecessor company. In mid-January 1997, Prock informed the employees that the outlook for the business was excellent and that it exceeded his expectations. He explained that the current goal was to build up the inventory in order to avoid overtime schedules which the Company had experienced in the prior year.

The Respondent further agrees that in spite of Prock's expressed optimism for the balance of 1997, inventories were building up and the Company increasingly resorted to the bank credit line in order to finance the operation. By March 1, 1997, so argues the Respondent, the Company had exhausted its credit line and was unable to finance further inventory, or pay wages or raw material costs for new production without revenue from product deliveries. Moreover, according to the Respondent, Prock learned in early February, while visiting Phillips 66, a customer located in Oklahoma, that it had taken its store construction in house, resulting in a substantial reduction in business from that source. In addition, other customers like Dominos and Borders had not committed themselves to production and delivery schedules all of which convinced management on February 20, 1997 that it was overstaffed by twenty to twenty-five percent. The Company then proceeded to devise a formula designed to evaluate the workforce and to retain the most qualified and productive employees. Among the various departments, the staffing in the cabinet rooms were particularly targeted for reductions. As a result employees were evaluated by their supervisors on the basis of a point system. Also included in the overall evaluation was the individual's absenteeism record which was assembled by senior management. The Respondent does not contest that the individuals named in the complaint were laid off or discharged.

Based upon my analysis of the record, including the financial information, I find that the Respondent's personnel actions were motivated by union animus inconsistent with and unjustified by the state of Respondent's business. Under the Respondent's evaluation system a greater number of prominent union activists lost their jobs, than the number of union supporters who remained employed, although several employees who had no history of union activity also became unemployed.

A logical discussion of the reasons for the reduction in the work force, starts with Prock's announcement to the assembled employees in the second half of January that business looked good, that the Company was building inventory because it had commitments and was trying to reduce overtime work which was necessary in the prior year. Prock indicated that business had improved quicker than anticipated.

The Respondent's two largest and important customers Border and K-Mart had already made commitments for products which were at least as large as those in 1996. In addition, the Respondent had two other customers, Domino's and Phillips 66. For example, in 1996, Respondent's business with Borders consisted of about $4 million worth of fixtures. This compared with orders in 1997 exceeding $5 million in fixtures. Similarly, Respondent's business with K-Mart which in 1996 amounted to almost $2.5 million was expected in January to grow to almost $3.4 million in 1997. Respondent expected to sell $500,000 worth of fixtures to Dominos. Another customer was Phillips 66 which in 1996 ordered almost $300,000 worth of products. On February 20, 1997 the Respondent anticipated to obtain orders from that customer worth about $480,000 in sales. This was the only reduction in anticipated business, because in January, 1997, projected sales to Phillips 66 were $750,000 in orders. In addition, the Respondent was able to obtain a new customer, Highsmith, and expected $500,000 worth of new business. In sum, as pointed out by the General Counsel, the Respondent hoped to exceed its 1996 sales, by $1.5 million from Borders, $1 million from K-Mart, $500,000 from Domino's and Highsmith and $180,000 from Phillips 66.

In the middle of February, the two senior executives, Prock and Soebbing, went out to visit their customers to obtain firmer commitments. Meetings on February 18 and 19 with officials of Dominos, K-Mart and Borders substantiated Respondent's projections, although

Borders had not formally committed itself. Only Phillips 66 was "the wild card" in this scenario because it had indicated a reduction in its orders, from a high of $750,000 to $480,000.

This scenario supports the optimism expressed by Prock in January 1997 to the employees that business looked good. The Respondent's meetings with its four major customers in February should have confirmed the optimism, because only one of the customers, Phillips 66, projected fewer orders than that expected, and that decrease -- $270,000 -- was relatively small in comparison to the increase in orders from the other customers, constituting approximately 3 percent of the anticipated orders for 1997.

In his testimony, Prock conceded that his business outlook in early January and his business outlook in February 1997 had not changed significantly. For example, he testified as follows (Tr. 1315):

> I figured we had the core business of Phillips, Borders, K-Mart and Dominos to sustain the number of workers there plus going out and getting some business. I thought it looked -- I know it looked a lot better and I made this comment -- than it did a year earlier.
>
> . . . .
>
> So the difference between the first part of January and the end of February was not that significant but yet it was enough that we had to make some changes.

The Respondent, however, made not only "some changes" but drastic changes. Respondent's brief refers to "factual information currently available from the four major customers. . . determined that Respondent had 20-25% more production workers than required" (R. Br. p. 6). Accordingly 33 employees were discharged and laid off.

The Respondent's assertion with regard to the overstaffing is plainly inconsistent with the record evidence summarized above. Instead, the record shows that the personnel action was made, as alleged in the complaint, because of the employees' union activity.

The Respondent had solid information that the Union was attempting to organize the employees. It is conceded that on February 13, 1997, Prock learned that authorization cards were being circulated. The record shows that the Company was aware that a union meeting was held on February 12, 1997. Moreover, the Respondent admitted knowing these principal union activists who served on the organizing committee, Steffen, Willis, Schieferdecker, Budde, and Stice. Prock had obtained a union card and supervisors had obtained information from the employees through interrogations and surveillance.

The record shows the Respondent's strong and unequivocal antiunion animus. Prock announced to the employees, especially assembled to listen to his message that he was opposed to the Union. In addition, the Company's supervisory hierarchy committed numerous independent 8(a)(1) violations, such as threats of plant closure and the loss of jobs, coercive interrogations and surveillance of employees' union activity. Supervisors were involved in circulating antiunion petitions and so informed Prock. In short, the Respondent's antiunion animus was strong, clear, and unambiguous.

The timing of the massive discharges and layoffs suggests an unlawful motive. On February 13, Prock had knowledge of the union drive and within days Prock and Soebbing made the decision to reduce the workforce by 20 percent. Management promptly devised a method to evaluate its employees. On March 4, 10 and 11, 1997 the Company effectuated its plan and discharged and laid off 33 employees. It is well recognized that timing is an important factor in assessing motivation. The Board frequently infers that an asserted justification is a pretext and that an adverse personnel action was discriminatorily motivated. *Causley Pontaic v. NLRB*, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980).

On March 17, 1997, the Company granted wage increases to those employees who were earning less than $8. Approximately 33 employees were affected by the increase in pay.

If in reality the Respondent had faced a business slowdown, it could have done what was done in January of the prior year and reduced the working hours of all of its employees. At that time the Respondent was not faced with a union drive of its employees. Moreover, if the Respondent had actually been overstaffed in March, it would have been unnecessary to augment its employee complement by the same number of employees already in June 1997. Similarly, the Respondent would not have had to start a second shift so soon in the mill room and have the entire workforce work overtime. And finally, the pay raises granted within days of the discharges and layoffs belies the argument that the Respondent's cash flow problem required a reduction in the payroll.

Clearly, the Respondent's justification for the discharges and layoffs in March were totally unjustified by business reasons. Instead, the Respondent was motivated by its union animus. I cannot credit Prock's or Soebbing's testimony that the decision for the layoffs and discharges were business related[2] and find that the business justification amounted to a pretext, and that the discharges and layoffs violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent clearly failed to establish a business justification and any suggestion that these 33 individuals would have been laid off or discharged even in the absence of the employees' union activity is simply unconvincing and not supported by the record. *Wright Line*, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).

The General Counsel argues not only that the adoption and enforcement of the evaluation policy was unlawful because it was used in response to the employees' union activity, but she also submits in great detail that the evaluation policy was designed to target individual union supporters. Evidence of this effort was Respondent's concentrated layoffs in the cabinet rooms where the majority of union supporters worked, and the selection of production workers rather than laborers. Lower scores were given to employees who did not sign the antiunion petition, and skilled employees were selected rather than the less skilled.

The records shows that the Respondent was advised by legal counsel in the planning of this job action. Once the decision was made to reduce the employee complement, the Respondent used a method which appeared lawful and nondiscriminatory on its face. Supervisors assigned a numerical score to each employee, based on five categories, attitude, work habit, quality of work, absenteeism, and knowledge (G.C. Exh. 3). In addition, the Respondent devised an attendance policy and a formula designed to evaluate the employees' attendance. The record shows that some union supporters lost their jobs pursuant to the policy

[2] For the reasons stated in the General Counsel's detailed brief, I find unreliable and implausible the Respondent's lack of cash argument. Domino's negotiator, for example, offered to pay for the built up inventory in February, 1997.

and some did not. Similarly, some employees who did not support the union lost their jobs. Most of the employees laid off on March 11 had signed union cards and half of the ones discharged March 4 had signed union cards. For example, employees Brooks, William and Jeremy Fruit, Hutton and Parrish were discharged. The General Counsel may be correct that the evaluation system was set up in such a way so as to include as many union supporters as possible. Why for example, did the process include evaluations for the Snelling temporary employees. That relationship could simply have been canceled in order to save the jobs of as many of Respondent's employees as possible. The Respondent counters by stating that it wanted to retain the most productive employees. The record also shows that relatively more skilled employees were laid off, which included many of the union supporters. Known union supporters who were laid off were Willis, Steffen, Brown, Schieferdecker and Gallaher. The evaluation process lent itself to a subjective appraisal of each employee, which could have been used to the disadvantage of union supporters. These and other arguments tend to support the General Counsel's theory, although I believe that the evaluation policy was not discriminatory on its face and not unlawful per se.

However, the unlawfulness of Respondent's entire job action of discharges and layoffs is well supported by the record. The Respondent's effort to target union supporters through the evaluation process substantiates the finding of the 8(a)(3) and (1) violations.

## Conclusions of Law

1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by each of the following acts and practices:

(a) Supervisor Trimpe coercively interrogating employees about their union activities on February 13, 21, 26, 28, 1997;

(b) Trimpe threatening employees with discharge on February 21 and 26, and with physical violence on February 28, 1997, because the employees engaged in union activities.

(c) Trimpe creating the impression that the employees' union activities are under surveillance on February 21.

(d) Trimpe telling employees that they must obtain permission from the Respondent to engage in union activities.

(e) Supervisor Winking coercively interrogating employees about their union activities on February 14 and 26, 1997.

(f) Winking threatening employees with plant closure and relocation on February 14, with unspecified reprisals on February 26 and with physical violence on February 28, 1997, because the employees engaged in union activities.

(g) Supervisor Mock coercively interrogating employees on February 20 and 26, 1997 about their union activities.

(h) Mock creating the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance on February 20, 1997.

(I) Supervisors Gibbs and Lockett engaging in surveillance of employees' union activities.

(j) Supervisor Lowe coercively interrogating employees about their union activities on February 25, 1997, and creating the impression that union activities were under surveillance.

(k) Lowe threatening to discharge employees because of their union activities.

(l) Lowe telling an employee that he should find another job if he wanted to engage in union activities.

(m) Supervisors Soebbing, Smith, Winking, Mock, and Gibbs, coercively interrogating employees about their union sympathies, by soliciting them to sign an antiunion petition and unlawfully circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on an antiunion petition.

(n) Maintaining an overly broad solicitation policy which prohibits any solicitations on company property without prior approval by management.

4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by its job actions and changes made on March 4, 7, 10 and 11, 1997 because of the employees' union activities, including discharging the following employees on March 4, 1997:

| | |
|---|---|
| John Boaerson | John Jacobs |
| Robert Booher | Tom Killday |
| Leonard Brooks | Tyson Mauck |
| Ed Fruit | Kevin McAffee |
| Jeremy Fruit | Pierre Parrish |
| Sam Hutton | |

and laying off the following employees on

March 7

| | |
|---|---|
| Quentin Brace | Jack Doran |
| Dan Byington | Greg Hultz |
| James Cannon | Crystal Jenkins |
| Joe Chitwood | Wes Massengill |
| Kyle Daggett | Daniel Werneth |

March 11

| | |
|---|---|
| Tom Boone | James Payne |
| Owen Brown | Jerry Schieferdecker |
| Gary Chapman | Brandon Schroder |
| James Ende | Wayne Steffen |
| James Gallaher | Dennis Tarpein |
| Marty McGlauchen | Roger Willis |

6. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by granting wage increases to about 30 employees because of the employees' union activities.

7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

## The Remedy

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged and laid off the above referenced employees, I shall recommend that the Respondent offer them immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. All backpay provided shall be computed with interest on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in *F.W. Woolworth Co.,*, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest computed in the manner and amount prescribed in *New Horizons for the Retarded*, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).

On these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record I issue the following recommended[3]

## ORDER

The Respondent, Hucks Store Fixture Company, its officers, agents and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their union activities, sympathies and the union activities of other employees.

(b) Threatening employees with discharge, loss of jobs, physical violence and unspecified reprisals because of the employees' union activities.

(c) Threatening employees with plant closure or plant relocation because of their union

[3] If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

activities.

(d) Creating the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance and engaging in surveillance of employees' union activities.

(e) Telling employees to find another job if they supported the Union and telling employees that they must obtain permission from management to engage in union activities.

(f) Circulating and assisting in obtaining signatures on antiunion petitions.

(g) Maintaining overly broad no solicitation rules.

(h) Taking job actions and initiating job changes, such as discharges, layoffs, reassignments and granting pay raises because of the employees' union activities.

(i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

(a) Offer Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary Chapman, James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty McClauhen, James Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon Schroder, Wayne Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis, Quentin Brace, Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe Chitwood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crystal Jenkins, Wes Massengill, Daniel Werneth, John Boaerson, Robert Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Killday, Tyson Mauck, Kevin McAffee, and Pierre Parrish immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if these jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.

(b) Expunge from its files any reference to the layoffs and discharges and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of the discharge will not be used as basis for any future action against them.

(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.

(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Quincy, Illinois, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."[4] Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,

[4] If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."

defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since March 12, 1997.

(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated, Washington, D.C. March 19, 1998.

Karl H. Buschmann
Administrative Law Judge

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees about their union activities, sympathies and the union activities of other employees.

WE WILL NOT threatening employees with discharge, loss of jobs, physical violence and unspecified reprisals because of the employees' union activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten employees with plant closure or plant relocation because of their union activities.

WE WILL NOT create the impression that employees' union activities were under surveillance and engage in surveillance of employees' union activities.

WE WILL NOT tell employees to find another job if they supported the Union and telling employees that they must obtain permission from management to engage in union activities.

WE WILL NOT circulate and assist in obtaining signatures on antiunion petitions.

WE WILL NOT maintain overly broad no-solicitation rules.

WE WILL NOT take job actions and initiate job changes, such as discharges, layoffs, reassignments and granting pay raises because of the employees' union activities.

WILL WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL offer Tom Boone, Owen Brown, Gary Chapman, James Ende, James Gallaher, Marty McClauhen, James Payne, Jerry Schieferdecker, Brandon Schroder, Wayne Steffen, Dennis Tarpein, Roger Willis, Quentin Brace, Dan Byington, James Cannon, Joe Chitwood, Kyle Daggett, Jack Doran, Greg Hultz, Crystal Jenkins, Wes Massengill, Daniel Werneth, John Boaerson, Robert Booher, Leonard Brooks, Ed Fruit, Jeremy Fruit, Sam Hutton, John Jacobs, Tom Killday, Tyson Mauck, Kevin McAffee, and Pierre Parrish immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if these jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them

whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision.

WE WILL expunge from our files any reference to the layoffs and discharges and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of the discharges will not be used as basis for any future action against them.

HUCK STORE FIXTURE COMPANY

(Employer)

Dated _____ By _____

(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered with any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 611 North 10th Street, Suite 400, Saint Louis, Missouri 63101–1214, Telephone 314–425–4154.