UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SUBREGION 24

UNIDAD LABORAL DE ENFERMERAS(OS)
Y EMPLEADOS DE LA SALUD,[1]

Employer

and Case 12-RC-127729

UNION DE LA ULEES,

Petitioner

DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION

Unidad Laboral de Enfermeras(os) y Empleados de la Salud (the Employer), a labor organization established under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, is engaged in representing employees for the purposes of collective bargaining in Puerto Rico.[2] The Employer represents employees for purposes of collective bargaining in the health care industry.

On May 1, 2014, Union de la ULEES (the Petitioner) filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) under Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, seeking to represent a unit of all full-time union organizers employed by the Employer at its facilities located in San Juan and Ponce Puerto Rico, excluding all other employees, confidential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

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[1] The Employer's name appears as corrected by the parties at the hearing.
[2] The parties stipulated that the Employer is a labor organization established under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with offices in San Juan and Ponce, Puerto Rico, and during the past 12 months, a representative period, the Employer received gross revenues valued in excess of $500,000 and purchased and received at its Puerto Rico locations, goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from firms which in turn, purchased those goods and materials directly from points located outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The parties stipulated, and I find, that the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.

The Employer contends that the petition should be dismissed because the Petitioner is not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, whereas the Petitioner contends that it is a statutory labor organization, and that an election should be directed. The Employer also alleges the Petitioner's coordinator, Arturo Grant Pardo (Grant), who filed the petition herein on behalf of the Petitioner, is a statutory supervisor, and therefore the petition should be dismissed, a claim which the Petitioner denies. In its post-hearing brief, the Employer asserted that the petition should be dismissed because the Petitioner had filed and withdrawn previous petitions, and had filed the instant petition less than six months after the withdrawal of those petitions.

There is no dispute that six of the Employer's employees are full-time union organizers. The Employer contends that two additional employees, Madelen Mercado and Jose Quiñones, are full-time union organizers and should be eligible to vote if an election is directed. On the other hand, the Petitioner contends that those two employees are confidential employees and are not union organizers; that Quiñones enjoys special status because his brother Radamés Quiñones is the Employer's Executive Director; and that neither Madelen Mercado nor Jose Quiñones should be found eligible to vote for these reasons.

I find that the Petitioner is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Petitioner's coordinator, Arturo Grant Pardo, is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. I further find that there is no bar to proceeding to an election notwithstanding the filing and withdrawal of previous petitions by the Petitioner. Accordingly, I find that a question concerning representation exists and I shall direct an election.

I further find that employees Madelen Mercado and Jose Quiñones are union organizers employed in the petitioned-for unit, and that they are eligible to vote because there is insufficient evidence to establish that either of them is a confidential employee, and

there is no evidence that Jose Quiñones enjoys special status that would make him ineligible to vote.

I. The Hearing

On May 26, 2014, a hearing was held in this matter. At the start of the hearing, the Petitioner argued that it was not prepared to present evidence because it had anticipated that the parties would execute a Stipulated Election Agreement. However, the petition, Notice of Representation Hearing, and Statement of Standard Procedures in Representation Cases were served on the Employer and the Petitioner on May 1, 2014, 11 days before the hearing. Therefore, the parties had ample notice and opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Notwithstanding the Petitioner's assertion that it was not prepared to present evidence, the Petitioner's coordinator, Grant, fully participated in the hearing, testified on behalf of the Petitioner, and cross-examined Ana Consuela Meléndez, the Employer's President and its only witness. The Petitioner did not request a postponement of the hearing and its coordinator stated that he had no additional witnesses when questioned by the Hearing Officer shortly before the conclusion of the hearing. The parties filed timely post-hearing briefs.[3]

[3] I have carefully considered the parties' post-hearing briefs to the extent that they relied on record evidence or on the prior petitions filed with the Board involving the petitioned-for unit, as discussed below at footnote 7. However, I have not considered certain post-hearing assertions made by the Petitioner regarding Jose Quiñones which were not based on testimony given under oath by a witness at the hearing, and were not subject to cross-examination or objection. In addition, I have not considered documents submitted by the Petitioner after the hearing because they were not offered in evidence at the hearing and were not subject to objection or ruling on their authenticity or relevance. These documents include what appear to be: a one page press release issued by Jose Quiñones on behalf of the Employer titled "Nurses in the S.J. Municipality Taking a 'Hit'" dated November 25, 2013; the Employer's constitution and rules consisting of a cover page and 13 pages of text, plus a code of ethics consisting of three pages of text; a one page daily work report form for officials and organizers employed by the Employer; a two page letter from Grant to the Employer's Executive Director dated May 27, 2013; and two pages of handwritten notes from a meeting of the Employer's personnel. I also note that the Petitioner did not move to reopen the record to introduce the additional asserted facts or documents.

II. Facts

A. Labor Organization Status of the Petitioner

The undisputed testimony of Grant, the Petitioner's coordinator, who is a full-time union organizer employed by the Employer, establishes that the Petitioner was formed on May 23, 2013, for the purpose of dealing with the Employer concerning conditions of work, wages, grievances, and labor disputes of the employees employed by the Employer at its facilities in San Juan and Ponce, Puerto Rico, and that it will fulfill this purpose if it is certified as the employees' bargaining representative. Since May 2013, the Petitioner's coordinator has met in person and conferred by telephone with the other union organizers employed by the Employer to discuss matters relating to their conditions of employment. The Petitioner is not affiliated with any other labor organization.

The Petitioner has asked the Employer to recognize it as the bargaining representative of the union organizers employed by the Employer on two occasions, and the Employer has not responded to those requests. The Petitioner's coordinator testified that under these circumstances the Petitioner is unable to engage in collective bargaining with the Employer until it is certified as the representative of the Employer's employees.

At the time of the hearing, the Petitioner had not registered with the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or with the United States Department of Labor. It had not yet adopted a constitution or by-laws, and it did not have a Board of Directors. However, the Petitioner had prepared a draft of a constitution.

B. Arturo Grant Pardo

At the hearing the Employer asserted that Grant, the Union's coordinator, is a statutory supervisor because he has assigned work to another union organizer. However, Grant denied that he assigned work to the other organizer, and denied that Radamés Quiñones, the Employer's Executive Director, directed him to supervise the other organizer. Neither the other organizer nor the Executive Director testified. In addition, Ana

Consuela Meléndez, the Employer's President, testified that Grant is employed by the Employer as a union organizer, and that she and the Employer's Executive Director supervise all of the Union organizers, including Grant. The Employer's President provided no testimony to the effect that Grant exercises supervisory authority. In summary, the Employer presented no evidence that Grant has assigned work or has exercised any other supervisory authority.

C. Madelen Mercado and Jose Quiñones

The Petitioner contends that two of the individuals who the Employer claims are union organizers, Madelen Mercado and Jose Quiñones, should be excluded from the unit because they are not organizers and they are confidential employees, and because Quiñones is the brother of the Employer's Executive Director, Radamés Quiñones. On the other hand, the Employer contends that Mercado and Jose Quiñones are union organizers who perform the same or similar duties and responsibilities as the other six organizers, that they are not confidential employees, and that Jose Quiñones enjoys no special status or benefits notwithstanding that he is the brother of the Employer's Executive Director. Accordingly, the Employer contends that Mercado and Jose Quiñones should be eligible to vote if an election is directed.

The Employer's President testified that she and three union organizers, including Grant and Jose Quiñones, work out of the Employer's San Juan office, and that Executive Director, Radamés Quiñones and five union organizers, including Mercado, work out of its Ponce office. The Employer's organizers have the duties of organizing unorganized employees of health care industry employers by various means, including leafleting, collecting employee signatures, holding meetings with employees, and making visits to employees. Organizers also visit members of the Employer, attend picket lines, and handle grievances and other representational duties with respect to employees in organized facilities. Organizers Grant and Ariel Echeverría also negotiate collective-

bargaining agreements with health care employers on behalf of the Employer. Other organizers attend collective-bargaining meetings on occasion, but not as negotiators.

Meléndez testified that Mercado has the same functions as the other organizers in the Ponce office, but also testified that Mercado is being trained for certain organizer duties because she is not yet ready to perform all of them, and will perform those functions once she has been trained. The record does not reflect which duties Mercado is being trained to perform, the nature of the training that she is receiving, or when her training will be complete. Meléndez further testified that Mercado collected signatures from employees as part of the Employer's effort to organize the employees of St. Luke's Hospital in Ponce. The record does not reflect when that occurred.

The Employer's President, Meléndez, testified that Jose Quiñones organizes employees of the Municipality of San Juan. The Petitioner's coordinator acknowledged that Jose Quiñones does "some" organizing work, and did not quantify what he meant by "some." Meléndez further testified that Jose Quiñones assists the Employer by organizing campaigns involving employers other than the Municipality of San Juan as needed, and that he participated in the Employer's organizing campaigns at St. Luke's Hospital in Ponce and Auxilio Mutuo Hospital, and worked with picket lines established by the Employer at Hospital San Carlos Borromeo in Moca, Puerto Rico and at a hospital in Guayama, Puerto Rico.

Concerning the Petitioner's assertion that Mercado and Jose Quiñones are confidential employees, Meléndez testified that neither of them attend the Employer's managerial meetings, nor are they involved in any labor relation matters, the implementation of policies on behalf of the Employer vis-à-vis labor relations with its employees, or the transportation of confidential documents concerning labor relations between the Employer and its employees. She further testified that Mercado is assigned to open and close the Employer's Ponce facility simply because there is currently no

"permanent secretary" working at that facility and Mercado lives the closest to the Employer's Ponce facility. Previously, this task was performed by a secretary. According to Meléndez, the Employer's confidential information is maintained in offices of the Employer's managers and accountant, for which there are individual office keys, and neither Mercado nor Jose Quiñones has keys to those offices.

Grant, the Petitioner's coordinator, asserted that the duties of Mercado and Jose Quiñones are different from those of the rest of the union organizers, but failed to provide any evidence showing how their duties are different, except that Mercado has a key to open the Employer's Ponce facility, and Jose Quiñones is the brother of the Employer's Executive Director. There is no evidence that Jose Quiñones enjoys any special status or that he receives any benefits that other union organizers do not receive.

III. Analysis

The Employer's argument that the petition should be dismissed because the Petitioner filed it less than six months after the withdrawal of previously filed petitions is without merit. I take official notice of the fact that the Petitioner filed and withdrawn petitions seeking certification as representative of the unit it seeks to represent in this case on three past occasions, in Cases 12-RC-116251 (filed on November 4, 2013, and withdrawn on November 14, 2013), 12-RC-116835 (filed on November 13, 2013, and withdrawn on April 17, 2014), and 12-CA-126788 (filed on April 17, 2014, and withdrawn on April 29, 2014). In its post-hearing brief, the Employer contends that the current petition is barred because a six month period has not transpired since the withdrawal of the previous petitions. However, there were no hearings or election agreements in any of the previous cases. In these circumstances, the Petitioner's requests to withdraw these earlier petitions

were appropriately granted without prejudice to the subsequent filing of a new petition by the Petitioner.[4]

With respect to the labor organization status of the Petitioner, Section 2(5) of the Act provides the following definition of "labor organization:

> Any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.

For an organization to fall within the statutory definition of a labor organization, the Board has held that employees must participate in the organization and it must exist for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers on their behalf regarding their wages, hours of employment and other terms and conditions of employment. See *Alto Plastic Mfg. Corp.*, 136 NLRB 850, 851 (1962). Under this definition, an incipient union that has not yet won representation rights is considered a statutory labor organization if it was formed for the purpose of representing employees. *East Dayton Tool & Die Company*, 194 NLRB 266 (1971); *Michigan Bell Telephone Company*, 182 NLRB 632 (1970). In addition, "structural formalities" such as a constitution, by-laws, meetings, and filings at the Department of Labor, "are not prerequisites to labor organization status within the broad meaning given that phrase in Section 2(5)." *Yale New Haven Hospital*, 309 NLRB 363 (1992), citing *Yale University*, 184 NLRB 860 (1970); *Butler Manufacturing Company*, 167 NLRB 308 (1967). Similarly, it is well settled that the existence of elected officers is not determinative in analyzing whether an organization is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. *Steiner-Liff Textile Products Co.*, 259 NLRB 1064, 1064-1065 (1982).

[4] If a withdrawal request is received before the close of a hearing or before the approval of an election agreement, the request should be granted *without prejudice* to the subsequent filing of a new petition by the petitioner. See Section 11111 of the Board's Casehandling Manual, Part Two, Representation Proceedings.

In the present case, the record evidence amply demonstrates that Petitioner is a newly formed organization in which employees participate and that its intent is to negotiate with the Employer on behalf of its union organizers, with respect to the organizers' wages, hours and working conditions. As stated above, such an incipient union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act even though it has not yet actually represented employees, chosen officers, or adopted a constitution or other structural formalities. Accordingly, I find that Petitioner is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.[5]

With respect to the alleged supervisory status of Arthur Grant Pardo, the Petitioner's coordinator, the burden of establishing the supervisory status of an employee is on the party asserting that status. *NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care*, 532 U.S. 706, 711-712 (2001); *Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.*, 348 NLRB 686 at 687, 694 (2006). As noted above, there is no evidence that the Petitioner's coordinator is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.[6] Moreover, the Employer did not even assert that Grant exercised independent judgment in connection with the assignment of work, a prerequisite to a finding of supervisory status. *Oakwood Healthcare, Inc.*, 348 NLRB at 687. Accordingly, the Employer failed to meet its burden of establishing that Grant is a statutory supervisor, and the petition should not be dismissed on that basis.

In view of the above findings, I further find that a question concerning representation has been raised with respect to the petitioned-for unit, which I find to be an

[5] At the hearing the Employer contended that the Petitioner's inclusion of the acronym for the Employer's name "ULEES" in the Petitioner's name violates federal copyright laws. However, this issue has no bearing on the instant case and is not an issue before the Board. In addition, the Employer did not address this issue in its brief or cite any specific authority in support of its position.

[6] In the Employer's post-hearing brief, the Employer made no mention of the labor organization status issue, or of its claim at the hearing that the Petitioner's coordinator is a statutory supervisor.

appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining, and that Grant is one of the unit employees and is eligible to vote.[7]

With respect to the Petitioner's contention that Jose Quiñones and Madelen Mercado are confidential employees, the long-established and narrow test for determining whether an individual qualifies as a confidential employee who is to be excluded from a bargaining unit based on Board policy, is whether the employee "assist[s] and act[s] in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations." *NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric*, 454 U.S. 170, 189 (1981), affirming the "labor nexus" test set forth in *B.F. Goodrich Co.*, 115 NLRB 722, 724 (1966). See also, *Waste Management de Puerto Rico*, 339 NLRB 262, fn. 2 (2003); *Bakersfield Californian*, 316 NLRB 1211, 1212 (1995); *Air Line Pilots Association*, 97 NLRB 929, 931 (1951) (only employees of a labor organization who have legal access concerning their employer's own labor relations are confidential employees). Moreover, it is well settled that the burden of proving an employee's confidential status rests on the party asserting such status. *S.S. Joachim & Anne Residence*, 314 NLRB 1191, 1196 (1994); *Intermountain Rural Electric Association*, 277 NLRB 1, 4 (1985).

In the present case, the Petitioner failed to submit any probative evidence that either Mercado or Quiñones assist and/or act in a confidential capacity to any of the Employer's personnel who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations. The Petitioner's assertions that Mercado is a confidential employee because she has a key to open the Employer's facility, and that Jose Quiñones is a confidential employees because he is the brother of the Employer's Executive Director, in the absence of any other evidence that either of them meets the definition of a confidential employee, are insufficient to establish that either of them is a confidential employee.

[7] The Employer did not raise any issue with respect to the appropriateness of the unit.

With respect to the alleged ineligibility of Jose Quiñones to vote because his brother is the Employer's Executive Director, the statutory definition of an employee in Section 2(3) of the Act, which specifically excludes "any individual employed by his parent or spouse" is inapplicable, as is the Board's policy of excluding from bargaining units the close relatives of individuals who have substantial stock interests in closely held corporations, even in the absence of special job related benefits. *NLRB v. Action Automotive*, 469 U.S. 490 (1985); *Scandia*, 167 NLRB 623 (1967). Thus, the Employer is not a closely held corporation, and instead is a labor organization.

According to Board policy the eligibility of the relative of a manager of an employer that is not a closely held corporation depends on whether or not the relative enjoys "special status" or has job duties that reflect a special relationship. *R&D Trucking*, 327 NLRB 531, 533 (1999); *M.C. Decorating*, 306 NLRB 816, 817 (1992). The special status test is also applied to determine eligibility of relatives of non-owner managers, who are not subject to the expanded community of interest test. *Peirce –Phelps Inc.*, 341 NLRB 585, 586-587 (2004); *Allen Services Co.*, 314 NLRB 1060, 1062-1063 (1994); *Cumberland Farms*, 272 NLRB 336 (1984). Accordingly, the special status test must be considered in this case involving a relative of the Employer's Executive Director, inasmuch as the Executive Director is not an "owner" of the Employer.

Under this test, the Board does not exclude an employee simply because he or she is related to a member of management. *International Metal Products Co.*, 107 NLRB 65 (1953). There is no evidence herein that Jose Quiñones enjoys special privileges with respect to his working conditions, job duties or benefits. In addition, there is no evidence that the Quiñones brothers live in the same household, or that Jose Quiñones is in any way financially dependent on his brother Radamés. Accordingly, I find that Jose Quiñones should not be excluded from the unit because he is the brother of the Employer's Executive Director.

Finally, I will address the Petitioner's assertion that Madelen Mercado and Jose Quiñones are not union organizers. With respect to Jose Quiñones, the evidence shows that he is, in fact, a union organizer, as Employer President Meléndez testified in some detail, and as Petitioner coordinator Grant conceded, at least in part. Meléndez provided a number of examples of the organizer duties engaged in by Jose Quiñones, and they appear to be no different than the duties of the other organizers. The Petitioner did not refute this testimony. Although Jose Quiñones does not negotiate collective-bargaining agreements with health care facilities on behalf of the Employer, that function is only performed by two of the six organizers who the parties agree work in unit positions, Grant and Echeverría. Accordingly, I find that Jose Quiñones is employed in the petitioned-for unit and is eligible to vote.

The record is unclear with respect to Madelen Mercado. Although the Employer's President testified that Mercado is a union organizer, the record only shows that she has worked on one organizing campaign and there is no evidence as to when that occurred. In addition, Mercado only performs certain duties of an organizer, and the record does not reflect which duties she performs (other than collecting employee signatures during the aforementioned organizing campaign), whether she performs duties that other organizers do not perform, or how she spends her work days. Although, according to the Employer's President, Mercado is training to perform other organizer duties, and will begin to perform at some unspecified future time, there is no evidence about the nature of the training Mercado is receiving, or when she is expected to complete her training. In summary, I find that there is insufficient evidence to make a determination as to whether Mercado is a union organizer, and therefore I shall permit her to vote subject to challenge by the Board agent conducting the election.

Based upon the foregoing, and the record as a whole, I shall direct an election herein.

IV. Conclusions and Findings

A. The Hearing Officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are affirmed.

B. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.

C. The Petitioner claims to represent certain employees of the Employer.

D. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of certain employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c)(1) and Section 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.

E. The following employees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

> All full-time union organizers employed by the Employer at its facilities located in San Juan and Ponce, Puerto Rico; excluding all other employees, confidential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.[8]

V. Direction of Election

The National Labor Relations Board will conduct a secret ballot election among the employees in the unit found appropriate above. The employees will vote whether they wish to be represented for purposes of collective bargaining by La Union de la ULEES. The date, time, and place of the election will be specified in the Notice of Election that the Board's Regional Office will issue subsequent to this Decision.

A. Voting Eligibility

Eligible to vote are those in the unit who were employed during the payroll period ending immediately before the date of this Decision, including employees who did not work during that period because they were ill, on vacation, or temporarily laid off. Employees engaged in any economic strike, who have retained their status as strikers and who have

[8] Madelen Mercado shall be permitted to vote subject to challenge by the Board agent conducting the election.

not been permanently replaced are also eligible to vote. In addition, in an economic strike which commenced less than 12 months before the election date, employees engaged in such strike who have retained their status as strikers but who have been permanently replaced, as well as their replacements, are eligible to vote. Those in military service of the United States may vote if they appear in person at the polls. Ineligible to vote are (1) employees who have quit or have been discharged for cause since the designated payroll period; (2) employees engaged in a strike who have been discharged for cause since the commencement thereof and who have not been rehired or reinstated before the election date; and (3) employees engaged in an economic strike which commenced more than 12 months before the election date and who have been permanently replaced.

B. Employer to Submit List of Eligible Voters

To ensure that all eligible voters have the opportunity to be informed of the issues in the exercise of the statutory right to vote, all parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their addresses which may be used to communicate with them. *Excelsior Underwear, Inc.*, 156 NLRB 1236 (1966); *N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Company*, 394 U.S. 759 (1969).

Accordingly, it is hereby directed that within 7 days of the date of this Decision, the Employer must submit to the Regional Office an election eligibility list containing the full names and addresses of all eligible voters. *North Macon Health Care Facilities*, 315 NLRB 359 (1994). This list must be of sufficiently large type to be clearly legible. To speed both preliminary checking and the voting process, the names on the list should be alphabetized. Upon receipt of the list, I will make it available to all parties to the election.

To be timely filed, the list must be received in the National Labor Relations Board Subregion 24 Office, La Torre de Plaza, Suite 1002, 525 F.D. Roosevelt Avenue, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00918-1002, on or before June 20, 2014. No extension of time to file this list will be granted except in extraordinary circumstances, nor will the filing of a request

for review affect the requirement to file this list. Failure to comply with this requirement will be grounds for setting aside the election whenever proper objections are filed. Since the list will be made available to all parties to the election, please furnish three copies of the list.[9]

C. Notice of Posting Obligations

According to Section 103.20 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Employer must post the Notices of Election provided by the Board in areas conspicuous to potential voters for a minimum of three full working days prior to the date of the election. Failure to follow the posting requirement may result in additional litigation if proper objections to the election are filed. Section 103.20(c) requires an employer to notify the Board at least 5 full working days prior to 12:01 a.m. of the day of the election if it has not received copies of the Election Notice. *Club Demonstration Services*, 317 NLRB 349 (1995). Failure to do so estops employers from filing objections based on nonposting of the Election Notice.

VI. Right to Request Review

Under the provisions of Section 102.67 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, a request for review of this Decision may be filed with the National Labor Relations Board, addressed to the Executive Secretary, 1099 14th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20570-0001. This request must be received by **June 27, 2014.** The request may not be filed by

[9] The list may be submitted electronically through the Agency's website at www.nlrb.gov, or by facsimile transmission to (787) 766-5478, as well as by hard copy. To file the list electronically, go to the Agency's website at www.nlrb.gov, select **File Case Documents**, enter the NLRB Case Number, and follow the detailed instructions. Only one copy of the list should be submitted if it is filed electronically or by facsimile.

facsimile, but may be filed electronically.[10]

DATED the 13th day of June, 2014.

David Cohen, Acting Regional Director
National Labor Relations Board, Region12
201 E. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 530
Tampa, Florida 33602

[10] See www.nlrb.gov for instructions about electronic filing and the Board's Rules and Regulations with respect to filing requirements generally.