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8 WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP., a wholly
9 owned subsidiary of QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC.

10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
11 BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
12

13 In the Matter Of:
14 WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP., a wholly
15 owned subsidiary of QUAD/GRAPHICS,
16 INC.,
17 and
18 GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
19 CONFERENCE OF THE
20 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
21 TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 715-C,
22

Case Nos. 32-CA-062242
32-CA-063140

**WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP., A
WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF
QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC.,’S MOTION
TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF
BOARD ORDER PENDING JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ORDER**

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Employer World Color (USA) Corp.¹, a wholly owned subsidiary of
3 Quad/Graphics, Inc. (“World Color” or “the Company”) hereby moves the National Labor
4 Relations Board (“Board”) for an order temporarily staying the enforcement of the Board’s
5 Order in the above-mentioned case (“Order”). The interests of justice would be served by
6 granting a stay pending the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
7 of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) on World Color’s Petition for Review of the Board’s
8 Order, filed on February 24, 2014.² A stay is necessary and appropriate in this case
9 because World Color is likely to prevail on the merits of its petition for review, as the
10 Board incorrectly interpreted the Company’s policy to include restrictions on union
11 insignia that simply do not exist. The Board also improperly placed the burden on the
12 Company to establish special circumstances in the absence of a policy that prevented union
13 insignia, which is contrary to existing Board law. Furthermore, World Color will suffer
14 irreparable harm in the absence of a stay, as the Board’s Order provides no guidance to the
15 Company as to how to remedy what it believes to be an unlawful hat policy. Based on the
16 Order, it is entirely unclear what, precisely, World Color must do or how it must revise its
17 policy to comply with the Order and with the Act. Last, a temporary stay while the D.C.
18 Circuit reviews the Order would alleviate the significant harm to World Color without
19 substantially harming the other parties to this case and would benefit the public by
20 providing guidance to other employers in creating their policies.

21 Accordingly, the Board should stay enforcement of that portion of its Order
22 directing World Color to (1) rescind its policy pertaining to employees’ wearing of
23 baseball caps, (2) issue revised employment guidelines to the employees at its Fernley,
24 Nevada location, and (3) post the Board’s Order.

25 ¹ World Color (USA) Corp. is now doing business as QG Printing Corp., which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
26 Quad/Graphics, Inc. For purposes of consistency with the proceedings below, the Employer will refer to this entity as
“World Color.”

27 ² See Exhibit B to the Declaration of Ronald J. Holland in Support of this Motion to Stay Enforcement (“Holland
28 Decl.”).

1 **II. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

2 Quad/Graphics, Inc. (“Quad”) is a multi-national commercial printing corporation
3 that is based in Sussex, Wisconsin. On July 2, 2010, Quad acquired World Color (USA)
4 Corp., including its location in Fernley, Nevada. That facility prints retail advertisements
5 to be inserted in newspapers. (Rec: 40:12-15.)³

6 **A. The Quad Uniform And Hat Policy**

7 Quad maintains a Company-wide uniform policy which includes some mandatory
8 and some optional components. (See Joint Exhs. 2, 4-5.) Known as “Quad/Blues,” the
9 minimum required uniform consists of navy blue pants, shorts or skirt and a navy blue shirt
10 with the Quad logo and employee name. Optional clothing under the policy, which
11 includes vests, t-shirts and sweaters, may be purchased through Quad’s website and must
12 contain the Quad logo. (See Joint Exh. 2, 4, 5.) The Quad/Blues uniform serves as a
13 reminder that everyone employed by Quad is a production employee regardless of their
14 role and promotes inclusion at every level of the Company – from the Press Room floor in
15 Fernley, Nevada to Corporate Headquarters in Sussex, Wisconsin. The Company-wide
16 uniform policy described above is written, among other places, in the “Employee
17 Guidelines For U.S. Employees” (“Employee Guidelines”). (See Joint Exh. 2.)

18 In the proceedings below, the Government conceded that the uniform policy is
19 lawful, “not in dispute” and that it does “**not have a problem with an employer asking**
20 **employees to wear a uniform** that depicts a logo of the Company.” (Rec: 37:18-21:
21 103:25-104:1, 105:18-106:2, 133:21-22 (emphasis added).

22 Quad’s uniform policy applies to all classifications of employees throughout the
23 country, including World Color employees, but employees may have “additional or
24 different” uniform requirements depending on an employee’s job classification. (Joint
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26 ³ References to the transcript of the July 31, 2013 hearing before the ALJ on this matter are designated as “Rec: ___;
27 to Joint Exhibits as “Joint Exh. ___; to the General Counsel’s Exhibits as “GC Exh: ___; to the Company’s Exhibits
as “Resp. Exh: ___; to the ALJ’s Order and Report and Recommendations as “ORD:page:line number”; and to the
Board’s Order as “B. ORD at [page number].”

1 Exh. 2.) Due to the obvious dangers of bodily injury posed by the printing presses, in
2 addition to the Quad/Blues, Quad's production employees are also required to secure to
3 their heads "all hair hanging past the bottom of the collar." (See Joint Exhs. 2 and 5.)
4 Further, even if "hair does not hang past the collar but could potentially be caught in
5 equipment, it must be secured with a hairnet or by other means." (*Id.*)

6 Due to the increased frequency of employees wearing hats in the workplace, in mid-
7 2010, Quad decided to formalize a written Company-wide policy allowing hats to be worn
8 to work and applied it to all of its facilities throughout the country. (Rec: 203:1-10, 206:1-
9 4, 207:11-20.) Three departments were involved in formulating this new corporate policy:
10 Safety, Security, and Human Resources. (Rec: 204:10-205:25, 211:21-212:2.) Safety
11 wanted to ensure "that the hat was appropriate for the production floor, safe, as well as
12 making sure that it could secure hair to the head." (Rec: 206:5-11.) With the operation of
13 high-speed presses at the plant locations, the Safety Department had concerns, among
14 others, about hats falling into the equipment. (Rec: 206:12-17.) Security had concerns
15 about gang insignia and symbolism, specifically the colors of the hats and the direction of
16 the bill. (Rec: 206:18-207:6.) Human Resources "wanted to make sure the hat aligned
17 with the uniform policy from a presentation standpoint." (Rec: 207:7-14.)

18 The three departments ultimately decided that, as an optional part of the uniform
19 (like a vest or a sweater) and as an optional means of securing hair hanging past the bottom
20 of the collar, all employees who needed to secure their hair to their head for safety
21 purposes would be allowed to wear hats with Quad's logo if they chose to do so. The hat
22 policy, in effect during the relevant timeframe, states:

23 All hair hanging past the bottom of the collar must be secured to the head
24 while in the production areas. If hair does not hang past the collar but could
25 potentially get caught in our equipment, it must be secured to the head with a
26 hairnet or by other means. Baseball caps are prohibited except for
Quad/Graphics baseball caps with the bill facing forward. Ponytails are
strictly prohibited. Facial hair longer than the base of the neck must be
secured.

27 (Joint Exh. 2.) Consistent with Quad's uniform policy, just as employees cannot wear
28 optional vests with a non-Quad logo, employees cannot wear baseball caps displaying

1 logos for sports teams, clothing apparel, vacation destinations or other non-Quad logos.
2 (*Id.*) While the hat policy is consistent with and is a part of the uniform policy, the hat
3 policy is spelled out specifically in the Safety Section of the Employee Guidelines, which
4 appears a few pages after the uniform policy. (*See* Joint Exh. 2.) Nothing in the policy is
5 intended to restrict the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the NLRA.

6 On February 8, 2011, the uniform policy (which included the optional Quad hat for
7 certain employees) was announced to the World Color employees at the Fernley facility
8 and rolled out over the next few weeks. (Rec: 208:21-209:6; *See* Joint Exhs. 4 and 5.) A
9 memorandum sent to the employees explained the mandatory requirements of the uniform
10 (Quad shirt/blue pants or skirt) and the optional components which are available for
11 purchase (jackets and hats). Several employees testified at the June 2013 hearing that they
12 understood that the hat was an optional component of the Company's uniform policy.
13 (Rec: 64:13-20, 121:15-22, 129:17-21.) Importantly, the policy does *not* prohibit
14 employees from wearing union insignia or any clothing or accessories that demonstrate
15 union support. (*See* Joint Exhs. 4 and 5). For example, rather than wearing a Quad hat,
16 employees can use any safety-compliant device, of any color, with any symbol or picture,
17 to secure their hair to their heads in order to ensure their safety.⁴

18 **B. Procedural History of the Case**

19 The hearing was held before ALJ William Cates on June 4, 2013, in Reno, Nevada.
20 (Rec:1.) On July 31, 2013, the ALJ issued his Report and Recommendations. (ORD:
21 13:8.) The ALJ found that the hat policy was separate and distinct from the uniform
22 policy, discriminatory, and interfered with the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights.
23 (*Id.* at 11:27-33, 12:11-14, 12:25-28.)⁵ On or about August 28, 2013, the Company filed

24 ⁴ At the hearing in front of the ALJ in June 2013, the Government presented no admissible evidence that Company
25 policy prohibits employees from wearing union insignia on their hats or elsewhere. (*See generally* Record.) There
26 was no evidence of discrimination or that employees had been prohibited from wearing union insignia or even union
hats under the so-called overbroad policy. (*See also* B. ORD. at 1 n.3.)

27 ⁵ Importantly, the Complaint did not allege that the policy is discriminatory, a fact which the Board noted in its Order.
28 (B. ORD. at 1 n.3.) The evidence presented at the hearing confirmed that the Company does not apply its policy in a
discriminatory manner. (*See* Rec: 100:18-102:1.)

1 exceptions to the ALJ’s findings and to his recommended Order on the grounds that the
2 findings, conclusions, recommended order and notice requirements were not supported by
3 the record, substantial evidence or the law. (Holland Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A.) On February 12,
4 2014, the Board issued the instant Order, affirming the ALJ’s finding in part. The Board
5 held that the policy “that prohibits employees from wearing any baseball caps other than
6 company caps is overbroad and in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1).” The Board further found that
7 “the policy on its face prohibits employees from engaging in the protected activity of
8 wearing caps bearing union insignia” and stated that no special circumstances exist to
9 justify the prohibition. (B. ORD. at 1 n.3.)⁶

10 Because World Color believes that the Board’s Order was incorrect based on the
11 factual evidence as well as on the applicable legal authority, on February 24, 2014, World
12 Color filed a Petition for Review of the Board’s Order with the D.C. Circuit, which was
13 amended on February 25, 2014. (Holland Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. B.) World Color now seeks,
14 through this Motion, a stay of enactment of the Board’s Order pertaining to its hat policy
15 pending the D.C. Circuit’s review of the Order.

16 **III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOARD’S ORDER MUST BE STAYED**
17 **PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW.**

18 **A. Legal Standard**

19 A Petition for judicial review of an order of the Board does not automatically result
20 in a stay of that order. 28 U.S.C. § 160(g). However, stays are available in certain
21 situations. *Pratt Institute*, 339 NLRB 971, 971 (2003). A number of federal courts,
22 including the Supreme Court, have found that a four-factor test is appropriate when
23 determining whether to issue a stay in a given case. In *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770,
24 776-77 (1987), the Supreme Court stated, “the factors regulating the issuance of a stay are
25 generally . . . (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to

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27 ⁶ The Board also found that the ALJ erred in finding a violation of section 8(a)(1) based on statements allegedly made
28 to an employee. (B. ORD. at 1.) That finding is not the subject of World Color’s Petition for Review and World
Color does not seek a stay of that portion of the Board’s Order.

1 succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
2 (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the
3 proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” *See also Adams v. Walker*, 488 F.2d
4 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1973); *Assoc. Sec. Corp. v. SEC*, 283 F.2d 773, 774-75 (10th Cir.
5 1960); *Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n*, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
6 Cir. 1958); *Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc.*, 559 F.2d 841,
7 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.*, 197 U.S. App. Lexis
8 11846, *1-2 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971). Furthermore, “since the traditional stay factors
9 contemplate individualized judgments in each case, the formula cannot be reduced to a set
10 of rigid rules.” *Hilton*, 481 U.S. at 777. Rather, each case must be considered
11 individually, based on the circumstances of that case. *Id.*

12 Here, enforcement of the Board’s Order should be stayed pending the D.C. Circuit’s
13 resolution of World Color’s Petition for Review of the Order, as all of the elements set
14 forth above are met.

15 **B. World Color Is Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Its Petition for**
16 **Review.**

17 First, World Color is likely to prevail on the merits of its Petition for Review to the
18 D.C. Circuit, as the Board’s Order is based on clearly erroneous factual and legal
19 conclusions.⁷ The ALJ determined, and the Board affirmed, that the optional hat policy
20 “prohibits employees from engaging in the protected activity of wearing caps bearing
21 union insignia” and thus violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respectfully, World Color
22 asserts that this decision is incorrect because the Board unreasonably failed to apply
23 applicable Board precedent which allows employers to maintain lawful, non-
24 discriminatory uniform policies. Significantly, the Board improperly shifted the burden to
25 require that the Company establish “special circumstances” for its hat policy, even in the
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27 ⁷ Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 18 directs that this Motion to Stay Enforcement is properly filed with this
28 Board prior to any such filing in the D.C. Circuit.

1 absence of any evidence that its hat policy is discriminatory or that World Color prohibits
2 employees from displaying union support by wearing other types of union insignia at
3 work.

4 **1. The Policy Is Not Facially Invalid.**

5 The Board incorrectly found that the Company’s policy is facially invalid in
6 violation of the Act. Employers are permitted to enact uniform policies so long as those
7 policies are enforced consistently and are not used to target union insignia. *See NLRB v.*
8 *St. Francis Healthcare Center*, 212 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 1993); *Burger King Corp v. NLRB*,
9 725 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1984) (no violation of the Act where employer consistently
10 enforced a policy requiring the wearing of uniforms only with authorized name tags). By
11 extension, this means that an employer may lawfully require uniforms and prohibit the
12 wearing of hats other than those bearing the employer’s logo, so long as the prohibition
13 applies to all other types of hats.

14 In fact, the Board has specifically allowed employers to require employees to wear
15 uniforms with company-approved logos so long as the rules do not otherwise prohibit
16 employees from wearing union insignia. For example, in *Meijer, Inc.*, 318 NLRB 50
17 (1995), *aff’d*, 130 F.3d 1209 (6th Cir. 1997), a case directly on point here, the NLRB
18 upheld the ALJ’s decision that the employer’s hat policy was lawful, even though it
19 provided that employees could only wear hats issued or approved by the company. The
20 ALJ in that case found, and the NLRB affirmed, that “the hat policy became part of the
21 uniform and maintained Respondent’s desired uniformity” and wearing union hats “stands
22 on different footing” from the wearing of union pins on uniforms.⁸ *Id.* at 57. *See also*
23 *Noah’s New York Bagels*, 324 NLRB 266, 275 (1997) (finding that an employer lawfully
24 enforced policy requiring employees to wear a company t-shirt and lawfully insisted that
25 she remove a company shirt with an added phrase).

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27 ⁸ In *Meijer*, the ALJ engaged in the “special circumstances” analysis because the employer prohibited employees
28 from wearing union insignia of all kinds at work. That is not the case here. See Section III.B.3, *infra*.

1 The Board incorrectly concluded that World Color’s hat policy is facially invalid
2 because it “prohibits employees from engaging in the protected activity of wearing caps
3 bearing union insignia.” (B. ORD. at 1 n.3.) The Board reached this conclusion by relying
4 only on the text of the policy, which says “baseball caps are prohibited except for
5 Quad/Graphics baseball caps.” However, this interpretation is plainly incorrect. The
6 policy simply prevents employees from *replacing* the Company hat with any hat of their
7 own choosing, including a union hat. Nothing in the policy prevents an employee from
8 attaching a union pin, sticker, button or other removable logo to their Quad/Graphics hat.
9 The Government presented *no* evidence to the contrary at the hearing.

10 The Board’s interpretation of the hat policy includes restrictions which simply do
11 not exist. World Color is likely to succeed on its Petition for Review of the Order because
12 the Board issued an overbroad order redefining the law on company uniform policies and
13 improperly shifting the burden to employers to defend such policies by establishing
14 “special circumstances.” The Board’s overbroad order now allows the Board to replace
15 the discretion of management with its own and endorses a policy permitting employees to
16 wear what they want to work if the employer at issue cannot establish “special
17 circumstances” for its uniform policy. That is simply not the current law, except as written
18 in this Order, and it is unlikely to stand.

19 **2. The Hat Policy Is Not Overbroad.**

20 Moreover, contrary to the Board’s holding, the Government in this case failed to
21 present adequate evidence that the hat policy is overbroad in violation of the Act. In the
22 absence of a facially invalid rule, to find a work rule unlawfully overbroad, the
23 Government must show one of the following: (1) the rule has been applied to restrict the
24 exercise of Section 7 activity; (2) employees would reasonably construe the language to
25 prohibit Section 7 activity; or (3) the rule was promulgated in response to Section 7
26 activity. *Martin Luther Memorial Home, Inc.*, 343 NLRB 646, 647 (2004).

27 First, there is no evidence that the hat policy has been applied to restrict Section 7
28 activity. The Government presented no evidence that employees have been prohibited

1 from adorning the hat (or any other parts of their person or uniform) with union insignia.
2 In addition, the Government presented no evidence of actual interference, coercion, or
3 restraint in employees' exercise of their Section 7 rights. Indeed, there was no evidence
4 that *any* employee attempted—or even desired—to wear union logos or insignia in the
5 workplace and was denied that opportunity. Second, employees would not reasonably
6 interpret the hat policy as restricting Section 7 activity.⁹ As stated above, while the hat
7 policy requires any *hat* to have the Quad/Graphics logo on it, the policy does not prevent
8 employees from wearing union insignia, such as stickers, pins, bracelets, or socks, to name
9 a few.

10 Third, there was absolutely no evidence in the record that the hat policy was
11 enacted in response to employees' lawful Section 7 activity. Undisputed evidence
12 demonstrated that the hat policy was implemented for legitimate business reasons and
13 uniformly applies to all Quad employees nationally. The Government presented no
14 evidence, and neither the ALJ nor the Board issued a finding, that the policy was targeted
15 at union activity.

16 Finally, the Board's decision that the policy is overbroad is irreconcilable with the
17 *Meijer* decision, *supra*. In *Meijer*, like this case, the employees were required to restrain
18 their hair for safety reasons. However, the *Meijer* employees were more limited than the
19 employees at issue here, as in that case the employees were required to wear the company-
20 provided hats as hair restraints, whereas World Color permits employees to use any
21 number of different devices to restrain their hair—*including* a device that demonstrates
22 union support. *Compare* 130 F.3d 1209 *with* Joint Exhibit 2. For example, the World
23 Color policy would not prevent an employee from using a union ribbon or hairnet to
24 restrain her hair, whereas the policy at issue in *Meijer* did. *Id.* As such, the Company's

25 ⁹ Furthermore, the evidence in the record clearly establishes that the World Color employees understand that hats are
26 an optional uniform item whose sole purpose is to offer employees a variety of options of how to secure hair to the
27 head. (See Joint Exhs. 2-3, and 5.) It is worth noting that, while the Government called several employee witnesses to
28 testify at the June 2013 hearing, *none* testified that the hat policy prohibited employees engaging in protected Section
7 activity at work. (See *generally* Record.)

1 policy is significantly less broad than the policy that the Board found lawful in *Meijer*.
2 Under *Meijer*, contrary to the Board’s decision, World Color’s policy is not overbroad in
3 violation of the Act, since it is much less restrictive and permits employees to display more
4 union insignia than the policy in *Meijer*.

5 **3. The Company Was Not Required To Establish Special Circumstances In**
6 **This Case.**

7 World Color’s likelihood of success of the merits is further buttressed by the
8 Board’s misapplication of the special circumstances analysis. It is well settled that where
9 an employer prohibits employees from wearing union insignia while at work, it must
10 establish “special circumstances” that justify this prohibition. *Republic Aviation v. NLRB*,
11 324 US 793, 801-803 (1945). However, employers may establish uniform or dress code
12 requirements **without** a showing of special circumstances, so long as those requirements
13 do not ban the wearing of union insignia.¹⁰ *Sears Roebuck & Co.*, 300 NLRB 804, 807
14 (1990); *Coca-Cola Bottling Co.*, 311 NLRB 509, 515 (1993); *Meijer*, 318 NLRB at 56.

15 In *Meijer, supra*, the ALJ engaged in the special circumstances analysis only
16 because the employer prohibited employees from wearing union insignia of all kinds at
17 work. 318 NLRB at 56 (where an employee is prevented from wearing union insignia at
18 work, employer must establish special circumstances). World Color’s uniform policy, in
19 contrast, simply states that “employees are required to dress and groom professionally at
20 all times. While accessorizing the uniform in good taste and in accordance with safety
21 rules is acceptable, your name (first and last) and the Quad/Graphics logo must show at all
22 times.” (See Joint Exh. 2). The policy at issue does *not* prohibit employees from wearing
23 union insignia on their uniforms, and *expressly contemplates* the “accessorizing” of the
24 uniform. (*Id.*) Despite these facts, the Board improperly placed the burden on World
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27 ¹⁰ This standard was noted by the ALJ in his Recommendations. (ORD: 9:14-16) (“An employer may prohibit the
28 wearing of union insignia by its employees if, and only if, the employer can demonstrate substantial evidence of
special circumstances that would outweigh the employees’ rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.”).

1 Color to establish special circumstances in the absence of a policy that prevents union
2 insignia. (B. ORD at 1 n.3; ORD:11:13-15.)

3 The Board inappropriately read into the hat policy restrictions that exist neither on
4 the policy's face nor as it has been applied. For these reasons, World Color is likely to
5 succeed on the merits of its Petition for Review of the Order to the D.C. Circuit.

6 **C. World Color Will Suffer Irreparable Injury Unless A Stay Is Granted.**

7 A stay is necessary to avoid the irreparable injury to World Color that will result
8 should the stay be denied. First, the Board's Order provides virtually no guidance to the
9 Company (or to other employers) as to what sort of policy *is* lawful under the Act. The
10 Order merely states that World Color must rescind its hat policy and either advise its
11 employees that the policy has been withdrawn or "provide the language of a lawful
12 policy." (B. ORD. AT 2.) What that language should be, however, is not specified, and
13 neither the ALJ's nor the Board's decisions provide any hints. World Color has been
14 given no direction, for example, if the Board's Order means that: (1) employees have a
15 statutory right under the Act to wear any hat they choose whenever they are at work; (2)
16 World Color may prohibit all hats; (3) World Color may prohibit all hats except union
17 hats; or (4) that the policy is saved by simply revising it to state that nothing in the policy
18 shall be construed to prevent the exercise of employees' Section 7 rights under the NLRA.
19 These are all questions left unanswered by the Order.¹¹

20 Because of the lack of any real guidance in the Order, a stay is needed in this case
21 as World Color is unable to comply with its requirements and unable to determine exactly
22 what type of hat policy, if any, it is permitted to enact. In addition, until World Color
23 receives further direction following the D.C. Circuit's review of the case, it is at risk of
24 inadvertently violating the Order. The D.C. Circuit's review of the Order will assist the
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27 ¹¹ Indeed, when Counsel for World Color asked the Region 32 Compliance Officer if World Color could simply
28 prevent employees from wearing baseball hats entirely by rescinding the policy, the Compliance Officer said she did
not know if that was consistent with the Board's order. (Holland Decl. ¶ 4.)

1 Company in answering these questions, and the Board should stay enforcement of the
2 Order pending that review.

3 D. **No Substantial Harm Will Result To Other Parties As A Result Of The**
4 **Stay.**

5 On the other hand, the risk of substantial harm to the other parties in this case is
6 extremely small, if not nonexistent. First, there is no risk that the World Color employees
7 will be constrained in exercising their Section 7 rights, as the Government offered no
8 evidence at all at the hearing that employees attempted to wear union hats or other insignia
9 at work but were prohibited from doing so. To the contrary, the plain language of the
10 uniform policy expressly contemplates that employees will “accessorize” their uniforms.
11 Second, there is also no risk that the Union will be harmed as a result of a temporary stay
12 of the Board’s order. Although the Union was a party to this case, the Union was
13 decertified by the employees four years ago,¹² and is not involved in the day-to-day
14 operations at the facility. Moreover, there was no evidence of Union organizing offered at
15 the hearing that would suggest that staying enforcement of the Order would harm the
16 Union’s right to try to organize the World Color employees. Finally, the stay will not
17 negatively impact the employees’ Section 7 right to communicate pro-union (or anti-
18 union) support, because there is no evidence that World Color prohibits such expression at
19 work. In fact, if the Board’s Order is not stayed, unions will unfairly benefit from the
20 erroneous legal conclusions in this case, including the interpretation that employees can
21 disregard lawful uniform policies completely in favor of wearing union apparel or anything
22 they choose at work.

23 Third, the Board will benefit from the D.C. Circuit’s decision on World Color’s
24 Petition for Review, in that that Court will, at the very least, shed some light on the
25 complicated—and sometimes apparently conflicting—rules that govern an employer’s
26 right to enact uniform policies for its employees. *See Pratt Institute*, 339 NLRB at 971

27 _____
12 (Rec: 23:17-19, 50:3-7.)

1 (stay appropriate pending outcome of another case, even if state of law remained the same,
2 in part because case could “give guidance to the parties.”). There is also a very real
3 possibility that “copycat” Board cases may be filed in response to the Order and that the
4 Board will have to analyze similar employers’ policies. Guidance from the federal
5 judiciary on this issue will only assist the Board in engaging in these analyses.

6 Last, the World Color employees will benefit from a temporary stay because such a
7 stay will promote stability in the terms and conditions of their employment, rather than
8 having those terms changed in response to the Board’s Order and then perhaps changed
9 again once the D.C. Circuit rules on the Petition for Review. Thus, because no substantial
10 harm will result to the other parties as a result of the stay, but irreparable harm will result
11 to the Company in the absence of the stay, the Board should grant this Motion and
12 temporarily stay enforcement of its Order.

13 **D. A Stay Is In The Public’s Interest.**

14 Finally, the Board should stay the enforcement of its Order because a stay is in the
15 public’s interest. As stated above, the Board’s Order does not inform employers how to
16 enact similar policies that are lawful under the Act, but merely directs World Color to
17 create such a policy. Moreover, the Board has improperly shifted the burden to employers
18 to prove special circumstances to justify such policies. This new rule of law must be
19 reviewed by the Court of Appeal. A stay of the Order would allow employers to have the
20 benefit of the D.C. Circuit’s guidance while drafting their policies.

21 **IV. CONCLUSION**

22 A stay is appropriate in this case because it is likely that World Color will prevail
23 on the merits of its Petition for Review to the D.C. Circuit. Additionally, the stay is
24 necessary because World Color will be irreparably harmed without the stay, while the
25 other involved parties and the public will suffer no harm as a result of a temporary stay.
26 For these reasons, World Color respectfully requests that the Board stay enforcement of
27 that portion of its Order directing the Company to rescind its policy pertaining to
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1 employees' wearing of baseball caps, issue revised employment guidelines to the
2 employees at its Fernley, Nevada location, and post the Board's Order.

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Dated: March 11, 2014

SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP

By  _____
RONALD J. HOLLAND
ELLEN M. BRONCHETTI

Attorneys for WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP., a
wholly owned subsidiary of QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
REGION 32**

**WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP.,
a wholly-owned subsidiary of
QUAD GRAPHICS, INC.**

and

**GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 715-C**

**Case(s) 32-CA-062242
32-CA-063140**

Date: March 11, 2014

**AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF WORLD COLOR (USA) CORP., A WHOLLY OWNED
SUBSIDIARY OF QUAD/GRAPHICS, INC.,’S MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT
OF BOARD ORDER PENDING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDER**

I, the undersigned employee of Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP say that on the date indicated above I served the above-entitled document(s) upon the persons at the addresses and in the manner indicated below. Persons listed below under "E-Service" have voluntarily consented to receive service electronically, and such service has been effected on the same date indicated above.

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