

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD  
REGION 32**

**MI PUEBLO FOODS**

**and**

**Case 32-CA-25677**

**INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF  
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 853, A/W  
CHANGE TO WIN**

**ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL'S BRIEF IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S  
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**

**I. Preliminary Statement**

On February 9, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Laws, herein called the Judge, issued her Decision in this matter finding, inter alia, that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally: (1) eliminating backhauls and pickups; (2) changing drivers' hours and schedules; and (3) consolidating drivers routes and laying off drivers. Thereafter, Respondent filed timely exceptions and a supporting brief to the Judge's Decision. Counsel for the Acting General Counsel submits that the record as a whole and the relevant case law fully support the Judge's findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order regarding the above issues and urges the Board to adopt the Judge's decision regarding those matters.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Counsel for the Acting General Counsel has previously filed cross-exceptions to the Judge's other findings and conclusions.

## **II. Argument**

### **Respondent's Exceptions Should Be Overruled In Their Entirety**

#### **A. The Judge Correctly Found And Concluded That Respondent's Elimination Of Backhauls and Pickups Violated The Act**

##### **1. The Judge's Findings and Conclusions**

The Judge found that historically Respondent's drivers backhauled Morton Salt and C&H Sugar products to Respondent's distribution center (DC) after dropping off other products from the DC at nearby stores. The Judge also found that these backhauls resulted in extreme delays at Morton Salt and C&H sugar while drivers had to sit idle waiting for their trucks to be filled. (ALJD 5:27-34, 42-45)<sup>2</sup> In January 2011, because of these delays, Respondent decided to eliminate these two backhauls and have a third-party contractor deliver Morton Salt and C&H Sugar products to the DC. (ALJD 5:34-36, 42-45) The Judge also found that for some period of time prior to January 2011, Respondent's drivers drove empty trucks to Dinuba, California to pick up produce from Durango packaging and to bring it back to the DC, a round trip that took the drivers up to 12 hours. (ALJD 6:7-10) Beginning in January 2011, Respondent contracted with a third-party contractor to pick up the produce in Dinuba and to deliver it to the DC because the pickup was taking too much of its drivers' time. (ALJD 6:10-11) Similarly, the Judge found for some period of time prior to April 2011, Respondent's drivers backhauled Mazola Oil products to the DC from ACH Food Company's warehouse in Tracy, California but in April 2011 it discontinued these backhauls and subcontracted the work out to an unidentified third-party contractor. (ALJD 6:17-20)

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<sup>2</sup> References to the Judge's Decision are listed as "ALJD \_:\_," "Tr. refers to cites in the official transcript; "GC" refers to the Acting General Counsel's exhibits; "REB" refers to Respondent's brief in support of its exceptions.

After a long and thorough discussion of the Supreme Court's decisions in *Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB*, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) and *First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB*, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Judge concluded that *Fibreboard* was the appropriate case to apply to the allegation that Respondent eliminated the backhauls and pickups without bargaining with the Union. In applying *Fibreboard* to the facts of the backhauls and pickups, the Judge concluded that Respondent was under a legal obligation to afford the Union an opportunity to negotiate and bargain concerning its unilateral decision to discontinue the backhauls and pick ups and to hire subcontractors to perform the work. (ALJD 11:6-9) She found that Respondent's decision to use subcontractors for the backhauls and pickups affected only a small portion of the work of the unit drivers and did not represent a change in the "scope or direction of the enterprise" and was not "akin to the decision whether to be in business at all." (ALJD 11:11-18)

The Judge rejected the Respondent's contention that this case is distinguishable from *Fibreboard* because labor costs did not factor into Respondent's decision to contract out the backhauls and pickups. In that regard, she pointed out that in *Torrington Industries*, 307 NLRB 809, 810 (1992), the Board held that when the record shows that *Fibreboard* subcontracting is involved, as is the case herein, "there is no need to apply any further tests in order to determine whether the decision is subject to the statutory duty to bargain." She noted that in *Torrington*, the Board specifically stated that it did not see the usefulness of applying the "labor cost concession" test set forth in *Dubuque Packing Co.*, 303 NLRB 386 (1991), in "cases involving decisions that, unlike the plant relocation decision at issue in *Dubuque*, are not likely to be entwined with changes in the operation

of the enterprise that go well beyond merely the replacement of one set of employees doing work by another set of employees.” *Torrington*, supra, at footnote 14. The Judge noted that in *Torrington*, the Board declined to independently analyze whether labor costs drove the company’s decision therein. (ALJD 11:37-43; 12:1-4)

Nevertheless, the Judge found that labor costs did factor significantly into Respondent’s decision to eliminate the backhauls and pickups. (ALJD 12:15-17) In this regard, she found that one of Respondent’s key concerns was the amount of time drivers were wasting waiting for their trucks to be loaded at Morton Salt and C&H Sugar and the long hours necessary for the pickups from Durango Foods. The judge found that it was only common sense that the drivers’ long wait times translated into labor cost. (ALJD 12:27-30)

## **2. Respondent’s Exceptions**

The essence of Respondent’s exceptions to the Judge’s finding that its elimination of backhauls and pickups violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act is its contention that the Judge erred by analyzing this issue under the Supreme Court’s decision in *Fibreboard*, supra, instead of the Supreme Court’s decision in *First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB*, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). (REB 35) In support of this contention, Respondent argues that Respondent’s decision must be analyzed under *First National Maintenance* because Respondent’s decision to subcontract out the backhauls and pickups were not based on labor costs but based solely on non-employment concerns. (REB 31) Applying *First National Maintenance* to the facts regarding the elimination of backhauls and pickups, Respondent concludes that this issue fell within in the third category of decisions outlined in *First National Maintenance*, i.e., a decision that had a

direct impact on employment and had as its “focus only the economic profitability of the business,” was not based on labor costs, and was thus not subject to bargaining. (REB 30-31) Respondent also contends that the Board should not apply its holding in *Torrington* to the facts of the instant case because “its mechanical holding is completely inconsistent with *First National’s* teachings.” (REB 31)

## **2. Conclusion**

In *Fibreboard Corp.*, supra, the Supreme Court held that an employer’s “replacement of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar condition of employment” is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id. at 215. In an influential concurring opinion, Justice Stewart identified another type of management decision, “concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise” that “lie[s] at the core of entrepreneurial control” and are not subject to collective bargaining. Id. at 223. In *Torrington Industries*, supra, the Board held that decision to subcontract work of employees unaccompanied by any substantial commitment of capital or change in the scope of the business was not the type of decision that Justice Stewart had identified as being at the “core of entrepreneurial control” and was, therefore, subject to bargaining. Id. 809-811.

Here, Respondent subcontracted out the backhaul/pickup work that had previously been performed by bargaining unit employees. Furthermore, the decision to subcontract this work did not involve any substantial commitment of capital or change in the scope or direction of Respondent’s business. Rather, it represented merely the substitution of one group of workers for another to do the same work in similar

circumstances. Accordingly, the Judge correctly applied *Fibreboard* to Respondent's decision to eliminate backhauls and pickups.

Furthermore, Respondent's attempt to apply the third category of decision outlined in the Supreme Court's holding in *First National Maintenance* to the facts of this case fails because application of the third category requires a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise. In *First National Maintenance*, the Supreme Court held that an employer's decision to close down part of its business was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because it was a decision "akin to the decision whether to be in business at all." *Id.* at 677. The Court found that in that situation, the "harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making the decision...." *Id.* at 686. The Court also found the employer's decision was "a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise." *Id.* at 677.

In contrast to *First National Maintenance*, Respondent's elimination of the four backhaul/pickups did not amount to a "partial closing" or other "change in the scope and direction of the enterprise," which remained devoted to supplying Respondent's stores with grocery products. Before and after the decision to subcontract out the four backhaul/pickups, the DC received goods from vendors and then delivered them to its retail stores. The only change was that one group of workers were substituted for another, that is, outside contractors rather than bargaining unit employees now delivered Morton Salt, C&H Sugar, Durango Oranges and Mazola Oil to the DC. Given the essential continuity of the DC operations, Respondent's actions in marginally expanding

its subcontracting in order to reduce perceived labor inefficiencies does not rise to the level of a change in the scope and/or direction of the enterprise. Moreover, since this decision to eliminate the four backhauls/pickups was closely tied to a desire to reduce labor costs, i.e. the inefficient use of the drivers' time, it was a decision particularly suited to bargaining. *Fibreboard*, 405-406.

As to Respondent's contention that the Board should not follow its own holding in *Torrington*, it is sufficient to point out that the Board has consistently applied *Torrington* to subsequent subcontracting cases with facts similar to the instant case.<sup>3</sup>

**B. The Judge Correctly Found And Concluded That Respondent Violated the Act By Unilaterally Making Changes To Its Drivers' Schedules and Hours**

**1. The Judge's Findings and Conclusions**

The Judge found that Respondent's failure to give notice to or bargain with the Union regarding changes to driver work schedules violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The changes included the elimination of Sunday work and changes to hours of the night shift drivers. She found that the duty to bargain about hours of work comes from the Act itself, and "therefore requires little discussion." She also found that the term "hours" has been interpreted by the Board to include work schedules and whether to work on Sunday. She further found that hours of the day and particular days of week during which employee are required to work are subjects well within the realm of wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment about which employers must bargain.(ALJD 15:31-37;16:1-2) Finally, the Judge found that this aspect of the case need not be analyzed under *First National Maintenance* because the statutory language explicitly includes hours as a mandatory topic of bargaining. (ALJD 16:5-8)

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<sup>3</sup> See for example, *O.G.S. Technologies, Inc.*, 356 NLRB No. 92, 3-4 (2011); *Overnite Transportation Co.*, 330 NLRB 1275, 1276 (2000); and *Acme Die Casting*, 315 NLRB 202, fn. 1 (1994).

## **2. Respondent's Exceptions**

Respondent argues that the Judge erred by not analyzing this aspect of the case in terms of *First National Maintenance*. In that regard, Respondent argues that the Judge erred in her decision regarding schedules and hours because the decision to change employee schedules and hours falls within the third category of decisions outlined in *First National Maintenance*, i.e., the focus of these changes was on the “economic profitability” and efficiency of the DC operation and only incidentally on employment-related concerns, so that they were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. In support of this argument, Respondent asserts that the decisions were based on the desire to more efficiently use DC assets and provide improved service to its retail stores. However, Respondent cited no cases where the Board has applied *First National Maintenance* to changes in employees' hours and/or schedules.

## **3. Conclusion**

Even if Respondent's decision to change employees' hours and schedules were part of plan to try to make the DC operate more efficiently, Respondent still had to bargain with the Union before implementing the decision. As the Judge correctly pointed out, hours of work is one of the terms and conditions of employment specifically mentioned by the Act to be susceptible to bargaining and employees' schedules are closely related to hours. Both the courts and the Board have found these conditions to be mandatory subjects of bargaining. A decision to reduce or change the hours and/or particular days of the work week of employees represented by a labor organization is a mandatory subject of bargaining. *Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.*, 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965); *Carpenters Local 1031*, 321 NLRB 30, 31 (1996); *Timken Roller Bearing Co.*, 70

NLRB 500, 504 (1946). Here, it is undisputed that on or shortly after January 24, Respondent eliminated all Sunday deliveries by the drivers and changed the hours of the night shift drivers. The record establishes that Respondent did not give the Union prior notice or a meaningful opportunity to bargain over these changes. Thus, The Judge correctly concluded that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by eliminating Sunday work for the drivers and changing the hours of work of the night shift drivers without first giving the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain over these decisions and the effects of these decisions.

**C. The Judge Correctly Found And Concluded That Respondent Violated the Act By Unilaterally Making Changes To Its Drivers' Routes And By Laying Off Drivers.**

**1. The Judge's Findings and Conclusions**

The Judge found that Respondent decided to deliver products to its retail stores more efficiently by sending out full trucks and consolidating delivery routes. She also found that the changes implemented by Respondent led to the elimination of 46 routes and ultimately to the layoff of six drivers and to an increased work load for the remaining drivers. (ALJD 16:12-14) She concluded that Respondent violated the Act by making these changes without first giving the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain over these decisions. (ALJD 18:42-43)

The Judge analyzed the consolidation and layoff issues in terms of the Board's decision in *Holmes & Narver*, 309 NLRB 146 (1992) and the Supreme Court's decision in *First National Maintenance*, supra. In regard to *Holmes & Narver*, the Judge quoted the Board's description of the issue in that case:

We are dealing with layoffs that are made in connection with a decision to continue doing the same work with essentially the same technology, but to

do it with fewer employees by virtue of giving some of the employees more work assignments.

In *Holmes & Narver*, the Board found that the decision to consolidate work and lay off employees fell within the second category of decisions as defined by the Supreme Court in *First National Maintenance*, i.e., decisions more akin to “management decisions, such as the order of succession of layoffs and recall, production quotas, and work rules” that are almost exclusively “an aspect of the relationship” between employer and employee. *Supra* at 676-677. As a result, the Board found that the employer had violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain over these decisions. The Judge found that the facts of the instant case were similar to those of *Holmes & Narver* and also fit within the second category of decisions as delineated by *First National Maintenance*. As a result, the Judge concluded that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by consolidating routes and laying off employees without first bargaining with the Union about these decisions. (ALJD 18:42-43) While noting that the Board in *Holmes & Narver* held that there was no need to engage in a multi-step analysis, including the consideration of labor costs, the Judge concluded nevertheless that Respondent’s assertions about efficiencies ultimately “boil down to labor costs.” (ALJD 18:10-17; 19-20) In that regard, she noted that Respondent admittedly realized a 33% reduction in labor as a result of its consolidation of routes. (ALJD 18:24-26)

## **2. Respondent’s Exceptions**

Respondent contends that the Judge erred by failing to correctly apply *First National Maintenance* to the route consolidation and layoff issue by concluding that these decisions fell into the second rather than the third of the three categories of decisions set forth therein. (REB 39) In support of this contention, Respondent asserts that the

overwhelming evidence at hearing demonstrated that the “focus of those changes was on the ‘economic profitability’ and efficiency of the DC operation and only incidentally on employment related concerns” and therefore, fell within the third category of decision defined in *First National*. (REB 39) In essence, Respondent argues that any operational changes made in the name of efficiency are exempt from bargaining because they fall within the third category of decisions outlined in *First National Maintenance*. Respondent also argues that these decisions are not amendable to bargaining because they were only “incidentally” related to labor costs. (REB 39).

### **3. Conclusion**

Contrary to Respondent’s contentions, the Judge did not err by concluding that Respondent violated the Act by failing to bargain over the decisions to consolidate drivers’ routes and to layoff six drivers. As the Judge correctly pointed out, these decisions fell into the second category of decisions outlined in *First National Maintenance* and were amenable to collective bargaining because they did not involve core entrepreneurial decisions or a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise. Thus, both before and after the changes, the drivers delivered products from the DC to Respondent’s retail stores, and the only thing that changed was as a result of the consolidation of routes, ten drivers were now doing the work that had previously been done by sixteen.

Respondent’s theory that any decision that has as its goal greater operational efficiency is not amenable to bargaining is not supported by the case law. In that regard, in *Holmes & Narver*, supra, the Board found a violation when the employer failed to bargain over its decision “to combine jobs, to reassign work and to layoff employees.” Id.

at 146-147. In *Holmes & Narver*, as in the instant case, the changes did not affect the scope and nature of enterprise and after the changes the employees continued to do “the same work with essentially the same technology,” but they did it “with fewer employees by virtue of giving some of the employees more work assignments.” *Id.* At 147. Here as in *Holmes & Narver*, the facts place the decisions squarely in the second category of decisions as defined by *First National Maintenance* and as a result the decisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Finally, as the Judge held, although the route changes and layoffs might have been economically motivated, Respondent still had to notify the Union of the planned actions and bargain over them. *Gulf States Mfrs.*, 261 NLRB 852 (1982); *Farina Corp.*, 310 NLRB 318, 320 (1993).

#### **D. The Judge Did Not Err By Finding That Respondent Violated The Act By Failing To Bargain Over The Effects Of Its Decision To Layoff Employees**

##### **1. The Judge’s Findings and Conclusions**

The Judge found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to engage in effects bargaining over its operational decisions that are at the center of this case. In that regard, the Judge found that Respondent offered to “discuss the [layoffs] but was not willing to engage in good faith collective bargaining.” (ALJD 19:46-49) The Judge found that on Friday January 21, 2011, Respondent’s attorney Patrick Jordan called Union attorney Teague Paterson to inform him “off the record” that Respondent would be implementing operational changes at the DC including layoffs on the following Monday January 24. (ALJD 6:28-31) On January 25, after the layoffs had already been implemented, Jordan followed up the conversation with a letter recounting his view of the conversation. In this letter, Jordan stated essentially that while Respondent had no duty to

bargain over its decisions, it was willing to “discuss” a process for implementing the layoffs if the Union wanted based on something other than seniority.” (ALJD 6:28-34; GC 4) Paterson responded to Jordan’s letter challenging Jordan’s recollection of the conversation. Following the layoffs, a series of communications between Jordan and the Union ensued. The Judge found that it was unclear whether the parties ever met to “discuss” the layoffs but she found that it was clear that they did not meet prior to Respondent’s implementation of the layoffs and “they never engaged in collective bargaining.” (ALJD 6:36-39). Consistent with these factual findings, the Judge concluded that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by not bargaining over the effects of all of the operational decisions at issue herein. (ALJD 22:4-11)<sup>4</sup>

## **2. Respondent’s Exceptions**

Respondent contends that it attempted to bargain over the effects of its decision to layoff employees and that attempt satisfied its bargaining obligation. Respondent’s contention is based on a conversation its attorney, Patrick Jordan, had with Union attorney Teague Paterson on Friday January 21, 2011 and a follow-up letter from Jordan to Paterson dated January 25. According to Respondent, in the January 21 conversation, Jordan informed Paterson of the planned layoffs and specifically offered to bargain over effects of layoffs. Moreover, Jordan followed up the conversation with a confirming letter on January 25 where he specifically offered to bargain over the effects of the layoffs, and the parties thereafter exchanged a series of letters in which Respondent confirmed its willingness to bargain over the effects of the layoffs. (REB 44-45)

## **3. Conclusion**

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<sup>4</sup> In its exceptions, Respondent incorrectly states that the only discussion of effects bargaining in the Judge’s decision involves her discussion of obligation for Respondent to bargain over the effects of its layoff decision but Respondent ignored the discussion in the Judge’s Conclusions of Law.

Contrary to Respondent's contentions, Respondent did not meet its obligation to bargain over the effects of the operational changes, including the layoffs, that it implemented on January 24, 2011 or shortly thereafter. Neither in Jordan's call to Paterson on Friday January 21 nor in his follow-up letter of January 25 did Jordan meet Respondent's obligation to bargain over the effects of the January 24 layoffs and other operational changes.

First of all, when Jordan called Paterson on Friday January 21 at about 5:00 p.m., he demanded that the call be "off the record" and that Paterson agree to not tell his client of the content of the conversation and Paterson agreed. (Tr. 42-43) Obviously, such an "off the record" conversation could not amount to a valid offer to bargain and did not therefore meet Respondent's obligation to bargain over the effects of the operational decisions announced during the call.

In addition, Jordan's January 25 letter did not meet Respondent's obligation to bargain over the effects of its operational decisions. Since the January 21 conversation was "off the record," this letter constituted the first official notice to the Union of the changes that Respondent implemented on January 24. Since this letter was not sent until after the layoffs and most other operational decisions had been implemented, it did not allow for meaningful effects bargaining. Thus, the Board has found that a union's ability to bargain even over the effects of a decision is severely diminished if not totally foreclosed when a union is not informed of the changes until after they are implemented. *Roll & Hold Warehouse & Distribution corp.*, 325 NLRB 41, 42 fn. 4 (1997). Furthermore, the so-called offer to bargain contained in the January 25 letter is too circumscribed to amount to a meaningful offer to bargain over the effects. Thus, the

letter merely offers to “discuss” a selection process for layoffs different than the seniority-based system chosen by Respondent and does not offer to bargain over the effects of the layoff decision or any of the other operational decisions. (GC 4)

### **E. The Board’s Recess Appointment Are Valid**

In its exceptions, Respondent contends that new members recently appointed to the Board were not validly appointed and, therefore, the Agency lacks a quorum to Act in this case. In similar circumstances, the Board has found that it is not appropriate for it to decide whether Presidential appointments are valid. Instead, the Board applies the well-settled “presumption of regularly support[ing] the official acts of public officers in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary.” *Center for Social Change*, 358 NLRB No. 24 (March 29, 2012); *Lutheran Home at Moorestown*, 334 NLRB 340, 341 (2001), citing *U.S. v. Chemical Foundation*, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926).

### **III. Conclusion**

For the reasons set forth above, Counsel for the Acting General Counsel submits that Respondent’s exceptions should be rejected in their entirety, and that the judge’s findings and conclusions with regard to allegations which she found meritorious be affirmed.

**DATED AT** Oakland, California this 30<sup>th</sup> day of April 2012.

Respectfully submitted,



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**AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE OF ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL'S BRIEF  
IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE DECISION  
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**

I, the undersigned employee of the National Labor Relations Board, state under oath that on **April 30, 2012**, I served the above-entitled document(s) *electronically*, upon the following persons, addressed to them at the following addresses:

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
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