

Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 26-CA-4098

June 7, 1972

DECISION AND ORDER

BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO

On February 11, 1972, Trial Examiner George Turitz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and General Counsel filed a cross-exception and a supporting brief.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.

The Board has considered the record¹ and the Trial Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recommended Order to the extent consistent herewith.²

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, Amory, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order, as modified below:

Substitute the following for paragraph 1(e):

"(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights under Section 7 of the Act."

¹ Respondent has requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied because the record, the exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.

² The only exception filed by the General Counsel is to the breadth of the 8(a)(1) Order recommended by the Trial Examiner.

TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

GEORGE TURITZ, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO ("the Union"), on August 17, 1971, and served that day on Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated¹ ("Respondent" and, at times, "the Company"), the General

Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board ("the Board"), through the Regional Director for Region 26, on October 5, 1971, issued a complaint and notice of hearing which was duly served on Respondent. Respondent filed its answer in which it denied all allegations of unfair labor practices. A hearing on the complaint was held before me at Aberdeen, Mississippi, on December 7, 1971, at which the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Union were represented by their respective counsel. The General Counsel and Respondent have submitted briefs.

Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses I make the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT

Respondent, Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, is a corporation having a plant and place of business at Amory, Mississippi, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of men's wearing apparel. In the course and conduct of its operations, Respondent annually sells and ships from the Amory plant directly to its customers located outside the State of Mississippi products valued at in excess of \$50,000, and annually purchases and causes to be transported and delivered to its said plant, directly from States of the United States other than Mississippi, goods valued at in excess of \$50,000. I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended ("the Act").

II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED

Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

The principal issues litigated at the hearing were whether Respondent engaged in illegal interrogation, whether it instituted new rules because the employees were organizing, and whether the discharge of Gloria Jean Martin and her sister, Willie Mirl Cavnar, was discriminatory.

A. Interrogation

In July 1971,² the Union started an organizational campaign among Respondent's employees. Meetings were held on the evenings of July 14, 21, and 28. The day of the first meeting, Cavnar, on her own initiative, went to the office of Johnnie Page, Respondent's vice president and superintendent, and told him that there was to be a union meeting that night. Page asked her where and she told him the place. He asked her what union was involved and she told him that she did not know but would tell him when she found out. He said, "Okay." The next morning, Cavnar returned to Page's office and told him it was Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. He asked how many were at

¹ Respondent is also known as Wilson Manufacturing Co., Inc.

² Unless otherwise stated, all dates mentioned in this

Decision are in 1971

the meeting, and she told him eight. He asked, "Can you tell me who they are?" She replied, "I could, but I'm not going to." Page remarked that "the only thing the union could do for us was to cost me more money," to which Cavnar replied, "That's your problem." At some point during the conversation, Page commented that he did not think Cavnar's sister would be like her but would be for the Company.³

Page readily availed himself of Cavnar's proffered services to keep Respondent informed of where the employees were meeting, what union some among them were considering, and the extent of employee interest. He did more than just listen, his response, "Okay," plainly encouraged Cavnar to keep him abreast of what the employees were doing with respect to self-organization, and he asked her specific questions. Employees cannot feel free to engage in union activities if their employer is keeping watch over those activities, whether through paid informers or by questioning volunteers who receive his encouragement. See *Tucson Ramada Caterers, Inc.*, 154 NLRB 571, 573. Page's inquiry as to the identity of the employees who attended the first meeting was especially menacing. As stated by the Board in *Cannon Electric Company*, 151 NLRB 1465, at page 1468:

An employer cannot discriminate against union adherents without first determining who they are. . . .

[T]here is a "danger" inherent in such conduct: a tendency toward interference with the exercise by employees of their organizational rights.

The fact that Cavnar was in Page's office as a result of her own initiative did not insulate her from the threat inherent in his questions. Indeed, her refusal to disclose the names of the employees at the meeting represented her effort to protect them against that threat. I find that Page's interrogation of Cavnar was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

B. *The Allegedly Discriminatory Discharge*

1. Respondent's knowledge of union activities

As already described, Respondent learned on July 15 that eight employees had attended a union meeting the previous evening. On July 29, the day after the third union meeting, Cavnar summoned Baines, the plant manager, to the cutting table, where six of the seven employees on the union committee were standing, and, naming the seven, told him that they were "making company knowledge" that they were working for the Union, were going to union meetings and signing union cards, and that if there was anything they could do, they would "get it in." Among the seven employees named by Cavnar were herself and Martin.

2. Respondent's practices as to absence from work

Martin testified that since she had started her employment with Respondent in 1959, absenteeism had always

been high. Baines, the plant manager, testified that it had not been excessive until about 1 to 2 months prior to August 6. He admitted having been concerned on various days before that, and that in 1969 and 1970, over the plant's public address system, as well as on one occasion between 30 and 90 days prior to August 6, he had urged the employees to reduce absenteeism. Employees in any event were never penalized for, or even given warnings about, their absence from work. One employee, Brown, who had worked for Respondent "off and on about 12 years," missed most Friday afternoons; and Cavnar, who had been employed since 1966, missed 2 days in most weeks, including some occasions when she stayed out to go fishing. Respondent expressed no objection to individual employees who stayed away from work, irrespective of the reason. Employees frequently did inform management of the reasons for their absences. However, this was not a requirement, and often it was not done; when it was done, it was not done with promptness. On one occasion, Martin asked Baines if he wanted her to tell him why she had missed work and he declined to hear her, saying that he knew she had a good reason.

On August 6 Baines, the plant manager, announced new rules to the employees over the public address system, to become effective August 9. That same day he caused two copies of the following to be posted in the plant:

1) CLOCKING OF TIME CARDS AT LUNCH AND 4 O'CLOCK BEGINS WHEN THE BELL RINGS. PLEASE REMAIN AT YOUR MACHINE—DO NOT GO TO THE CLOCK BEFORE CHECKING OUT TIME.

2) DO NOT CLOCK ANY TIME CARD OTHER THAN YOUR OWN.

3) YOU MUST HAVE A TIME CARD IN ORDER TO BE PAID. IT IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO GET YOUR CARD AND SEE THAT IT IS CLOCKED IN AND OUT. ANYONE WHO ISN'T INTERESTED ENOUGH TO ASSUME THIS RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE PAID ACCORDING TO THE HOURS CLOCKED ON THE TIME CARD.

4) WE ARE ON A FIVE-DAY WORK WEEK AND EXPECT EACH EMPLOYEE TO BE PRESENT. YOU MUST HAVE A GOOD EXCUSE TO BE ABSENT FROM WORK.

5) DO NOT VISIT ON LINES. VISITING CAUSES LOSS OF PRODUCTION AND LOW QUALITY PRODUCT.

6) THESE ARE COMPANY POLICIES. IF YOU AS THE EMPLOYEE CAN NOT COMPLY, YOUR EMPLOYMENT MUST BE TERMINATED

WILSON MFG. COMPANY
JACK F. BAINES

3. The discharge of Martin and Cavnar

On Saturday, August 7, Martin broke her hand. On Monday, Cavnar, who was Martin's sister, drove Martin to see a doctor. Neither reported for work or communicated with Respondent that day and they were terminated at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Frank Page, Respondent's president, testified that they were discharged for failure to

listen," and "thank you." He also stated that Cavnar said she was opposed to the Union and would try to win over her sister, who was in favor.

³ The above findings are based on Cavnar's testimony, which I have credited over that of Johnnie Page, who testified that he merely listened on both occasions, asked no questions, and said no more than, "Well, I'll

call in or send word in violation of the rules promulgated on August 6. Baines, the plant manager, testified:

I assumed that they didn't call in on Monday all day up to 4:00 o'clock, that they had quit and at that time on Monday, August the 9th, they were terminated.⁴

On Tuesday, Cavnar helped Martin move to a new residence and neither reported for work that day either. At about 2 o'clock, Martin telephoned Baines and told him that she had broken her hand and that her sister had driven her to the doctor's. Baines told her that he wished she had sent him word, but that both had been terminated because they had failed to call in

On Wednesday morning, both went to the plant and spoke with Baines. To Martin, Baines said that he had to "stick to company rules"; and when she said she did not know that that was a rule, he replied that it had been for years. Martin insisted that she had never known of such a rule, and she asked him about employees whom she had called to try to get them to work, and whom she had even picked up in her car. He merely said, "Yeah." Cavnar asked if she could have her job back and he answered, "No. You didn't call in." She asked, referring to newly hired employees, "How do you know they will call in in the future?" He did not reply.⁵

Baines testified that when he had his secretary draw up the new rules for posting she "left off one thing on this, the fact that anybody not showing up for work and not either calling by phone or sending word would be terminated, regardless of their ability."⁶ He stated, however, that his oral announcement over the public address system definitely included the requirement that absent employees call in. Asked what his announcement had been in this respect, he testified in part as follows:

A. I told them that anyone failing—missing work and failing to either call or send word by someone else would be terminated starting August the 9th, if they didn't call in sometime previous to the following day or sometime the next day. That could be from 5:00 o'clock in the morning until—if they could wake up at night.

Q. In other words, during that first day they missed?

A. Right, that first day.

* * * * *

Q. (By Mr. Smith) What did you tell the employee in the speech which was the rule about the latest they had to report?

* * * * *

A. I told them that any time previous, which could mean before or the following day, anytime the following day.

Q. The following day to what?

A. If they didn't come in on Monday they had to call in sometime between 7:00 o'clock, or ever when they got up, any time during that day, from 7:00 o'clock and, if they wanted to call me at 11:00 o'clock.

Q. On Monday?

A. On Monday.

Baines also stated that the written rules had been drawn up prior to his announcement, but that he did not have them before him at the time. Page, Respondent's president, when asked "all the reasons" for Martin's discharge, testified:

Our plant manager, on August the 6th . . . made an announcement over the public address system and also put this announcement on the bulletin board, that due to excessive absenteeism, that effective the following Monday anybody who did not come in to work and didn't call in or send word would be automatically terminated, and those two people violated that rule. The secretary did not testify. Martin denied that the oral announcement included a requirement for calling in testifying:

He didn't say anything about calling in.

* * * * *

He said we was having too much missing and anyone not wanting to work but two or three days a week, to go and check their card right then, that he understood sickness.

At the time of the hearing, the rules were still posted in their original form.

4. Concluding findings as to the discharges

Respondent's claim that the announced rules included a call-in requirement is not supported by credible evidence. Page testified that the requirement was announced *and posted*, but he was flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence of the posting. Baines testified that he instructed his secretary to include the call-in requirement in the posted rule; but Respondent did not explain its failure to call the secretary to corroborate this self-serving testimony. I infer that she would have contradicted Baines. Moreover, he did not claim at his Wednesday conference with Martin and Cavnar that the call-in rule on which he based their discharge had been instituted in the August 6 announcement; what he claimed was that it had been in effect for years. Finally, Baines' own testimony contains serious internal inconsistencies. He had difficulty at the hearing in his attempt to formulate the alleged rule. Twice, while later correcting himself, he stated it initially in such form as to bring Martin's telephone call on Tuesday within the area of compliance. Accurate expression is often difficult to attain, and for this reason inaccuracy in testifying is not always significant. In this case, however, Baines' difficulty in formulating at the hearing what he claimed to have told the employees throws doubt on the claim that he had made

on the testimony of Cavnar and Martin, which I have credited Baines did not describe the conversation in detail and he did not specifically deny what Cavnar and Martin testified was said

⁶ Earlier in his testimony, Baines had forgotten that the posted rules did not include the call-in requirement and testified "I didn't read it. I told them exactly the same thing that was on the paper . . ."

⁴ Martin had promised her foreman to be in to work on Saturday, August 7, but did not report or call in. Whether because the new rules were not effective until August 9, or because Saturday work was purely voluntary, Respondent does not advert to this incident in justifying Martin's discharge

⁵ My findings as to the conversation on Wednesday morning are based

any such formulation on August 6. Moreover, when he at last satisfied himself at the hearing with a formulation of the rule, it was that an employee would not be delinquent under it if he called in at any time the first day of absence, even if he awakened Baines as late as 11:00 at night. But Baines' own testimony establishes that he had terminated Martin and Cavnar at 4:00 on Monday, their first day of absence. I do not credit Respondent's witnesses that a call-in rule was announced on August 6. I found Martin's testimony as to what Baines said on August 6 convincing and find that he said nothing about calling in.

As the posted rules did not include a call-in requirement, and as it was not included in the oral announcement, I find that Respondent did not have a call-in rule.

In reaching this conclusion, I have considered Baines' testimony that on various dates between August 11 and December 6 Respondent discharged five employees, whom he named, for failing to call in when absent. No showing was made that those employees made any attempt, or even had any desire, to come back to work; so far as Baines' testimony is concerned they might have quit. As I do not consider Baines a reliable witness, I do not accept his testimony that those employees were terminated pursuant to the August 6 rules. I note, also, that the enforcement of a rule from August 11 would in any event not establish that the rule had been in effect prior to that date.

Cavnar and Martin were known by Respondent to be active supporters of the Union. Cavnar, as spokesman for the employee committee on July 29, was especially outstanding. The conduct for which they were discharged had theretofore been freely tolerated by Respondent and was consistent with Respondent's established policy of tolerating absenteeism without prompt notification to management. Respondent made no claim that their reasons for their absence were unacceptable under rule 4 as posted but justified the discharges solely on the basis of a nonexistent call-in rule. Plainly that was a pretext. In view of these facts, I find that Respondent discharged Cavnar and Martin because of their union activities and in order to discourage membership in the Union. I further find that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.

C. *The Allegedly Discriminatory Rules*⁷

At least rules 1 and 4 introduced to Respondent's plant new conditions of employment having material impact on the employees. While these two rules are sensible and represent industry practices which are fairly common, they are by no means universal. Employers frequently maintain a loose policy with respect to punchout time. There are various reasons for this, such as that it is a convenient and flexible substitute for a specified washup time. As to absenteeism, in some labor markets a liberal policy is often essential in plants employing persons also engaged in farming or women with children. Without such a liberal policy many individuals would be unwilling, or simply unable, to take employment, and some employers find it

advantageous to adjust their operations to this condition. It is necessary to examine Respondent's motive in promulgating the new rules.

While Respondent knew since early July that organizational activity was going on, it was on July 29, only 8 days before promulgation of the new rules, that it learned that the campaign had progressed to the point where seven employees were ready to step forward and identify themselves to Respondent as the plant organizing committee. The introduction of new, less liberal conditions of employment following so closely upon that announcement would appear to the employees as a warning by Respondent of its ability to punish them if they insisted on their right to use their collective strength in dealing with Respondent. Unless explained, therefore, these circumstances would warrant the inference that Respondent's motive was to chill the employees' interest in unionization by flexing its own economic muscle.

Respondent made no attempt to explain its tightening up as to punchout time. Even if I were justified in assuming that a loose policy in this respect would necessarily result ultimately in abuse of the privilege by employees, there is nothing in the record to warrant the assumption that matters had reached that point around August 6.

Respondent did attempt to show that circumstances warranted a change of policy as to absenteeism. Baines testified that absenteeism, while always something of a problem, had become "excessive" during the 1 or 2 months preceding August 6 and that during that period he had begun a practice of maintaining a roll of individuals who could be called to fill in on short notice when the need arose.⁸ He also stated that starting 3 months before he had, on occasion, sent employees out to round up qualified individuals to fill in for absentees on particular jobs. However, he gave no specific evidence that the problem had become aggravated in the 2 or 3 months before August 6. As the evidence Baines gave as to the increases in absenteeism was only general, and as I have found him not to be a reliable witness, I find that Respondent has not established that absenteeism had become aggravated in the period around August 6.

Since the credited evidence discloses no business reasons calling for a change in Respondent's policy as to absenteeism or punchout time, and as the change followed hard upon the announcement of the formation and makeup of the employee organizing committee, I find that Respondent introduced the new rules because the employees showed interest in unionization and in order to discourage membership in the Union. I further find that Respondent thereby coerced and restrained the employees in their exercise of Section 7 rights. This conclusion is in no way affected by the fact that Martin told Baines that the rules were good and that he should stick to them. The test as to the coerciveness of an employer's action is not whether Respondent succeeds in making a particular employee or employees feel coerced, but whether it has a tendency to coerce employees. See *Murray Ohio Manufac-*

⁷ The rules and Respondent's prior policy as to absenteeism are described in sec B of this Decision

⁸ Baines pointed out that Respondent's assembly line method of production could make an employee's absence costly, since one with

especially high dexterity on a particular operation might have to be replaced by one with less experience and speed, with the result that the entire line was delayed. However, there was no change in the method of production during the period in question

turing Company, 155 NLRB 239, 240. Nor is it of moment that the changes made were not far-reaching. What is significant is that Respondent's tightening up of its personnel policies at that particular time was calculated to demonstrate to the employees, and thus warn them, that if they insisted on unionizing Respondent had the means, and had the will, to make them regret it. Cf. *Morgan Precision Parts v. N.L.R.B.*, 444 F.2d 1210, 1212 (C.A. 5) enfg. 183 NLRB No. 119. I find that by introducing the new rules Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE

I find that the activities of Respondent set forth in section III, occurring in connection with its operations described in section I, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.

V. THE REMEDY

In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, I find that it is necessary that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and to take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act.

It is recommended that Respondent reinstate Gloria Jean Martin and Willie Mirl Cavnar to their respective former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and that they be made whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against them. The amount of backpay shall be a sum of money equal to what they would have earned from August 11, 1971, to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement, less their respective net earnings during said period, computed in accordance with the formula stated in *F. W. Woolworth Company*, 90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum, to be computed in the manner described in *Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.*, 138 NLRB 716. It is recommended also that Respondent preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents all payroll and other records to facilitate the computation of backpay.⁹

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record of this case, I make the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Respondent, Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent is, and at all times material has been, an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act.
3. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,

⁹ In the particular circumstances of this case, I do not recommend that Respondent be required to abrogate any of the rules promulgated on August 6

¹⁰ In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,

AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

4. By discriminatorily discharging Gloria Jean Martin and Willie Mirl Cavnar, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.

5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act

6. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.

Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:¹⁰

ORDER

Respondent, Wilson Manufacturing Company, Incorporated, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against them because of membership in, or activities on behalf of, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.

(b) Interrogating any employee with respect to his own or any other employee's activities, membership, or interest in any labor organization in a manner, or under circumstances, constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

(c) Instituting, or discriminatorily or more stringently enforcing, work rules in retaliation for employees having joined or assisted the Union or any other labor organization or in order to discourage membership in or support of such labor organization.

(d) Discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against them because of membership in, or activities on behalf of, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.

(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights under Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

(a) Offer Gloria Jean Martin and Willie Mirl Cavnar immediate and full reinstatement to their respective former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges.

(b) Make Gloria Jean Martin and Willie Mirl Cavnar whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner described in section V of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."

(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, work records, production records, time-

conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, automatically become the findings, conclusions, decision, and Order of the Board, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

cards, and all other data necessary to analyze and compute the backpay required by this Order.

(d) Notify Gloria Jean Martin and Willie Mirl Cavnar, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.

(e) Post at its office and plant in Amory, Mississippi, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix."¹² Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, shall, after being signed by a representative of Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(f) Notify said Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.¹²

¹¹ In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board"

¹² In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith"

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

WE WILL reinstate Gloria Jean Martin and Willie

Mirl Cavnar to their former jobs and pay them backpay which they lost, as provided in the Board Order.

WE WILL NOT discharge employees or discriminate against them in any other manner because they join or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.

WE WILL NOT put into effect new work rules, or enforce old rules more stringently, because employees show interest in unionization or in order to discourage them from joining or assisting any labor organization.

WE WILL NOT question you about your union sympathies or activities, or those of other employees, under circumstances or in a way that would restrain or coerce you.

WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your right to self-organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of your own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.

WILSON MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INCORPORATED
(Employer)

Dated _____ By _____
(Representative) (Title)

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main Street Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-534-3161.